Read more: best of enemies: Bashar al-Assad's collusion with Islamic State
The latest announcement of a “cessation of hostilities” in Syria has a real chance of being enacted on Saturday morning. It is desperately needed. In the five years since the Syrian civil war started, more than a quarter of a million Syrians have been killed and 4.7 million have fled the country. In this time, attempts have been made at a “ceasefire” between several of the parties militarily involved in the country. Russia and the United states are chief among these: currently, Russia is launching airstrikes on the enemies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while the United States is supporting some rebel groups. Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra are not to be a part of any agreement.
The terms of the deal have been developed since they were first announced by US Secretary of State John Kerry on 11th February. However, the agreement still stops short of clarifying key issues: to whom exactly the cessation will apply, and where it will apply. The devil remains in the detail.
Kerry’s announcement in Munich that the cessation of hostilities should be implemented within a week was met with little optimism. Rather than an agreement in itself, it was an agreement to agree at a later date. There was no sense that a breakthrough had been achieved to reconcile the divergent positions of the US and Russian governments. Kerry acknowledged that it was a deal that was far from perfect. It would only become significant once words translated into action, he said. There was little surprise when they did not: the deadline for the implementation of the cessation—Friday 18 February—passed without a hint of an end to the fighting.
But there has been some progress. The 11th February agreement announced the formulation of two task forces. One, UN-led, would press forward on issues of humanitarian access to Syria. The other, with joint US-Russian leadership, would explore the “modalities” of the planned cessation: how can it be implemented and monitored? The humanitarian task force has been able to facilitate aid delivery to a number of besieged areas, including air drops in to the city of Deir Ezzor in the southeast, where over 200,000 of its citizens are currently under siege by Islamic State.
The timeline of a week for agreeing this cessation through modalities identified and implemented by the second taskforce was always ambitious. Rumours from Munich were that the Russians wanted a 30 day timeframe for implementing the agreement but were pressured by the US into accepting seven days. In the end, that seven day window was given little credence: it took longer than that for substantive discussions to take place between the Russians and Americans over the suggested modalities.
But the final result of those discussions, announced on Monday, are some practical details. Combatants—with the exceptions mentioned above—are expected to signal their commitment to and acceptance of the terms of the cessation 12 hours before the time it is meant to start. Those terms hold no surprises and essentially restate the terms of The United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 2254, agreed unanimously in December, to bring an end to the fighting and to allow humanitarian access. (Although they do also exclude Russian airstrikes). Nonetheless, Syrian actors look set to sign up to it this time around. Both the regime and the opposition High Negotiations Council have signalled their intention to do so.
Yet, those two critical issues remain unsolved. First, it remains unclear to which groups the ceasefire will apply. There continues to be a significant difference between the US and Russia over which rebel groups should be deemed “terrorist” beyond Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. In their interpretation of that term, Russia and the Syrian regime incorporate nearly all who fight Assad, leaving the status of major groups in opposition to Assad’s regime, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, uncertain. A deal that didn’t include them would not be credible; they are two of the more moderate groups.
Moreover, certain rebel forces fight alongside the terrorist group Jabhat al Nusra in some areas of the country, particularly around Aleppo—Syria’s largest city. This has been used as a pretext for Russia and the regime to target certain rebel groups with the justification that they are in fact Jabhat al-Nusra. This issue has the potential to drive a wedge through an already battered and weakened opposition, even if the ceasefire deal is implemented in good faith. Rumours that rebel forces will be expected to share intelligence on Nusra’s positions with the ceasefire task force would test any remaining semblance of rebel unity, while there already appear to be moves afoot on the ground from some rebel groups to distance themselves from the terrorist group.
This leads us to the second issue: how do you delineate the areas that are to be included in the deal? Noah Bonsey of the International Crisis Group—an NGO that aims to resolve deadly conflicts—has noted that unless this issue is decided before a cessation comes into force then it is unworkable. Here we may also have a problem of “the poacher turning gamekeeper.” The Russians will play a role in policing the cessation—through the ceasefire task force—while also being a party directly involved in the war. There is an obvious conflict of interest here.
Trust is a commodity that is in short supply in Syria. The opposition High Negotiations Committee (which is the main rebel bloc) has said that the implementation of the “ceasefire” will be a test of sincerity for Russia and the regime. The committee’s expectations will, I’m sure, be limited. For the optimists, the personal involvement of President Putin—who has been conducting calls to explain the details of the ceasefire to leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel—hints at the prospect that Russia is now willing to get this done.
Whether Moscow will compromise on the status of rebel groups remains an open question, and the delineation of territory that the ceasefire will respect is no more certain. For Kerry, who has sought to portray these negotiations as an ongoing process, it will be difficult for him to argue progress is being made if the Russians refuse to cede any ground after the cessation enters into force. Should that eventuality come to pass, then the agreement will have simply provided continued cover for attempts by Russia and the Syrian regime to create a faits accompli on the ground. It will also have staved off the threat (as they see it) of entry on the ground from regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey—who will not intervene if they see a ceasefire is happening.
One thing is clear: despite Kerry’s recent comments to the contrary, the US does not appear to have a “plan B” if this plan goes awry.
