Read more: Why Islamic State wants to destroy the past
In an interview in the new issue of the Atlantic, President Barack Obama suggests that David Cameron may be partly at fault for the current crisis in Libya. After the country's former leader Muammer Gaddafi was toppled with the help of western forces—including the United Kingdom—in 2011, a power vacuum opened up. A civil war broke out in 2014, and several rival groups are now fighting for control of the country. Islamic State is one of them, and is making rapid territorial gains.
Obama suggests this anarchy may exist partly because David Cameron has been “distracted by a range of other things” and so wasn't properly "invested in the follow-up" to 2011's intervention. Is he right? As well as this, is Britain to blame for the current crisis because it never should have intervened in the first place? Or perhaps Britain simply isn't at fault at all. Our panelists share their views.
Britain and France were right to intervene militarily to prevent Gaddafi's military crushing the rebellious city of Benghazi. The shame was that they did so little to prevent Libya's descent into anarchy following his subsequent removal.
The fall of dictators is almost invariably followed by chaos because they have suppressed ethnic and other rivalries, and eliminated all political opposition. Gaddafi was so paranoid that the Boy Scouts were practically the only civic grouping he permitted, and football commentators had to refer to players by their numbers, not names, lest they gained a following.
In Libya's case the chaos could have been contained. It had a viable economy, an educated middle class and a relatively homogenous population—certainly compared to Syria or Egypt. What a difference an international peacekeeping force, or a really concerted programme of institution-building and disarmament, might have made in the euphoric aftermath of that miraculous revolution.
No. It’s fanciful to suppose that leaving a man like Gaddafi to deal with an insurrection would have involved less bloodshed. If we had stayed out, there are only three possible outcomes. Gaddafi might have suppressed the revolt by inflicting one massacre after another (starting in Benghazi). Or he would have fallen anyway, meaning that today’s turmoil would have happened in any case—except that the West’s failure to help would have created another source of grievance. More likely is that Gaddafi and the rebels would still be slugging it out—and instead of one calamity like Syria, we would have two.
Engineering the fall of Colonel Gaddafi was yet another calamitous misjudgment by the west about the Middle East. Gaddafi was a bad man, but the anarchy and chaos that have consumed Libya since his fall have turned it into a principal incubator of global jihadi terror. Cameron, with his jejune belief in the Arab Spring as the antidote to Arab tyranny, bears a heavy responsibility for signing up Britain to this debacle. The main blame, however, must be laid at America’s door, particularly since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was the main architect of the coup. Both the US and UK failed to think through the consequences of ousting Gaddafi. The west is now in far greater danger as a result.
The story of Libya provides a catalogue of British errors, French and American too. We conducted a drive-by shooting with neither the ground forces to sustain security nor the client politicians to establish governance. Libyan weapons and displaced fighters sparked the Mali conflict, Libyan chaos provided an operating base for terrorism in Tunisia and Libya now beckons as a safe haven for Islamic State. The aggregate scores of good and bad consequences tilt towards bad, with more to come.
But it’s not just policy errors that count here, legacy matters too. As the centenary of the Somme approaches, maybe it’s time to acknowledge that we try to fight wars on the cheap. At no point in the Wars of 9/11 have we devoted enough military resources to bring about decisive effect; we constantly fail to reconcile ends with means. Against that background, what chance does policy have?
The UK must share responsibility for the current crisis in Libya. Along with France, it led the way in pressing for strikes to prevent Benghazi’s recapture, and then for continuing all the way to regime overthrow. We will never know whether, without Western action, there would have then meant a brutal but rapid reimposition of order (as in Egypt) or a protracted civil war (as in Syria). I am also sceptical of the argument that doing more on the ground—short of substantial troops on the ground—could have prevented the developing post-war chaos. The main responsibility for today’s events lies with Libyan elites and Libyan armed groups, not with outside powers. The lesson for future interventions is that, whenever “something must be done” arguments are made, doing nothing should never be ruled out as an option.
