The weakness of the Iran nuclear deal

After almost 13 years of negotiations a deal between Iran and the P5+1 over its nuclear programme has been, if not yet signed and delivered, broadly agreed.

It is a testament to both the difficulties at hand and the desperation to make some sort of progress that the latest round of Iran talks in Lausanne continued two days beyond their original deadline of 31 March.

Journalists covering the talks are forever reliant on signs or elliptical (and not so elliptical) statements from their participants to get some idea of how things are going. This time there were few leaks, but the initial signs were positive. Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Phillip Hammond and the head of the US negotiating team, Secretary of State John Kerry were both guardedly hopeful that what Hammond called “a broad framework of understanding” could be reached before a comprehensive accord is scheduled to be signed by 30th June.

What ultimately emerged, on the evening of 2nd April, was perhaps better than anyone expected. The issue with Iran’s nuclear crisis has always been the seriousness of its outstanding issues. The major points of disagreement revolve around fundamental technological concerns about how Iran could potentially build a bomb. And then there are the political problems. The P5+1 have always insisted that Iran to set out in as much detail what it would commit to. The Iranians for their part have always wanted to keep the finer details as hazy as possible to allow for maximum wiggle (or indeed wriggle) room.

The deal, or as the US State Department described it, the Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,that was struck—though not yet signed—seemed to address, in large part, both of these concerns. Critical to the P5+1 is the issue of uranium enrichment—Iran’s major possible route to a nuclear bomb. Iran runs around 19,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges at present, which it agreed to reduce to 6,104 with only 5,060 enriching uranium for ten years—all of them the older first generation model.  This was a serious climbdown for Iran, which also agreed not to enrich uranium over 3.67 percent (85 percent or above is considered ideal for weapons purposes) for at least 15 years.

Another significant concession was Iran’s agreement to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched Uranium (which could theoretically be enriched to weapons-grade levels) from 10,000kg to 300 kg for 15 years. The Iranians also agreed to remove around two thirds of the centrifuges and infrastructure from the underground enrichment facility at Fordow. The goal of all this, as the State department made clear, was to increase the “breakout” time by which Iran could get a bomb from the 2-3 months it currently is to a year, for a duration of ten years.

Critically, the deal also targeted the heavy water reactor at Arak, which offers Iran an alternative plutonium path for a bomb. Once more, the Iranians climbed down from previous demands and undertook to “redesign and rebuild” the heavy water research reactor to a design “agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium.” It is unsurprising that a number of experts like Gary Samore, President Obama's former coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction, are pleased at what was achieved in Lausanne.

There is still much to do. The technical details that need to be hammered out by 30th June are complex and numerous. And huge international opposition, from Israel to Saudi Arabia, will further complicate matters. Despite all of this, it is almost certain that in the end some sort of deal will be reached. As I have written before, both Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and US President Barack Obama have invested far too much political capital in the process to allow it to break down now. Both are fighting battles with domestic political forces ardently opposed to the negotiations. Rouhani faces hardliners who object on principle to any compromise with the “Great Satan” while Obama faces a Republican-controlled Congress that believes he is too soft on Iran and wants to increase sanctions on the country, thereby torpedoing any chance of an accord.

But both men have dug their heels in. Both need a deal for their political legacies. There is no turning back now.  Come June a deal will almost certainly be announced. It will be imperfect and it will cause much gnashing of teeth, but it will be done.

The question is: will it be enough? As Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said: “Iran-U.S. relations have nothing to do with this [agreement]… This was an attempt to resolve the nuclear issue [only].”

And therein lies the root of the problem. By tackling the nuclear crisis alone any agreement fails to address the wider issue, namely increasing Iranian hegemony in the Middle East. From its backing of Houthi rebels in Yemen to Hezbollah in Lebanon and President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Iranian policies are now a cause of huge instability—and violence—in an already chaotic region. By ring-fencing the nuclear talks, President Obama has given the Iranians no incentive to change their behavior in anything but the nuclear sphere: a policy that the US, and the world, may come to rue.