It was, in the end, a comfortable victory. In the second round of the French presidential election, Emmanuel Macron defeated Marine Le Pen by 58 per cent to 42. It was not as overwhelming as the 66 to 34 margin by which he had beaten her in 2017, still less the 82 to 18 victory of Jacques Chirac against her father in 2002. But it is the first time in 20 years that an incumbent French president has secured a second term.
Foreign policy did not feature much in the election campaign, with one exception: Russia. Time and again Macron brought up his opponent’s openly expressed admiration for President Putin, her apparent endorsement of his annexation of Crimea and her party’s acceptance of a loan from a Russian financial institution. In their two-and-a-half-hour television debate on 20th April, he put it bluntly: "When you talk to the Russians, Madame Le Pen, you are talking to your bankers."
Le Pen had condemned the invasion of Ukraine but had also emphasised the need to find a constructive relationship with Russia once the war is over. Had she won, she would probably have stopped French arms supplies to Ukraine and suspended the implementation of sanctions. Her commitment to withdraw from Nato’s military command structure and to demand radical reforms to the EU would have been a huge distraction from both organisations’ current focus on the war in Ukraine. No wonder that President Zelensky, while professing not to want to interfere in French politics, made a point of emphasising his appreciation of Macron’s support.
In the run-up to the invasion and in its immediate aftermath, Macron saw himself as the only western leader capable of engaging with Putin—partly because as a head of state he was Putin’s formal equal, and partly because France is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. He spent over 20 hours in conversation with the Russian leader, including a six-hour meeting in Moscow on 7th February and 10 telephone calls. It was all in vain. As Macron himself acknowledged, Putin was impervious to argument and unwilling to discuss ways in which the war might be brought to an end.
Macron has stopped trying to talk to Putin for now, but has said that he does not rule out doing so in future if it seems useful. He has been careful to keep Zelensky informed of his attempts at mediation and seems to have Zelensky’s confidence. If Putin were in the mood to contemplate compromise, Macron would be well placed to help broker it. Sadly, though, Putin seems committed to a military solution.
France has delivered, or is in the process of delivering, significant amounts of weaponry to Ukraine, including the Caesar heavy artillery system. Macron will help ensure that Ukraine is able to resist effectively for as long as it is willing.But the war has forced him to adjust his thinking about European defence. Nato, which he once foolishly described as brain dead, has shown itself to be the key institution upon which most European countries rely for their security. President Biden, for all his gaffes of communication, has proved to be a safe pair of hands and has responded effectively to Putin’s challenge. The EU is not going to replace Nato or Europe’s relationship with the United States any time soon.
In a way this suits the French president. He has never seen the EU’s institutions as playing a leading role in defence or foreign policy: certainly not if that would mean Macron himself playing less of a role. He has not really sought to involve the presidents of either the European Council or the Commission in his discussions with Putin, and only one of his telephone calls has included the chancellor of Germany. When he talks of European autonomy he seems to envisage a Europe of member states led by France, not a strengthening of the EU’s own institutions. Macron was reportedly annoyed that both Ursula von der Leyen and Johnson visited Kyiv before him. It will be galling for him to hear Zelensky praise Johnson as one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters.
Macron now sees himself as the EU’s leading statesman. His only potential rival, Olaf Scholz, does not have either the communication skills or the political authority to challenge him. But Macron must also realise that any new European defence architecture will require the blessing of the United States—and the participation of the United Kingdom.
