A protest against drug violence, Mexico City
An apparently perfect solution may be nothing more than a false start. For Mexico, the nation most brutalised by the international drugs trade, the idea of legalising narcotics may be just that—an irrelevance.
Those who favour legalisation say it would resolve all problems. With a legislative act, violence would vanish and a taxable, multi-billion dollar industry would be created in its place. But the problem is that theoretical discussion of legalisation ignores Mexico’s broader political and social problems. It also ignores the conditions required for legalisation to function.
Here in Mexico, I see two central problems with legalisation: the first concerns the nature of the drug market; the second, objective reality. With respect to the former, the crucial market is not in Mexico but in the United States. For legalisation to work, the US must also legalise. It is the biggest market and the ultimate source of all the money. The US market is so big that it creates its own demand and drugs will flow into its territory through any possible route. If Mexico were to succeed in controlling the whole of its territory, drugs would simply find a different conduit—and would continue to flow.
If the US were to liberalise its drug policies, this would come as a very great relief to Mexico. But Mexico’s problems would not go away; drugs compound Mexico’s problems, but they are not their cause.
The root problem for Mexico is not the existence of drugs but the absence of a properly-functioning and consolidated state. Before Mexico’s drug-related violence mushroomed to current levels, the main problem was not drugs but rather organised crime (ranging from abduction to car theft and product piracy and extortion) and at all levels, the government has been incapable of handling it. Drug trafficking did nothing other than make the challenge much greater.
Mexico’s problem is one of police and judicial incapability, which has brought the state to its knees. Mexico never had a professional police and judicial system. What it did have, throughout the greater part of the 20th century, was an authoritarian political system that controlled everything, including criminality. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ran the country from 1929-2000, constructed an authoritarian system that was able to withstand the challenges of its time and which brought stability, economic growth and an incipient middle class. However the PRI system was incapable of running a modern country.
State apparatus was adequate and sufficient for dealing with local problems. But financial mismanagement in the 1970s caused economic shocks in Mexico, which weakened political control. The eventual defeat of the PRI in the presidential elections of 2000 dismantled this local infrastructure of control and brought Mexico directly face-to-face with a type of new organised crime for which it was not prepared.
The growth of the Mexican drug trade was stimulated by changes taking place elsewhere: the structure of the US market; the success of the Colombian government in regaining control of its country; and the closure, by the US, of Caribbean drug-trafficking routes. These three factors concentrated the “narco” in Mexico and consolidated the Mexican mafias in the business.
The point is that the government could not respond to these challenges. A primitive, incompetent security system had become completely politicised and was quickly overwhelmed. Traditional controls were eroded and criminal organisations—with enormous economic might, cutting-edge weaponry and the willingness to use both—took advantage.
Legalising or “regulating” drugs would be a conceivable response in a country where police and judicial structures were capable of establishing rules and making them stick. This is, in fact, Mexico’s true challenge. Until that happens, the idea of legalising drugs will be nothing more than water-cooler conjecture. The fundamental problem in Mexico is not the presence of an illegal drugs trade but the absence of state capability. The insecurity and the violence are the consequence of this absence, not its cause.
An apparently perfect solution may be nothing more than a false start. For Mexico, the nation most brutalised by the international drugs trade, the idea of legalising narcotics may be just that—an irrelevance.
Those who favour legalisation say it would resolve all problems. With a legislative act, violence would vanish and a taxable, multi-billion dollar industry would be created in its place. But the problem is that theoretical discussion of legalisation ignores Mexico’s broader political and social problems. It also ignores the conditions required for legalisation to function.
Here in Mexico, I see two central problems with legalisation: the first concerns the nature of the drug market; the second, objective reality. With respect to the former, the crucial market is not in Mexico but in the United States. For legalisation to work, the US must also legalise. It is the biggest market and the ultimate source of all the money. The US market is so big that it creates its own demand and drugs will flow into its territory through any possible route. If Mexico were to succeed in controlling the whole of its territory, drugs would simply find a different conduit—and would continue to flow.
If the US were to liberalise its drug policies, this would come as a very great relief to Mexico. But Mexico’s problems would not go away; drugs compound Mexico’s problems, but they are not their cause.
The root problem for Mexico is not the existence of drugs but the absence of a properly-functioning and consolidated state. Before Mexico’s drug-related violence mushroomed to current levels, the main problem was not drugs but rather organised crime (ranging from abduction to car theft and product piracy and extortion) and at all levels, the government has been incapable of handling it. Drug trafficking did nothing other than make the challenge much greater.
Mexico’s problem is one of police and judicial incapability, which has brought the state to its knees. Mexico never had a professional police and judicial system. What it did have, throughout the greater part of the 20th century, was an authoritarian political system that controlled everything, including criminality. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ran the country from 1929-2000, constructed an authoritarian system that was able to withstand the challenges of its time and which brought stability, economic growth and an incipient middle class. However the PRI system was incapable of running a modern country.
State apparatus was adequate and sufficient for dealing with local problems. But financial mismanagement in the 1970s caused economic shocks in Mexico, which weakened political control. The eventual defeat of the PRI in the presidential elections of 2000 dismantled this local infrastructure of control and brought Mexico directly face-to-face with a type of new organised crime for which it was not prepared.
The growth of the Mexican drug trade was stimulated by changes taking place elsewhere: the structure of the US market; the success of the Colombian government in regaining control of its country; and the closure, by the US, of Caribbean drug-trafficking routes. These three factors concentrated the “narco” in Mexico and consolidated the Mexican mafias in the business.
The point is that the government could not respond to these challenges. A primitive, incompetent security system had become completely politicised and was quickly overwhelmed. Traditional controls were eroded and criminal organisations—with enormous economic might, cutting-edge weaponry and the willingness to use both—took advantage.
Legalising or “regulating” drugs would be a conceivable response in a country where police and judicial structures were capable of establishing rules and making them stick. This is, in fact, Mexico’s true challenge. Until that happens, the idea of legalising drugs will be nothing more than water-cooler conjecture. The fundamental problem in Mexico is not the presence of an illegal drugs trade but the absence of state capability. The insecurity and the violence are the consequence of this absence, not its cause.
