Kabul was brought to a standstill this week as Afghan protestors called for a “city closure” on 16th May, prompting the government to block off many streets. This is the latest in a spate of protests opposing a decision to reroute an electricity transmission line covering Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan (TUTAP).
The 500 kv transmission line is being routed away from the Hazara-majority Bamiyan Province in central Afghanistan over the Salang Pass (a mountain pass connecting northern Afghanistan with Parwan Province, which lies next door to Kabul on its North Eastern border with connections to Kabul Province and southern Afghanistan). Over the past few weeks, demonstrations have been seen in Bamiyan, Mazar-e Sharif, Ghazni, Daikundi, Baghlan and Herat as well as in a number of western capitals, including Washington, Stockholm, Berlin, Tokyo and London. (For information on the demonstrations see Thomas Ruttig’s comprehensive report for AAN).
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) project is aimed at promoting trade in electricity between energy-rich Central Asian countries, and Afghanistan and Pakistan that face severe electric power deficits. Afghanistan ranks among the five per cent of countries with the lowest per capita energy consumption in the world, and is still a net energy importer. This, as the ADB states, creates disparities in economic development; and fuels ethnic and regional tensions, insecurity, and discontent. The government finally opted to route the line over the Salang pass, rather than through Bamiyan Province, in a Cabinet decision on 30th April.
This has sparked huge condemnation among Afghanistan’s Hazara population. Tensions over the project started gathering momentum in January 2016 as Hazara leaders in the government started trying to ensure the line would be routed through Bamiyan. Once news of the Cabinet’s decision reached the public, it triggered a broad political and social protest movement, known as the Jombesh-e Roshnayi (Enlightening Movement).
The opposition rests on two key arguments: firstly, that Bamiyan is a better option technically. Those who argue this point to a recommendation by the German Fichtener Engineering Company, which in 2013 concluded that “the proposed line routing over the Salang Pass, even if technically possible, is associated with such difficulties and constraints that another more convenient and safer solution has to be investigated” with Bamiyan posed as the alternative.
Secondly, opponents argue the decision contravenes the government’s commitments to social justice by neglecting the development of Bamiyan (and other central provinces). Residents of Bamiyan have frequently complained of suffering from a “peace penalty”—there is a widespread perception that the area, which has been more stable than the rest of the country, has been neglected in favour of more insecure areas. The change in TUTAP’s route has therefore likely exacerbated existing (and frequently valid) perceptions that Bamiyan has been ignored. More worryingly, this has sparked complaints that President Ghani’s government discriminates against Hazaras.
There is no real evidence that Ghani is deliberately doing this. He claims that routes of the power transmission lines were a decision made in 2013 under former President Karzai’s administration—though admittedly one that could have been reversed. He fears that a reversal of the decision now could affect millions of people in 12 provinces. The ADB also believes that the Salang is a better route, and considerably cheaper (by around $100 million by some calculations).
There is a dark history behind Hazara claims of oppression. Historically, the Shia Hazara population, which is the third largest ethnic group in the country, has been discriminated against, but it is the memories of the massacres that occurred under the majority Pashtun, Sunni, Taliban regime that remain particularly raw. The legacy of this should not be downplayed. But, these latest claims of ethnic discrimination are troubling given the ability of the country’s leaders to manipulate ethnicity at times of insecurity in order to shore up their own power. In parliament, there have been mutual accusations of “discrimination” and turning the TUTAP initiative into a “victim of ethnic politics” between different groups of MPs. There have also been counter-reactions among Pashtun MPs and communities in areas south of where the Salang transmission line would pass such as Paktia, Khost, Helmand, Logar and Parwan.
Hazaras and certain political figures have capitalised on the popular basis of this protest in order to fulfil their own political goals, which include undermining the National Unity Government (NUG) or conversely, obtaining or keeping positions in the NUG. Genuine concerns relating to TUTAP therefore risk becoming a pawn in this latest round of competition for power among Afghanistan's leaders. One illustration is provided by the powerful Northern leader and acting Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor who, reportedly infuriated by his prolonged “acting” status, has jumped on the bandwagon and voiced concerns regarding the implementation of the project via the Salang. Meanwhile, second deputy to Chief Executive Officer Abdullah, Mohammad Mohaqiq, has warned he would leave the government if the power project was not implemented via Bamiyan. Though unlikely, in the event, this could trigger a government collapse.
In reaction to the protests, President Ghani has now promised to send all documents related to TUTAP to parliament for deliberation and has created a 12-member review commission. The commission has ten days to come up with a solution. Finding a way forward in a context in which “truth” is contested will not be easy. The final decision is unlikely to be accepted by those on the losing side and further protests are likely. Moreover, this is unlikely to provide a resolution to the underlining drivers behind the demonstrations, which include discontent with the government.
At this stage, TUTAP is unlikely to be divisive enough to split the government. But it is not unique: there is an ever-greater tendency among Afghan leaders to politicise issues in their own battles for power. They need to recognise this is a dangerous game to play. It could further destabilise the fragile country.