The most notable thing about Donald Trump’s initial steps this week is what he did not do. He did not launch a tariff policy: he talked about tariffs in general. He didn’t make any pre-emptive moves against Canada and Greenland. He did not launch an actual immigrant deportation plan, rather, he took steps to curb new immigration and immigrant citizenship. And he didn’t give Vladimir Putin an initial boost by cancelling aid and support for Ukraine, but rather sent an envoy to talk to both sides.
So we don’t yet know whether Trump, in practice, is going to be revolutionary or evolutionary in his approach to America’s allies and neighbours.
Similarly, Trump’s pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu to agree a ceasefire with Hamas could be temporary, until the release of the remaining Israeli hostages. Or it could be indefinite if Trump brokers a longer-term peace agreement which preserves the Palestinian territories, involving in particular the Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman, whom Trump has always been keen to court as a close personal commercial ally.
The policy ambiguity partly reflects genuine uncertainty and division among Trump’s allies—including his key appointees—in their revolutionary fervour. It also reflects the ambiguity of Trump’s character, alongside his restless quest for a deal in order to boast of a personal victory. He doesn’t generally do absolutist policies that result in a massive cost to the US, as would be the case if, for example, Netanyahu or Putin were allowed to entirely destroy their neighbours.
There are obviously big deals to be done with Europe, Putin, Xi Jinping, MBS and the whole list of international interlocutors beating a path to Trump’s door. But not if he takes massive unilateral steps which preclude negotiations and destroy existing alliances.
On tariffs and territorial disputes, America’s interlocutors are all anxiously, privately gaming options for potential deals. Might Trump be less attracted to tariffs and Putin if Britain and Europe are prepared to spend a lot more on defence? Ditto tariffs on China, if Xi clearly eschews a takeover of Taiwan and does deals on Chinese tech giants like TikTok? The array of potential options and deals is huge until Trump actually implements a firm policy.
Equally uncertain at the outset is how far Trump will have to negotiate with Congress if he attempts revolutionary moves. The Democrats and his Republican critics have all but vanished from sight since Trump’s unexpectedly clear victory in November. But the Republican majorities are small in both the House and the Senate, and he will doubtless be forced into a flurry of deal-making as firm proposals come forward, provoking bitter opponents.
Furthermore, one thing that Trump can’t do a deal on is a third term. So he doesn’t have long before his interlocutors start looking beyond him.
