The launch of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine will come to be seen as a turning point in Putin’s war, one with long-term benefits for European security. Even if the Ukrainian conflict settles into a stalemate and an armed truce, getting the free provinces of Ukraine into Nato and the EU will make a return to war much less likely.
In March 2022, a few weeks after the launch of the Russian invasion, I wrote a blog for Prospect called “How wars end”. I predicted that there would be no outright victory or a peace treaty, and that the most likely outcome would be an internationally supervised armistice. I am even more convinced of that now. Both sides have found that defending forces are very hard to dislodge in this war of attrition (it has been described as the First World War with drones).
The invasion of Ukraine has so far been a strategic disaster for Putin. The latest US intelligence assessment is that Russia has suffered over 300,000 killed and wounded since the invasion began, as well as losing massive amounts of military equipment. Yet the frontline has barely moved for a year. Putin has further distorted the economy by moving to hike defence spending by 70 per cent. The economy is being kept afloat for now on the high oil price. But western sanctions have reduced Russia to begging for arms from Iran and North Korea.
At some point, the Russian people will demand to know what all the loss of life and the harsh reduction in their living standards has been for. But the immediate priority is for the west to sustain its military and economic support so that Ukraine can hold out against another winter of Russian bombardment of its energy infrastructure.
The fact that neither the US Congress nor the EU have yet managed to agree on the funding for 2024 onwards is being interpreted as evidence that Putin is successfully wearing down western political will to stand with Ukraine. But that is at least premature. In the EU, 26 of the 27 member states are committed to paying the €50bn pledged by the president of the Commission. They will find a way of getting the money to Ukraine, despite the efforts of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to block it.
In the US Congress, President Joe Biden's funding bid has been caught up in a domestic row about money for defences on the southern border. But there is still widespread support in Congress for Ukraine. I predict that Biden will get most of the funding he seeks for 2024. Beyond that, the outlook is much less certain, especially if Trump’s campaign for the White House gathers yet greater momentum. President Volodymyr Zelensky may well face a difficult choice in the summer of 2024 on whether the time has come for some sort of truce.
An armistice would be bitterly disappointing for all Ukrainians who have fought so bravely to preserve their freedom. Putin has shown himself a master at creating frozen conflicts and then choosing the time to reactivate them. The challenge for the west would be to ensure that a frozen conflict in Ukraine did not become a springboard for further Russian aggression. The way to achieve that is to bring the 80 per cent or so of “free” Ukraine into Nato and the EU as soon as possible. That is why the EU decision on accession is of such importance.
There would be many problems in bringing a partially occupied country into Nato or the EU. But if the strategic imperative is strong enough, solutions could be found. The treaties would need to specify that they applied initially only to the free parts of Ukraine. When West Germany joined Nato in 1955, it undertook not to seek reunification by force. Something similar would probably be needed from Ukraine to reassure other Nato members that they could not be dragged into a war with Russia in pursuit of a united Ukraine.
Joining Nato would bring Ukraine the military security to underpin the reconstruction effort. EU accession would be a long and difficult process. But Putin has created a fiercely pro-western Ukraine with every incentive to root out corruption and meet EU standards. With a highly efficient agriculture sector and innovative people, Ukraine in the EU could well match Poland’s performance of doubling per capita GDP in the space of less than two decades.
Alongside a booming free Ukraine, the Russian-occupied rump would be a sad and benighted place. Rather than plotting further aggression against what would then be a member of Nato, Putin or his successor would be hard put to stem the westward flow of human capital and economic activity.
There will be plenty of obstacles along the way. But the direction of travel is now set towards Ukrainian membership of Nato and the EU. Ukraine should not be afraid to settle for an armed truce if this is the best it can achieve. Anchored in western defence and economic structures, its future will be secure. If Ukrainians want evidence of what will then be possible, they might look at what South Korea has achieved since the armistice of 1953.
