One thing that Covid-19 has knocked on the head is the Ferrero Rocher side of the ambassador business: the elegant reception which, for many, will be all the word “diplomacy” conjures in their minds. Insofar as diplomacy is about representation, flying the flag of your country, showing who you are and why your country matters are a significant part of the business. But the champagne glass is a distorting prism. Yes, diplomacy is a contact sport, but its principal stock in trade is knowledge and influence.
When the French socialists under François Mitterrand won power in 1981, many of the key members of the new government had in opposition sat round the kitchen table of a young member of the British Embassy in Paris, whose job it was to get to know them. When, during the Falklands War, Margaret Thatcher was at loggerheads with Al Haig, the US secretary of state, the path to understanding was laid by the British Ambassador, Nicko Henderson, who had spent the previous two years playing tennis with Haig each week. Anyone who has ever wondered why Nelson Mandela did not regard the British government with profound suspicion need look no further than the practical assistance rendered by British diplomats in South Africa during the apartheid era to health projects in the townships, many of them run by the ANC.
Some of diplomacy is public. Much of diplomacy is about effecting change, and most of that has to be done behind the scenes.
As a diplomat, you have to understand how the country where you are serving works: relatively easy in a democracy, much harder in a country such as China, where those in government have a line to peddle and even outside government people (when accessible) fear to talk openly. The constant challenge then is how to do business with an unpalatable regime, while also trying to support the forces of democratic change and the human rights of the country’s citizens: how to be “in” with the “outs” without being “out” with the “ins.”
The British government of the day got it wrong in the 1970s in believing in the survivability of the Shah of Iran and not accurately assessing the strength of the outlawed opposition. Yet no British government can afford to neglect the commercial opportunities in a country which may bring jobs and prosperity to its own citizens. This makes for messy and unpalatable choices. In such countries, social media platforms are increasingly tools of diplomacy, creating a window of access to information for people who would otherwise see nothing beyond their own government’s propaganda.
Almost as hard for diplomats, in today’s world, is imparting their knowledge and judgments forthrightly to those in government back home. Kim Darroch, Britain’s former ambassador in Washington, paid with his job for the truths he told about the Trump administration; and there was little sign that the British government paid heed to his advice. Had it done so, Theresa May would not have been so rash as to invite Trump on a state visit. For Darroch was giving his best judgment, based on travelling throughout the United States and getting to know the key people in the administration, the opponents waiting in the wings, Congress, the media and (the most difficult thing of all for a foreign diplomat) ordinary members of society.
One of the advantages of Britain’s EU membership was the leverage borne of the political, economic and development relationships which, collectively and individually, the 28 established and nurtured around the world. “Give me a ton of coal and I will give you a foreign policy” was the dictum of Britain’s post-war foreign secretary, the trade unionist Ernie Bevin.
The United Kingdom’s economic, and therefore political, clout will be diminished outside the EU. But we still have assets we can bring to bear: our language, our cultural reach (not least through the BBC), the British Council and more world-class universities than any country other than the US. Our programme of development assistance is still larger than that of most other European countries, despite its recent reduction. We remain a key member of Nato (the only large member apart from the United States to pay our promised level of contribution). We are a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Despite the short-sighted dishonesty of our government in proposing to break international law last year, we still stand in the world for respect for the law, for championing human rights, for free speech and for parliamentary democracy.
The fights against international terrorism and global warming are high on the agenda of a British government which remains keen to strengthen the tools of diplomacy through the G7 and G20, and through building reinforced cooperation with countries such as Japan and India. But the biggest challenges are those created by the increasing dominance, and desire for domination, of China, and the destruction of western democratic solidarity wrought by President Trump. Despite its fawning sycophancy towards Trump, this British government has more in common with Joe Biden. There needs to be a shared agenda to reset the west’s relationship with China.
That will require the UK to reinvigorate its bilateral diplomacy with the EU countries which are no longer our partners but remain our closest neighbours and allies. Britain’s bilateral diplomatic presence in EU capitals was drawn down while we were in the EU, where so much business was done on EU networks. Now, bilateral diplomacy is back. There will be new tools and new skills, but the basics of knowledge, influence and judgment will be as important as ever.
