Can Hassan Rouhani cling on against the hardliners?

The upcoming presidential elections in Iran—to be held on 19th May—is for the regime first and foremost about political theatre, turnout and legitimacy. For Iran’s leaders a balance has to be struck between having a credible competition and retaining control over the process. When this works well, the stability of the regime is reinforced, as with the election of the current president Hassan Rouhani in 2013, and the somewhat opaque parliamentary elections in 2016. The calamitous presidential election of 2009—when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s tainted victory led to mass demonstrations by reformists—are a good example of what happens when the system breaks down. Indeed, the experience of 2009 has so scarred the political elite, not least the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that extra care and attention is now given to the management of the elections. The voting itself is a mere punctuation point in a wider process of negotiation—and manipulation.

Iran credits itself with being one of the few countries in the region to actually hold competitive elections. Its chief rival for the mantle of “Muslim democracy” has been Turkey, but events there have taken a turn for the worse, so Iran no longer has to worry about the comparison. That said, the colourful nature of the election campaign, including the sometime rumbustious candidate debates, should not disguise the fact that the process is heavily managed and the system open to abuse.

The most obvious part of this is the opaque vetting procedure administered by the Guardian Council, a conservative body of 12 lawyers, half appointed by the Supreme Leader, who are not obliged to give any reason for their disbarment of candidates. There is an appeals process but this rarely leads to significant changes. This year some 1,600 hopefuls registered their candidacies, which the Guardian Council, in a spectacular exercise of administrative efficiency, managed to whittle down to six in the space of a week.

Of these six, only four are significant figures with a chance of winning. One of whom is the current occupant, Hassan Rouhani, and another his vice-president and wing-man in this election whose role is to support him, Ehsaq Jahangiri. Their two opponents are the current Mayor of Tehran, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, competing in his third successive election; and the dark horse, cleric Ebrahim Raisi, recently appointed head of the largest religious foundation in Iran, the Imam Reza shrine complex in Mashhad. Raisi, a noted hardliner with a career to date in the Judiciary, who was involved with the mass execution of prisoners ordered by Khomeini that occurred at the end of the 1980s, has been talked of as a possible successor to the Supreme Leader, so his entrance has raised some eyebrows.

It seems impossible to most observers that Raisi would enter the race simply to face humiliation at the hands of the incumbent and at the very least he will have to put in a good showing. He has, of course, been helped by a sympathetic environment: a fawning hardline press which has peremptorily promoted him to the status of “Ayatollah,” along with the support of the Revolutionary Guard establishment as well as Khamanei himself. None of these factors will probably endear him to the general public—indeed they may work against him. But it provides him with generous resources and access to the coercive tools of the state. His public relations team has been working hard and to some effect, turning their hitherto marginal candidate into a leading player.

What they may not have anticipated was his inexperience and lack of charisma when faced with any spontaneous situation—for example, the TV debates. Here Ghalibaf has proved the more impressive performer, and the man who should have played a supporting role has turned out to be the more combative of the two conservative candidates. The same can be said for the other side of the political divide. Jahangiri, who has positioned himself as the authentic voice of the Reformists, outshone Rouhani during the first debate, who by contrast put in a lacklustre performance.

Everyone expects Jahangiri to withdraw and give Rouhani a clear run, so there is no danger of Rouhani’s vote being split. Yet Jahangiri’s performance did have the unfortunate effect of exposing Rouhani’s limitations. Rouhani might have been expected to sweep to victory on the back of the 2015 nuclear deal, but the economic benefits have not impacted ordinary voters. Others have criticised Rouhani’s poor progress on political reform.

Significantly, none of the candidates have said they will tear up the nuclear deal. Iran does not want to be seen to be the party breaching the accord. But there is much criticism of the details and its apparent failure to yield a substantive economic dividend. Here Rouhani has found himself hostage to the grandiose claims he made on its implementation and public disenchantment is palpable, not least because few expect Rouhani to be more effective if he gets a second term. Indeed, experience suggests that presidential second terms are usually more constrained than the first. Rouhani’s opponents will hope that disenchantment, apathy, and a little help from their “friends” in high places will ensure that Rouhani will suffer the ignominy of being a one-term president.

All things being equal, Rouhani should secure a second term, even if, as is probable, he is forced into a second round. He is still generally regarded as the best of a rum lot. The trouble with elections in Iran is that things are never equal.