During the First Cold War (1945-1990), the two sides operated within a framework of both clarity and uncertainty. They each knew, or thought they knew, the important interests of the other. They understood that certain actions would be likely to provoke a response. They did not know exactly what that response might be (Nato was deliberately opaque about the exact circumstances in which it might resort to using tactical nuclear weapons). But they assumed that it would be rational and thus, to an extent, predictable. The term “escalation dominance”—the ability to control the level of retaliation—entered the strategic lexicon.
Risks were sometimes taken: for example, the Berlin airlift in 1948 and the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. But the greatest danger was a miscalculation based on faulty information (such as the Soviet misperception in 1983 that the Nato exercise Able Archer was a preparation for a surprise attack) rather than irresponsible decisionmaking.
Whether this will apply to the Second Cold War, which is starting now, is less clear. This is not because Vladimir Putin has become irrational. All his actions in Ukraine have been based on clear goals—the reduction of Ukraine to the status of a vassal state and the annexation of more of its territory—and well-founded assessments of how the rest of the world would respond. In 2008, Putin was able to detach South Ossetia from Georgia. Then, in 2014, he annexed Crimea and engineered the secession of part of the Donbas without significant damage to Russia’s interests. It was a reasonable presumption that he could achieve the same in 2022 in the rest of Ukraine.
Had his invasion gone according to plan, he might have. In the early days, appetite among Nato countries for sanctions was limited. The alliance’s leaders seemed more concerned with spelling out what they would not do rather than what they would. A quick occupation of all of eastern and southern Ukraine, the installation of a puppet president in Kyiv and a swift end to hostilities would probably not have generated much more than verbal condemnation. Putin’s key miscalculation was not about Nato’s reaction: it was about Ukrainian resistance. Had the Ukrainians not fought in the way that they are doing, he would probably have got away with it.
Both Russia and Nato are now in unfamiliar territory, with judgments to make whose consequences they cannot foresee. Russia is facing unprecedented economic sanctions, including the loss of virtually all its energy markets in Europe within five years. That comes alongside the likelihood of increased defence expenditure by many European countries, notably Germany, and the possible accession to Nato of Finland and Sweden. Russia’s war crimes in Bucha have led to calls for further measures. In deciding whether to continue his war, Putin will need to assess what new sanctions might be in prospect—as well as what additional military support Nato countries will be prepared to provide Ukraine.
There is a similar dilemma for Nato. So long as Ukraine chooses to resist (and this is a decision which Ukraine must be allowed to make on its own), Nato should continue to give it the means to do so. The quality of this support is already ratcheting up. The UK is supplying anti-aircraft missiles; Germany, armoured personnel carriers; and the United States, longer range artillery. But decisions may soon be needed on tanks, combat aircraft and anti-ship missiles. The taboo on direct involvement in the war may also have to be re-visited. Should technicians be deployed to help the Ukrainians use certain specialist weapon systems? Should Nato countries’ own offensive cyber warfare capabilities be brought into play? Should direct action be taken to lift the blockade of Odesa?
It makes sense to consider the possible Russian reaction before taking further steps. But Nato cannot let itself become paralysed by fear of what the Russians might do in response: not least because of the precedent which this would set for the defence of Nato’s own territory. In this new Cold War, risks cannot be avoided. We will just have to calculate them as best we can.
