On 20th December 2024, six people were killed and 299 injured when a car was driven into crowds at a Christmas market in Magdeburg, the capital of the east German state of Saxony-Anhalt. The modus operandi and target were reminiscent of the 2016 Islamist extremist terrorist attack in Berlin, but the alleged attacker’s beliefs would turn out to be quite different.
A few days before German chancellor Olaf Scholz had lost a confidence vote, triggering a snap federal election. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) quickly linked the attack to its narrative that migration is making Germany less safe. At a rally in Magdeburg on 23rd December, AfD leader Alice Weidel described it as “an act of an Islamist full of hatred for what constitutes human cohesion... for us Germans, for us Christians” and called for more deportations of migrants. On election day (23rd February), when Germans voted, the AfD won 20.8 per cent, becoming the second-strongest party and doubling its 2021 results.
However, reporting after the attack soon indicated a problem for the far right’s narrative. The alleged attacker, Taleb al-Abdulmohsen, was not an Islamist extremist, but an ex-Muslim from Saudi Arabia. Significant public debate emerged over his ideology, with many describing him as not fitting into a clear ideological box, whether as a “far-right” or “Islamist” extremist. Such cases of “complicated” ideology have become more common: since 2020, annual German stats breaking down politically motivated criminality show a significant increase in cases in which no clear ideology could be identified.
The lack of a label can have consequences. Reporting since the attack has revealed there were 105 instances in which local authorities, police and intelligence services were alerted about the alleged Magdeburg attacker, but his case was deprioritised. It has been suggested that his supposed lack of a clear ideology was part of the reason for this. In the UK, the investigation into the Southport attacker Axel Rudakubana, who killed three young girls at a Taylor Swift dance class in July 2024, showed that despite risk assessments from authorities, Rudakubana’s case had likewise not been escalated over the years as he did not show clear signs of ideological radicalisation.
Our research team at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), an international counter-extremism organisation, has examined al-Abdulmohsen’s online profile over the past eight years and found that he did in fact have a clear set of views—security services just didn’t spot them. Al-Abdulmohsen consistently expressed views inspired by the counter-jihad movement, a loose network of bloggers, thinktanks and organisations promoting anti-Muslim and often far-right ideas. He considered Islam to be a dangerous, violent and totalitarian ideology, not a religion. He described Muslims and Arabs as intellectually primitive, promoted conspiracy theories about the “Islamisation” of Europe and justified discrimination against Muslims. These posts are not outliers but rather part of a consistent pattern spanning more than eight years.
Despite the AfD’s attempt to use the Magdeburg attack as further evidence to support its anti-migration policies, the alleged attacker had supported the far-right party since 2016. In his view at that time, “I and the AfD were fighting the same enemy in order to protect Germany.” In December 2017, he even shared a post by Alice Weidel in which she blamed Islam for security threats to Christmas markets.
He also supported international far-right figures promoting counter-jihad ideology, including Dutch politician Geert Wilders. In April 2019, he retweeted a post in which Wilders justified revoking Muslims’ freedom of religion. In 2020, he shared multiple tweets by Wilders that said “Stop Islam” or “Stop Muhammadanism”. In August 2024, he shared a post calling Wilders a “hero”.
As early as December 2016, al-Abdulmohsen also expressed support for the British far-right and anti-Muslim activist Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, the founder and former leader of the English Defence League who goes by the name Tommy Robinson. In May 2024, he retweeted Robinson stating that “using the word Islamism let’s [sic] Islam off the hook. The problem is Islam.” In October 2024, he shared a tweet by Robinson promoting his new book, which he claimed provided “all the evidence of the replacement of Europeans by the oligarchy”.
Given the remarkably consistent beliefs in the alleged attacker’s online activity over nearly nine years, why were authorities in Germany seemingly unable to link him to the far right? Confusion about his ideology appears to stem partly from his identity as a Saudi citizen who left Islam. While this is an unusual background for a violent extremist attacker, our analysis strongly suggests he was deeply immersed in an ideological online ecosystem promoting far-right and anti-Muslim views. His ideology is neither new, mixed nor confusing.
Some may wonder why the alleged attacker would target a traditional Christmas market in an AfD stronghold with no substantial Muslim community if he had such ideological views. But indiscriminate attacks by far-right perpetrators on German festivals are not unprecedented. In 1980, a far-right extremist attacked the Oktoberfest, killing 13. And in recent years, the alleged attacker increasingly directed his anger towards Germany, accusing the German state of supporting Islamist extremism while persecuting ex-Muslim asylum seekers. The alleged attacker expressed his violent fantasies more and more overtly, threatening politicians and German society at large.
While mixed and inconsistent ideologies deserve greater attention from policymakers, security agencies and researchers, the mislabelling of poorly understood but internally consistent ideologies as mixed or incoherent—simply because they do not fit the “usual” mould—is a significant risk to security.
Clear ideological currents—notably proliferating far-right and anti-Muslim ideologies— continue to pose serious security threats, even if they manifest in unexpected ways. The horrific attack in Magdeburg highlights the danger of such extremist views, and the importance of more definitive ideological categorisations in limiting the risk of violence.
