Welcome to this week’s Weekly Constitutional, where a judgment or other formal document is used as a basis of a discussion about law and policy. This week’s document is the 1985 treaty which gave Greenland independence from the then European Communities.
Once upon a time there was a proud island nation in the north Atlantic. Many on that island did not want to be ruled from Brussels and the European Communities. They instead wanted to take back control, and so they did.
A referendum was held, where just over 52 per cent voted for departure. This was followed by hard negotiations with European Commission officials and a deal was finally struck, weighted in the departing country’s favour. And since departure that island has benefited and prospered, and there has never been any serious demand for rejoining.
That country is Greenland. The referendum was in 1982, and the departure treaty took effect in 1985. Greenland had been part of what were then the European Communities as it was part of the kingdom of Denmark. Greenland was—and is—largely autonomous. It is concerned with its lucrative fisheries—and so it ensured that any EC fishing in its waters had to be done under expensive licences.
One may think that this sterling resilience and successful departure from the clutches of the grand project that is now the European Union would be celebrated by those opposed to that powerful trading bloc. One may even think that Greenland should be a poster-nation for those who want to weaken the EU and encourage further departures.
But no. It appears that Greenland may be out of the fish-pan and into the fire of aggressive American imperialism. Having shrugged off the control of one continental power it is now the target of another. According to Reuters, when President Donald Trump was asked directly this month about the prospect of annexation, he said: “I think that will happen.”
The plucky Greenlanders do not want to be part of the US. Their recent general election showed heavy backing of parties opposed to being annexed or otherwise being acquired by the US. A planned visit by the vice president JD Vance to the island has had to be scaled back, seemingly because of local opposition. Greenland does not want to be part of the US any more than it wants to rejoin what is now the EU—indeed, the latter may now be more popular.
Perhaps Trump’s interest in Greenland will wane once it becomes plain there is no deal to be done and no internal American appetite for what would be hard, Arctic military operations against a hostile population: a Vietnam or Afghanistan in the snow and ice. Perhaps some wily diplomat will just show Trump a world map without the Mercator projection, or even a globe, and he will realise Greenland is not as big as he thinks it is.
But even if nothing comes of this bullying, severe damage has been done. Greenland is—via Denmark—part of another organisation, Nato. Its geographic and strategic importance to its Nato allies is immense. Denmark itself, at the mouth of the Baltic Sea, is also an important member of Nato.
For the US to be threatening its own Nato allies is significant. It means that other Nato members would be prudent to build a new international security arrangement. This is not how allies should behave. The same can be said about the various threats to Canada—and to the EU.
In this way, there has already been a virtual battle of Greenland, which Trump and his administration have lost decisively. Without any military action, the US has lost the confidence of its Nato allies, who will adjust their policies accordingly.
A far better policy would have been for the US to engage with the semi-independent Greenlanders for sustainable long-term trading and other arrangements. There are rich natural resources other than fish, and mutually beneficial agreements were there to be made. And it would be a matter for Greenlanders what would be agreed.
There may also be a wider lesson for other European nations not in the European Union, such as the recently departed United Kingdom, as well as Iceland and Norway. It may well be that their (perceived) interests do not align with the EU to the extent that membership is a realistic possibility. But being completely outside can be even more economically precarious. Closer relationships between EU and other European countries would seem to be prudent.
Trump and his supporters may clap and cheer Brexit and its proponents like Nigel Farage. But being defiant in having (or in having taken back) control means nothing to aggressive expansionist nations who want to take advantage.
If America can threaten Greenland and Denmark—and Canada and Panama and Mexico—there is no inherent reason why it cannot also threaten us. Plucky independence ultimately means nothing to bullies who want to take things from you.
