Defence review: what is Britain's place in the world?

Despite some recent evidence to the contrary, the British have a vocation for strategy. We did not outfight Germany twice in the 20th Century; we did, though, make better use of intelligence and industrial production, exploit the potential of maritime power and, above all, make better alliances. It is in the co-ordinated application of all instruments of national power in pursuit of clearly defined objectives that strategy finds its highest form of expression.

That expression has been conspicuously absent for much of this century and even the casual observer might recently have noticed both the Prime Minister and Chancellor making reference to a comprehensive strategy for Syria. This reflects an attempt in Whitehall to re-establish strategy as a function of whole government rather than the squabbling fiefdoms of individual departments that characterised much of the initial response to the wars of 9/11.

And about time too, because the world has become a much more complicated place. Islamic State (IS) grabs the headlines with its pervasive terrorist threat, but it wasn’t long ago that the Russians were using novel tactics in Ukraine that were neither conventional nor terrorist, and at the same time both of these, that became known as hybrid warfare. Meanwhile, China continues to test the limits of American power in the Western Pacific in a potential confrontation that has a very traditional, almost early 20th Century, great power look about it. So any review conducted today has to address a strategic landscape more complex—though not necessarily more dangerous—than any time since 1945.

So it is not just about the numbers of ships, tanks and aircraft. We will fight simultaneous fixtures, home and away. This will require more resources for intelligence, cyber and information operations. Development funding continues to be generous, and, tucked away in a separate announcement yesterday, was a substantial increase in funding for the BBC World Service, recognising that soft strategic instruments are as important as military capability in the era of smart power. The main winner in this strategic defence and security review is therefore strategy itself.

Mature commentary on strategic trends is all very well but it will not be the subject this morning of conversation in officers’ messes and gentlemen’s clubs. That will concentrate on inter-service rivalry and who emerges best from this quinquennial dogfight for defence dosh. The RAF will feel it has achieved a score draw in a difficult away match. Its air defence capabilities had been reduced to piteous levels against a manifest Russian threat and are now partially restored. Throw in maritime patrol aircraft, additional drones and an increase in the numbers of new generation of F35 aircraft and the RAF will be happy to settle, just.

The army, however, will not. Two new strike brigades are, of course, nothing of the sort; existing manpower will man long planned replacement equipment. More importantly from a parochial army point of view, this implies that the expeditionary land unit of manoeuvre (the force we might send to a theatre like Syria) will now be a brigade of about 5,000 troops rather than the more substantial division of about 30,000 troops we sent to Basra in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. More importantly still, a division has traditionally been regarded as the minimum level required for independent land operations within a coalition so we are implicitly abandoning the international stage. Those interested in defence debates might now keep an eye out for former generals beginning to express doubt about the relevance of Trident; future army ambitions will have to be funded from somewhere and Trident will be in their sights.

The clear winner will be the Royal Navy. The future navy will be have custody of both the national nuclear deterrent and the main national expeditionary capability contained in the new generation of Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. So there is some cause for satisfaction in the Senior Service, until, that is, you read the small print. In a chronically undermanned Service facing the imminent requirement to man the largest ships the navy has ever put to sea, a manpower uplift of 450 will simply not cut it. Probably the only way the surface flotilla will be maintained is by the emasculation of other parts of the naval service.

Note too the planned reduction in the numbers of Type 26 frigates. The aircraft carriers represent a lot of expensive eggs in one, potentially vulnerable, basket and they will only go into harm’s way if adequately protected by an escort force. Strip out escort numbers and you compromise the capital platform at the heart of a naval task force.

Taken overall, and despite defects in detail, this SDSR looks like a responsible attempt by a middle sized power to position itself in a difficult world.