When Putin’s war against Ukraine began in February, Russian politicians and the Russian media expected it to be a conflict between profoundly unequal forces. As so often in this war, they have turned out to be right, but not in the way they expected.
The current Ukrainian counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region has reportedly liberated more than 8,000 square km of territory in around two weeks, routing Russian forces in the area. This extraordinary success has shown the decisive strategic, tactical, and operational superiority of the Ukrainian army and the failure of all aspects of the Russian campaign.
Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv region, in the northeast of the country, after weeks of signalling that the liberation of the Kherson region in the south was its priority, and having begun the operation to achieve it. The scale and speed of the gains seem to have taken even Ukrainian forces by surprise.
The collapse of the occupation in the northeast has many consequences for the Russian army and for the Kremlin. One immediate result is that the referendums on joining Russia that had been planned for occupied regions have now been postponed indefinitely. They would have been used to give a false coating of democratic legitimacy to the Kremlin’s attempted annexation, just as the 2014 referendum in Crimea has been used to justify the seizure of that region. This will not be possible now.
Another problem for Russia is that the rapid loss of this territory makes it more difficult to maintain the structures of occupation elsewhere. Collaborators were left behind as the front collapsed; many of them have fled across the border, leaving their homes and families. Russian teachers who had been brought to Ukraine were also abandoned and now face imprisonment, with no prospect of being exchanged as prisoners of war. Persuading local and Russian civilians to work with the occupation forces is going to be much harder when they have no confidence that those forces will remain or will look after them if they are forced to retreat.
The most immediate and serious consequence for the Kremlin is that Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive destroys the last shreds of Russia’s reputation as a great military power. This had already been very badly damaged by the multiple failures of the first six months of the war, but the September rout is of a different order and represents a profound international humiliation for the Russian armed forces. In the first days of the counteroffensive, the liberation of towns by Ukraine occurred so fast that maps of the frontline were obsolete within hours. Images of abandoned tanks and arms stores (now available for Ukrainian use) were seen around the world. Reports of generals being fired, ongoing troop shortages, and discontent among the enlisted, conscripted, or press-ganged men reinforce the perception of an army in which existing morale problems are metastasizing into something more ominous.
And not just ominous for the Russian armed forces, but for Putin himself, who for the first time appears unable to fully deflect blame onto the military and security services. Public criticism of the war at home is still rare but it is growing, notably on the nationalist right of the Russian political spectrum, including from Chechen dictator and close Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov. If the Russian army is unable to stabilise its position in Ukraine—and there is no reason to expect that it will—then Putin is likely to find himself in the most precarious position since the early years of his presidency.
Nothing can be taken for granted in war—as the complacent Russian army has discovered to its cost—but it is clear that Ukraine currently has momentum and will continue to push to liberate its territory to the maximum possible extent. Before the start of the invasion in February, there was no serious prospect of Kyiv regaining control of the regions lost in 2014; that has now changed. The scale of the ongoing Russian military disaster and its political repercussions for the Kremlin mean that no one can confidently set limits to Ukraine’s recovery of territory.
The disgrace of the Russian military should not blind us to the spectacular achievements of the Ukrainian armed forces and the Zelensky government, which confirm that western states were right to provide the military aid that has made these gains possible. There is an obvious argument for continuing, indeed increasing, this support now that Kyiv has shown how effective it is at turning back Russian aggression—something that is a strategic priority for Europe as a whole, as well as for the Biden administration.
Writing for Prospect in March, I said that although it was too early to tell whether Ukraine had won, Russia had already lost. This is even more obvious now than it was then. The question is just how great this defeat will prove to be, and what will happen to Putin when its reality becomes clear.
