Two aims of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have come to a head in what is his second major attempt at subjugating Ukraine to Russian mastery—the first, of course, resulted in the illegal annexation of Crimea at a cost insufficient to deter another try. The Russian president aims to further limit Ukraine’s political options in relation to the west, while simultaneously extracting concessions on a wider agenda of weakening Nato and the EU. Keeping Ukraine under threat of the use of force and sowing political turmoil must seem to him a promising way of achieving these twin goals.
What is the motive in relation to Ukraine itself? People say it would be an offence to Putin’s authoritarian regime to have a thriving Ukrainian democracy on his doorstep—an implicit threat to his power at home. This is true, but not the whole story. Putin’s reading of Russian history leads him to assert that the country has an inherent right to exercise imperial power and control a sphere of influence which others should not seek to challenge. Hence his assertion about the fall of the Soviet Union being a catastrophe. He sees Ukraine as a key element in the reconstruction of Russia’s powerbase—and the use of military force, combined with fabricated political justifications, as a legitimate way of achieving his goals. He has invented a false narrative of Nato encroachment on Russia’s neighbourhood, which he demands should be rolled back. He wants to see Nato cease military activity in some existing members states and pledge not to accept new ones, notably Ukraine.
Putin knows perfectly well that Nato will not accept such limitations. The tactic is however a good way of putting the military alliance on the backfoot, as the crisis he has induced shows up divisions among its members. It has obliged the United States to take notice and put Putin centre stage, at the same time as it has provided cover for Moscow to paint Nato as the party guilty of creating insecurity.
Creating a false narrative of its own is not a game Nato can play. Nor is it going to threaten direct counterforce. Nato has made it clear that while it will protect its own members and will help Ukraine defend itself, it will not fight in Ukraine. That puts the alliance in a poor position to get Putin to pull back the 130,000 or so troops he has arrayed along the border between Ukraine, Russia and Belarus—the last of which is now the obedient satellite state that Russia hopes Ukraine will become. The stage is thus set for a war of nerves with the west in which, pretty much indefinitely if he so chooses, Putin can simultaneously deny any intention of using force in Ukraine while still building up all the elements necessary for its exercise.
Putin has so far retained the initiative. He is reasserting Russian influence in Europe not just, as hitherto, through covert “greyzone” activity which falls somewhere between peace and outright conflict, but by potentially bringing important economic issues, such as energy supplies, also into play. This enables him to pursue his second aim, which is to make the world understand that important matters cannot be settled without the assent of Moscow and the satisfaction of Russian interests. And the world should remember that Russia is a great power with its own authoritarian friends.
Making the political weather in this way raises the stakes—not just for Nato, but Moscow too. The severity of the sanctions which will be imposed were Russia to invade Ukraine should indeed give Putin pause. He may underestimate their effect, calculating that Russia was able to survive those imposed in the wake of the seizure of Crimea and observing that the current international price of oil, which would increase still further in the event of war, is filling the Russian coffers nicely. On the other hand, the reluctant statement by Germany that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea would be unlikely to come into operation in the event of invasion is a warning to Putin. A visible political and economic setback of this kind would have long-term consequences for Russia.
Indeed, the rewards available from Putin’s tactics may already be diminishing. He has woken up a sleepy Nato in a major way but, while he has had the satisfaction of stoking division in the alliance about the right response, he has also aroused levels of distrust in his intentions which will heighten vigilance about Russian behaviour and increase willingness to invest in more security. Putin must also know that invading Ukraine, with the ensuing loss of life, would carry its own penalties, going well beyond anything the alliance might impose. The Russians would have to occupy Ukraine militarily and rule with an iron fist to keep a political grip, making its successful integration into the Russian sphere of influence exceptionally difficult to achieve.
Which is why it will be important to be on the watch for a less costly but, from Putin’s point of view, potentially more rewarding outcome: the installation of a puppet regime in Kiev. Apart from military help which can never be enough to thwart Russian invasion, western democracies, especially those in Nato and the EU, must give the government in Kiev the political support needed to increase confidence and prevent Putin achieving his goal by subversive means. This involves demonstrating that the commitment to Ukraine is long term and serious. Do we have the stamina and determination to do this?