Now read: Book Review: The Syrian Jihad—Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Evolution of an Insurgency by Charles R Lister
The latest announcement of a “cessation of hostilities” in Syria has a real chance of being enacted on Saturday morning. It is desperately needed. In the five years since the Syrian civil war started, more than a quarter of a million Syrians have been killed and 4.7 million have fled the country. In this time, attempts have been made at a “ceasefire” between several of the parties militarily involved in the country. Russia and the United states are chief among these: currently, Russia is launching airstrikes on the enemies of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while the United States is supporting some rebel groups. Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra are not to be a part of any agreement.
The terms of the deal have been developed since they were first announced by US Secretary of State John Kerry on 11th February. However, the agreement still stops short of clarifying key issues: to whom exactly the cessation will apply, and where it will apply. The devil remains in the detail.
Kerry’s announcement in Munich that the cessation of hostilities should be implemented within a week was met with little optimism. Rather than an agreement in itself, it was an agreement to agree at a later date. There was no sense that a breakthrough had been achieved to reconcile the divergent positions of the US and Russian governments. Kerry acknowledged that it was a deal that was far from perfect. It would only become significant once words translated into action, he said. There was little surprise when they did not: the deadline for the implementation of the cessation—Friday 18 February—passed without a hint of an end to the fighting.
But there has been some progress. The 11th February agreement announced the formulation of two task forces. One, UN-led, would press forward on issues of humanitarian access to Syria. The other, with joint US-Russian leadership, would explore the “modalities” of the planned cessation: how can it be implemented and monitored? The humanitarian task force has been able to facilitate aid delivery to a number of besieged areas, including air drops in to the city of Deir Ezzor in the southeast, where over 200,000 of its citizens are currently under siege by Islamic State.
The timeline of a week for agreeing this cessation through modalities identified and implemented by the second taskforce was always ambitious. Rumours from Munich were that the Russians wanted a 30 day timeframe for implementing the agreement but were pressured by the US into accepting seven days. In the end, that seven day window was given little credence: it took longer than that for substantive discussions to take place between the Russians and Americans over the suggested modalities.
But the final result of those discussions, announced on Monday, are some practical details. Combatants—with the exceptions mentioned above—are expected to signal their commitment to and acceptance of the terms of the cessation 12 hours before the time it is meant to start. Those terms hold no surprises and essentially restate the terms of The United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 2254, agreed unanimously in December, to bring an end to the fighting and to allow humanitarian access. (Although they do also exclude Russian airstrikes). Nonetheless, Syrian actors look set to sign up to it this time around. Both the regime and the opposition High Negotiations Council have signalled their intention to do so.
Yet, those two critical issues remain unsolved. First, it remains unclear to which groups the ceasefire will apply. There continues to be a significant difference between the US and Russia over which rebel groups should be deemed “terrorist” beyond Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. In their interpretation of that term, Russia and the Syrian regime incorporate nearly all who fight Assad, leaving the status of major groups in opposition to Assad’s regime, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, uncertain. A deal that didn’t include them would not be credible; they are two of the more moderate groups.
Moreover, certain rebel forces fight alongside the terrorist group Jabhat al Nusra in some areas of the country, particularly around Aleppo—Syria’s largest city. This has been used as a pretext for Russia and the regime to target certain rebel groups with the justification that they are in fact Jabhat al-Nusra. This issue has the potential to drive a wedge through an already battered and weakened opposition, even if the ceasefire deal is implemented in good faith. Rumours that rebel forces will be expected to share intelligence on Nusra’s positions with the ceasefire task force would test any remaining semblance of rebel unity, while there already appear to be moves afoot on the ground from some rebel groups to distance themselves from the terrorist group.
This leads us to the second issue: how do you delineate the areas that are to be included in the deal? Noah Bonsey of the International Crisis Group—an NGO that aims to resolve deadly conflicts—has noted that unless this issue is decided before a cessation comes into force then it is unworkable. Here we may also have a problem of “the poacher turning gamekeeper.” The Russians will play a role in policing the cessation—through the ceasefire task force—while also being a party directly involved in the war. There is an obvious conflict of interest here.
Trust is a commodity that is in short supply in Syria. The opposition High Negotiations Committee (which is the main rebel bloc) has said that the implementation of the “ceasefire” will be a test of sincerity for Russia and the regime. The committee’s expectations will, I’m sure, be limited. For the optimists, the personal involvement of President Putin—who has been conducting calls to explain the details of the ceasefire to leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel—hints at the prospect that Russia is now willing to get this done.
Whether Moscow will compromise on the status of rebel groups remains an open question, and the delineation of territory that the ceasefire will respect is no more certain. For Kerry, who has sought to portray these negotiations as an ongoing process, it will be difficult for him to argue progress is being made if the Russians refuse to cede any ground after the cessation enters into force. Should that eventuality come to pass, then the agreement will have simply provided continued cover for attempts by Russia and the Syrian regime to create a faits accompli on the ground. It will also have staved off the threat (as they see it) of entry on the ground from regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey—who will not intervene if they see a ceasefire is happening.
One thing is clear: despite Kerry’s recent comments to the contrary, the US does not appear to have a “plan B” if this plan goes awry.
Now read: Book Review: The Syrian Jihad—Al-Qaeda, ISIS and the Evolution of an Insurgency by Charles R Lister