In an interview in the new issue of the Atlantic, President Barack Obama suggests that David Cameron may be partly at fault for the current crisis in Libya. After the country's former leader Muammer Gaddafi was toppled with the help of western forces—including the United Kingdom—in 2011, a power vacuum opened up. A civil war broke out in 2014, and several rival groups are now fighting for control of the country. Islamic State is one of them, and is making rapid territorial gains.
Obama suggests this anarchy may exist partly because David Cameron has been “distracted by a range of other things” and so wasn't properly "invested in the follow-up" to 2011's intervention. Is he right? As well as this, is Britain to blame for the current crisis because it never should have intervened in the first place? Or perhaps Britain simply isn't at fault at all. Our panelists share their views.
A lost opportunity
Martin Fletcher, former foreign and associate editor of The TimesBritain and France were right to intervene militarily to prevent Gaddafi's military crushing the rebellious city of Benghazi. The shame was that they did so little to prevent Libya's descent into anarchy following his subsequent removal.
The fall of dictators is almost invariably followed by chaos because they have suppressed ethnic and other rivalries, and eliminated all political opposition. Gaddafi was so paranoid that the Boy Scouts were practically the only civic grouping he permitted, and football commentators had to refer to players by their numbers, not names, lest they gained a following.
In Libya's case the chaos could have been contained. It had a viable economy, an educated middle class and a relatively homogenous population—certainly compared to Syria or Egypt. What a difference an international peacekeeping force, or a really concerted programme of institution-building and disarmament, might have made in the euphoric aftermath of that miraculous revolution.
Inevitable bloodshed
David Blair, Chief Foreign Correspondent of the Daily TelegraphNo. It’s fanciful to suppose that leaving a man like Gaddafi to deal with an insurrection would have involved less bloodshed. If we had stayed out, there are only three possible outcomes. Gaddafi might have suppressed the revolt by inflicting one massacre after another (starting in Benghazi). Or he would have fallen anyway, meaning that today’s turmoil would have happened in any case—except that the West’s failure to help would have created another source of grievance. More likely is that Gaddafi and the rebels would still be slugging it out—and instead of one calamity like Syria, we would have two.
Lack of forethought
Melanie Philips, Columnist for the TimesEngineering the fall of Colonel Gaddafi was yet another calamitous misjudgment by the west about the Middle East. Gaddafi was a bad man, but the anarchy and chaos that have consumed Libya since his fall have turned it into a principal incubator of global jihadi terror. Cameron, with his jejune belief in the Arab Spring as the antidote to Arab tyranny, bears a heavy responsibility for signing up Britain to this debacle. The main blame, however, must be laid at America’s door, particularly since Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was the main architect of the coup. Both the US and UK failed to think through the consequences of ousting Gaddafi. The west is now in far greater danger as a result.
Don’t fight wars on the cheap
Robert Fry, former Deputy Commanding General of Coalition forces in IraqThe story of Libya provides a catalogue of British errors, French and American too. We conducted a drive-by shooting with neither the ground forces to sustain security nor the client politicians to establish governance. Libyan weapons and displaced fighters sparked the Mali conflict, Libyan chaos provided an operating base for terrorism in Tunisia and Libya now beckons as a safe haven for Islamic State. The aggregate scores of good and bad consequences tilt towards bad, with more to come.
But it’s not just policy errors that count here, legacy matters too. As the centenary of the Somme approaches, maybe it’s time to acknowledge that we try to fight wars on the cheap. At no point in the Wars of 9/11 have we devoted enough military resources to bring about decisive effect; we constantly fail to reconcile ends with means. Against that background, what chance does policy have?
Doing nothing should always be an option
Malcolm Chambers, Research Director at RUSIThe UK must share responsibility for the current crisis in Libya. Along with France, it led the way in pressing for strikes to prevent Benghazi’s recapture, and then for continuing all the way to regime overthrow. We will never know whether, without Western action, there would have then meant a brutal but rapid reimposition of order (as in Egypt) or a protracted civil war (as in Syria). I am also sceptical of the argument that doing more on the ground—short of substantial troops on the ground—could have prevented the developing post-war chaos. The main responsibility for today’s events lies with Libyan elites and Libyan armed groups, not with outside powers. The lesson for future interventions is that, whenever “something must be done” arguments are made, doing nothing should never be ruled out as an option.
