Remember Libya

With Syria and Egypt burning, the west can ill afford to lose Libya. As Nato once helped liberate Libyans from Gaddafi, so the west must now help them to overcome the challenges of the transition from dictatorship. The future of democracy in the Middle East is here, in the streets of Tripoli, Benghazi, Zintan and Misrata, cities once feted by western media but increasingly forgotten.

Since the 2011 revolution that ousted Gaddafi, a wave of violence, driven by both the supporters of the ex-dictator and the militias who ousted him, has spread across Libya. The car bombs and assassinations at the centre of the violence seem to highlight the endemic insecurity of a failing state; another Arab Spring country descending into the abyss. The Libyan state seems little more than a bystander to the chaos, the fragments of a state that Gaddafi left behind unable to bring security or development—a recent occupation of parliament by Berber tribesmen is one of the starkest examples of its impotence.

Yet despite the violence and absent state, Libya has the potential to be more than the first Arab Spring country in which Nato dropped bombs; it can also be the first in which the transition to a successful and stable democracy occurs. The raw materials for a functioning state exist here. Libya's population is 85 per cent urban, educated and overwhelmingly Sunni. Unlike Egypt, the first failed democracy of the Arab Spring, there is no deep security state and the conflict between liberals and conservatives, moderates and Islamists is contained within parliament. The country is still relatively united, Gaddafi's brutal rule at least leaving Libya's citizens believing they are, above all, Libyan. There is a huge desire for security, freedom and representation, with the success of the 2012 elections as its proof.

Should the west re-engage with Libya, its task will not be easy. The impotence of the Libyan state has become crystallised in the militias’ ability to strong-arm the government through force, as in the passing of the “Political Isolation” law to remove Gaddafi-era politicians from government. Even today, eastern tribes in the Cyrenaica region threaten to blockade the oil industry, effectively crippling Libya's economic lifeline. The state cannot exert power within its borders, and at street level there is simply no functioning army or police force that can confront the tribes and militias.

This street-level weakness reflects weakness at the top. The ruling body, the General National Congress, is a disparate collection of individuals—moderates, secularists, Islamists and ex-regime—each jockeying for power and patronage, and has failed in its priority mission to craft a constitution or roadmap for the future.

Prime Minster Ali Zeidan seems isolated as his popular support ebbs. In response to the security and governance crises, he undermined the General National Congress further by replacing the cabinet on 6th August with an “emergency cabinet” consisting of fewer ministers. The decision was intended to portray strength but instead betrays weakness as Zeidan pulls further away from democratic institutions.

The west still can, and should, act to help Libya's transition. It must actively support Zeidan’s efforts to forge a consensus amongst the General National Congress's disparate elements. Zeidan, too, must be encouraged to trust his ministers and move away from the small, unaccountable crisis government he created in August, in the spirit of recent moves to finally create a constitution. Western diplomats must use this act to encourage the congress to draft a constitution that binds them together in building a state for all Libyans, rather than their own constituencies. Only with support will the Libyan political class hold together under Zeidan.

None of this will be easy while insecurity reigns. If the militia and ex-regime continue to have such power, popular support for the General National Congress will evaporate. It will be hard, and expensive, but the west must expand its current efforts to train and equip a Libyan police force and army that both confronts and co-opts the militias; training 2000 troops is not enough. And, critically, it must help society reconcile by developing the governing skills of Libya's institutions, from policymaking to implementation, and recognising the nascent civil society that Gaddafi was so afraid of.

Libya still totters on the precipice. Zeidan and his colleagues seem overwhelmed by the task of crafting a state from the ruins of Gaddafi’s madness. But, given support, the opportunity to do so remains. If Libya can overcome its demons and become the functioning democracy it can be, perhaps so too can the wider Middle East. It is a prize the west cannot afford to lose.