Germany has been reborn three times since 1945. The first was in 1949, with the formation of the Federal Republic. The second was reunification in 1990, when West Germany absorbed the communist East. The 2025 federal election, which took place on Sunday, is arguably the third.
This was the election in which the old assurances of German politics were cast aside as the country enters a far less certain era, with Donald Trump casting Europe out of the American security umbrella.
Start with the obvious. Until now, in every West German and then German federal election since 1949, no party other than the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or the Social Democrats (SPD) had ever placed first or second. The Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s historic result is an epochal moment. For the first time, a far-right party has come second in a federal election, in the face of near-universal hostility from across the political spectrum and the media.
The AfD’s success comes despite, or perhaps because of, increased radicalism. Other far-right parties moderate as they go mainstream, at least in terms of the image they try to project—think of Marine Le Pen repudiating her Holocaust-denying father. But the AfD only became more extreme as it gained in popularity.
This election campaign, the party embraced “remigration”, a term popularised by white nationalists to refer to mass deportations of non-white Europeans. At the party’s congress in January, delegates chanted “Alice für Deutschland” in support of party leader Alice Weidel, a pun on the Nazi-era slogan “Alles für Deutschland”.
An electoral map of the former East Germany is a sea of AfD blue, with only specks of colour marking out some big cities. In some areas, the party registered scores of nearly 50 per cent of the vote, which would have been unimaginable even four years ago. The party appears to have made huge inroads with non-voters, which drove a surge in turnout, the highest since reunification.
But even the maps appearing to show phantom Cold War borders are misleading. The AfD has more voters in the west than east. The AfD core base is working-class easterners but the party has nationwide appeal. It succeeded particularly in appealing to young men, who voted for the party in far greater numbers than women.
Much will now depend on how the AfD behaves during its probable spell as the main opposition. It will spend the next four years arguing that it should run the country. That will be taken seriously, an entirely different proposition to the 2025 election campaign, when it was clear throughout that the AfD would not enter government. Will the party professionalise, as co-leader Tino Chrupalla called for on Monday morning? Or will it remain a radical protest outfit?
Beyond the far-right surge, the other parties’ results demonstrate widespread acceptance that the assumptions which have underpinned the German economy and security since the Second World War are no more.
Few countries were as reliant on the US-led “rules-based order” as Germany. Its security depended upon Nato membership. Its export-led economic model was based on buying cheap raw materials, turning them into expensive finished goods and selling them around the world. Both were already under pressure but have been under systematic assault by Trump since he returned to office.
The mainstream parties understand that the old pillars are gone. In a televised debate shortly after polls closed, CDU leader Friedrich Merz, the leading candidate to be the next chancellor, bluntly said: “My absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA.”
“I wouldn’t have thought I’d have to say something like that… But after Donald Trump’s statements, it is clear that the Americans, at least this American government, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe,” he added. It is a radical departure for a man who previously headed the pro-American lobby group Atlantic Bridge.
The sentiment that the alliance with the US is over is widely shared across three of the largest parties–Merz’s CDU, the SDP and the Greens. At the same debate, Robert Habeck, the Green leader, said the Americans had “abandoned” Ukraine to “the worst imperialism,” calling for rapid funding of defence capabilities.
The urgency of action may catalyse coalition negotiations between the CDU and SPD. Both parties, conscious of the stakes of the security situation and AfD threat, will want to act rapidly and decisively. Talks will be much easier because only two parties will be needed for a majority in parliament. Negotiations can take months, and Merz has called for them to be concluded by April.
What is not clear is whether Germany is up to the task of filling the security vacuum left by the US withdrawal. “Independence” will require spending hundreds of billions of euros. To do that, constitutional rules preventing deficit spending will need to be reformed, but the AfD and Left party—both opposed to higher military spending for different reasons—hold enough seats to block such a change.
An additional question is whether Europe itself is ready for a new era of German leadership. Nato was created “to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” the alliance’s first secretary general is said to have quipped. Now the Americans are on their way out and there is no alternative to the Germans replacing them.
But Nato membership always conveniently served as an excuse for Germany to avoid taking a leading role in European security. Berlin will have to overcome entrenched suspicion at its often-tepid response to the war in Ukraine, as well as doubts over how committed it is to European defence–particularly if it looks as if the AfD could play a role in government after the next election.
So for the third time since 1945, Germany faces existential questions about its role and purpose. The future of Europe depends on it getting the answer right.
