The British government's refusal to exempt Catholic adoption agencies from its ban on discrimination against gay parents misunderstands the complex principles at stake. A liberal society faces a difficult decision when some of its members claim that their religious conviction will not allow them to obey a law that the majority deems necessary to prevent injustice. In such cases there is an apparent conflict between the demands of justice and respect for the freedom of citizens to follow their own convictions on matters of faith, and care is needed to discover the best way to reconcile the two liberal principles at stake. Liberal societies have exempted conscientious pacifists from frontline fighting in war, for example, in spite of the important principle that danger ought to be shared equally among citizens able to fight.
Discrimination against gays is indeed unjust; it is wrong for an adoption agency to refuse to help a gay couple adopt a child when they meet all other tests for qualified parents. But the leaders of the Catholic church not only disagree, as a great many private citizens no doubt disagree. They also believe that it would be unconscionable for them, a sin against cardinal tenets of their faith, to hand a child in their care to gay parents. True, Catholics are not forced to run adoption agencies. But requiring them to choose between abandoning a historical mission of charity, in which they have contributed much benefit, and acting as they believe their faith forbids, does place them in a position in which they think their duty is compromised however they choose. It also diminishes the chances of abandoned children finding a stable home: the Catholic agencies, by all reports, have been among the most conscientious and successful.
Is this harm necessary? Of course qualified gay couples have as much right to adopt as any other couple, and any policy that seriously compromised their opportunities would be unacceptable. But Catholic agencies arrange only some 6 per cent of adoptions in Britain, and they could be required, if they were exempted, to inform gay applicants that other agencies are fully subject to the anti-discrimination rules and even to supply a list of convenient other agencies. It is said that exempting Catholic agencies would mean that the government endorses their discrimination. But that is silly: no one thinks that when government exempts conscientious objectors it endorses their view that it is wrong to fight. It is also said that since the church has charitable status, exempting Catholic agencies would mean that the government subsidises discrimination. But that is wrong as well: it is more accurate to say that government subsidy makes possible the benefits that those who are exempted are nevertheless able and willing to provide. The NHS does not require Catholic doctors themselves to perform abortions.
The strongest argument against exemption is different: it is that since discrimination against gays is wrong in principle, no one should be allowed to discriminate even if the harm this causes is minimal. It would be wrong to permit restaurant owners to discriminate against black customers even if only a few wished to do so, and even if those owners claimed that their discriminatory policy was a matter of conscience. That is a very different matter, however. For reasons I describe in my new book, Is Democracy Possible Here?, respect for religious freedom does not mean accommodating any preference that anyone dresses as conviction, or any preference that a religious group chooses to call religious.
It means respect for convictions that are matters of central concern across religious traditions because they touch the meaning of human life, generation and death. Bigotry is not among those issues, but war, sexuality and procreation are. That is why it is wrong for the state to forbid early abortion, and also wrong for it not to permit and sanction gay marriage. Government that limits freedom in those ways takes sides on religious issues. Of course the state cannot allow people full licence even in matters of religious dimension: it must regulate marriage and adoption out of concern for those who would otherwise be harmed. But it should try to accommodate strongly held and genuine religious conviction when accommodation would not significantly impair important government policy or significantly damage anyone.