What do Catalonia and Scotland have in common?

Given Catalonia’s long search for a binding vote on independence from Spain, the euphoria present on the streets of Barcelona last night was inevitable. It offered a determined movement a prized moment of release.

Yet even the most committed independista would struggle to claim that statehood is now an imminent possibility. While the combined victory of of Junts pel Sí and the more radical Popular Unity Candidacy serve to validate the cause of independence itself, what happens next is far from clear.

The truth is that the cry of "victory" from Catalan President Artur Mas is really the clamour of a battle once again joined. It heralds an era of further relentless political manoeuvring and confrontation between the Spanish and Catalan governments, both of whom are intent on claiming last night’s result as a watershed moment.

‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear," the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci once remarked. That serves as a useful tagline for the kind of political space that Spain and much of the rest of Europe now inhabits. For those staking out a new claim, or defending an old order, in Scotland as in Catalonia, constitutional politics have become the carrier of numerous deep rooted issues.

Across Europe established, centralised states face multiple threats from insurgent movements. Such groups, if not straightforwardly "separatist," derive much of their momentum from a claim that the Ancien Régime has become introverted and corrupt—thereby making its rule illegitimate.

The politics of what Tariq Ali calls the "extreme centre" are defined by the logjam of neoliberal consensus, but also speak to the manner in which large, centralised, nation-states have been seen to fail as vehicles for hope or progress. The creaking structures of post-war bureaucracies and the steady erosion of social democratic parties and institutions, have created a desire for new spaces of autonomy and control.

In this sense the Catalan and Scottish examples share much in common. The desire to start all over again is powerful, and seems to offer an escape route, albeit one that fits within the rhetoric and structures of the European Union. Such movements seem young and confident: unlike the populism of big state nationalisms, chauvinism in either case is a marginal issue.

 

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What is of course ironic about such bids for statehood is that they have arrived in an era in which transnational institutions and connections are making borders increasingly porous. The declining nation state might begin to inexorably make space for autonomous regions and cities, as highly centralised control is increasingly questioned, or circumvented. Transnational networks are now arguably more ensconced than at any point in European history since the fall of Christendom.

The most striking contrast between Scottish and Catalan nationalism is the latter’s resilience as a credible political force. The long years of suppression and dictatorship aside, nationalism has played a crucial role in Catalan politics for over a century. The omnipresent Estelada (the Catalan national flag) draped on the balconies of Barcelona testify to the deep role of language, identity and culture play in the desire for statehood, factors that are far more marginal in the Scottish context.

In fact, Scottish nationalism is unique in Europe in that it did not spring up alongside a wider movement for linguistic-cultural revival. Scotland’s brand of romantic nationalism, as embodied by figures like Sir Walter Scott, was a staunchly unionist project.

Crucially, there is no Franco casting a long shadow over Scotland's political identity. No one in Scotland, as in Catalonia, has been shot or incarcerated for uttering the wrong words in the wrong company. The demon is instead Thatcher, an uncompromising ideologue foreign to Scotland's civic self image but never an outright oppressor. Spain has also developed an essentially federal structure: taking the leap post-Fascism to a clearly codified constitutional structure that sought to balance past iniquities. Federalism in the UK is notable only for its obscurity.

Intriguingly, despite the more pressing passions present in Catalonia, Madrid’s ongoing refusal to countenance a referendum could help to offer a framework that effectively validates the gradualist approach the SNP has so carefully crafted.

What seems plausible now is that some form of dialogue between Madrid and Barcelona might begin: perhaps taking place behind closed doors until after national elections at the end of the year. This represents the kind of scenario that could offer a way out for both unionists and independistas in both Spain and the UK. Given all the political hurdles it presents for the SNP, the case for a second referendum seems fragile, yet the party’s ultimate health is tied up with the promise of independence.

Perhaps in Scotland a second referendum simply won’t be required. Perhaps the Catalan desire for a legally binding plebiscite, embodied in an non-binding ballot held last November, will force Spain to compromise on other fronts. In this scenario, the project of independence doesn’t rest on a grand moment of democratic liberation, but instead embraces the project that Artur Mas has pointed to as an alternative: the methodical creation of the institutions of statehood, through innovation on the ground and savvy manoeuvring via negotiations. Mas's Junts pel Sí coalition is now committed to building the structures required of an independent country, including a tax authority, a central bank and a diplomatic service, on a unilateral basis if necessary.

Given the current Spanish government’s habitual intransigence it seems likely such moves will be dogged by legal challenges at every step. Yet perhaps both Spain and the UK can only save face by allowing, quietly, the gradual evaporation of their authority. In seeking out a mutually acceptable political solution, politicians on both sides may have to move on from the old assumption that the desire for independence or union will one day be resolved through the triumph of one side over the other.