Most of the commentators who sought to draw political conclusions from the outcome of the Eurovision song contest focused on the winners. It was no surprise that Ukraine was hugely popular with ordinary viewers. It was extremely surprising that the United Kingdom, famous for its succession of “nul points,” came second. But it was the losers who perhaps had more cause to reflect.
Germany came last and France next to last. This could of course simply be because their representatives had been given poor songs (though the German one was actually rather good) or didn’t perform them well. But insofar as the contest reveals something of the wider European public mood (and many of course would argue that it doesn’t) there could be other reasons.
France and Germany have traditionally seen themselves as having the right to play the leading role in the European Union. For them, the Franco-German axis (or motor as the Germans prefer to call it) is necessary to give impetus to the EU’s development and to set its agenda. There is no basis for this claim in the EU’s treaties: indeed they specifically grant to the Commission the exclusive right of initiative for proposing EU legislation. But France and Germany believe that their status as founding members and as the EU’s two largest economies means that they have a particular responsibility to co-ordinate and set out their views.
For many years, they made a habit of submitting a joint paper before European Council meetings, with the expectation that it would form the basis of the subsequent discussion. It usually did, because the Commission tended to endorse whatever position France and Germany had adopted. This wasn’t just out of deference. Given France’s and Germany’s differing instincts on many issues (free trade versus protectionism, for example) whatever they could agree on would probably represent the middle ground of the EU overall.
The Franco/German relationship was and remains an exclusive one. Other member states, including the UK before it left, were consulted bilaterally and their views were considered. But it was always made clear that there would be no sharing of leadership. There was a brief British/German flirtation during the years when Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder were in power. But at no other point during the UK’s 46 years of membership were we other than a second-rank EU power.
When the EU contained no more than a dozen or so members, France and Germany were able to maintain their role without serious challenge. But once it began to enlarge significantly in the 1990s, tensions began to appear. In 2003, a number of central and eastern European countries showed sympathy for President Bush’s position on Iraq and a disinclination to follow the critical position of France and Germany. President Chirac’s reaction was to tell them that “ils ont manqué une bonne occasion de se taire” (they had missed a good opportunity to keep quiet).
A similar challenge to French and German authority is being seen now. A group of 12 member states has reacted quickly to the report of the Conference on the Future of Europe (a European Parliament-inspired attempt to consult public opinion about how the EU should develop) by declaring that they see no need for any treaty change. They did so without waiting first to see what the German position would be—as would probably have been the case when Angela Merkel was in office.
More seriously, there has been undisguised criticism from many of the newer member states about what they see as Germany’s hesitancy in supporting Ukraine. The Latvian defence minister has accused Germany of having an immoral and hypocritical relationship with Russia, unprecedentedly harsh language from one of the EU’s smaller member states. Germans are not used to this sort of attack from their friends and allies.
France too has been experiencing substantial pushback on some of its recent initiatives. Its advocacy of strategic autonomy for the EU was already greeted with scepticism in many member states. The war in Ukraine has probably killed it off. There is no enthusiasm in the EU for anything which looks as if it is designed to weaken the role of Nato or the United States’ commitment to Europe’s defence: Finland and Sweden’s decisions to seek Nato membership are a clear proof of this. France’s position on Ukrainian accession to the EU has also been challenged: immediately after the French Europe minister claimed that it would take 15 to 20 years, the Polish president demanded that it should happen rapidly.
France and Germany remain the EU’s biggest economies and their views will always carry huge weight. But they are no longer the dominant partnership they once were, and they will need to work hard to regain the respect and deference they previously enjoyed. Maybe the Eurovision voters sensed this.
