Syria peace talks: is there hope for the opposition?

As the Syrian conflict edges towards entering its sixth year, the numbers are bleak. Over 250,000 Syrians are estimated to have been killed and 13.5 million are in need of humanitarian assistance. Over 4.3 million have fled the country.

As international attention intensifies on the diplomatic efforts to achieve peace this week, the tide has turned against the Syrian opposition. The UN-brokered talks in Geneva, which had been set to begin today (in the event, only preliminary talks took place), offer the most likely route to a peace settlement, but current dynamics suggest that any deal would do little to address the demands of the opposition.

On Thursday night, the opposition’s High Negotiations Committee stood firm, saying it would not attend indirect talks in Geneva until there is an end to bombing and to the blockades that are inflicting so much suffering on civilians. The Committee was formed at a conference in Riyadh late last year and was lauded as a step forward for an opposition that has long been fractured. The Committee’s membership is split among opposition political movements, armed rebel groups (not including ISIS or Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra) and a number of independents.

The regime and its supporters have long sought to undermine the opposition by accusing it of excluding the so-called “loyal” Damascus-based opposition—which is seen as co-opted by the regime—and for comprising of “terrorist” groups. In fact, Russia argues that Jaysh al-Islam, whose leader is chief negotiator of the High Negotiations Committee, should be excluded on that basis. A Russian airstrike killed Jaysh al-Islam’s prominent former leader, Zahran Alloush, on Christmas Day.

Ahead of the Geneva talks, Russia has sought to include the “loyal” opposition and Kurdish forces as part of a wider opposition bloc. Relations between the opposition and Kurdish forces are poor. It is clear that any lasting solution to the crisis cannot exclude the dominant Kurdish forces, and this remains a major chink in the High Negotiations Committee’s armour. While the Committee does claim to represent Kurds, it has no relationship to the dominant Kurdish forces in control of Rojava, the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Syria’s northwest. There are conflicting accounts over whether Kurdish leaders have been invited to Geneva. Most accounts argue that Turkey has been successful in ensuring their exclusion, but there may be shades of grey here as other delegations are expected to travel to Lausanne and may be engaged in De Mistura’s diplomacy in some fashion.

The Committee’s refusal to join talks in Geneva on Friday (29th January) is based upon December’s UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which demanded that the bombing of civilians should cease and that humanitarian agencies should be offered “rapid, safe and unhindered” access to areas under siege. Yet, when briefing the UN Security Council earlier this month, UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan De Mistura said that, “These are neither CBMs [confidence-building measures] nor are they preconditions. They are crucial signals to the people of Syria that this time around “peace talks” will make a difference to their lives.” His comments demonstrate a tough reality: the dilemma for the opposition is that, unless it attends the talks it will not be able to win concessions on bombing and access, but if it goes with no assurances then it risks lessening its credibility further with its constituents. The opposition realises that talks must deliver something tangible to those inside Syria.

In the past week, the opposition’s relationship with its most influential backer, the US, has frayed, underscoring the opposition’s fear that the Washington is ready to accommodate Moscow’s interests in forthcoming negotiations. On Monday Al Hayat, a daily newspaper distributed across most of the Arab world, wrote that US Secretary of State John Kerry had presented a “poisoned chalice” to the opposition ahead of talks. The opposition was reportedly enraged by the suggestion that the US could not guarantee future support if it were not to participate in talks that it sees as based entirely on Russian and Iranian terms. The US has strenuously denied that its position has changed in line with that of the Russians’, seeking to reassure the opposition over a number of supposed misunderstandings from the Kerry meeting. But the conclusion is unavoidable that Russia and Iran—which both have forces on the ground—have greater commitment to their allies and interests in Syria than the US does. Russia is the driving force behind the current diplomatic track, spurred following its military deployment into Syria in September. The sooner a deal is brokered, the sooner those forces might be recalled, runs the argument.

US Envoy to Syria Michael Ratley has told the rebels that only by participating in talks in good faith “can the world know with clarity who is responsible for their success or failure.” But the opposition will surely wonder, what, if any, ramifications the regime will face from the US and its allies for not reciprocating. The last round of talks held in Geneva in 2014 ended in acrimony only months after the regime’s chemical weapons attack on rebel-held Ghouta in the Damascus countryside. Opposition negotiators will harbour a sense of déjà vu.

Despite the asymmetry of the opposition and the regime’s respective bargaining positions, the High Negotiation Committee is likely to engage in talks in Geneva in the near future. The rebels are under pressure from their international backers to participate and will not want to be placed in the position of turning their backs on a peace process amidst the terrible suffering that continues in the country. Yet, the opposition’s paramount fear will be that negotiations on current terms will simply seek their capitulation. Negotiations are scheduled to last six months, where the key issues, such as the future of Assad and the nature of the transition will need to be resolved. As the opposition and the regime both seek to set their stall for those negotiations, it is clear that the High Negotiations Committee will be operating from a position of weakness if and when it arrives in Geneva.