What if europe had no future, at least no future significantly different from its past? What if the absence of a future for Europe was in no way disastrous? And what if it was irrational to artificially try to create a future for Europe as a "political actor," a role for which it was never conceived, or rather, against which it has been conceived until now?
Between 1975 and 2000, the European process fulfilled, and even surpassed, the terms of its contract in relation to economic and legal integration: namely the euro and the Court of Justice. Fiscal, budgetary, education and transport policies have followed, or will do so. We have made rapid progress in the free movement of goods, labour and services. Why not tackle the second round of integration-political union-with the same vigour and enthusiasm? Why should the method of incremental change which has been so successful since the European Coal and Steel Community, be any less successful in transforming the world's largest commercial power into a political actor worthy of the title?
The failure to date of this second round is usually blamed on the inadequacies of the current personnel. Our heads of state are no longer up to the job. The generation which had first hand experience of the war knew what was at stake in the European project. The generation of pragmatic leaders which has replaced them did not pay with their blood and so do not have the same blind belief. We have promoted managers rather than prophets. How can the director of France and co, Germany plc, or Spain inc be expected to come up with a "vision" for Europe. Europe's current agenda propels young talent towards business and neglects the public good. This may be true but it is not the whole story.
The problem is that the methods which have made the economic and financial sectors so dynamic are not suitable for political and strategic questions. In the first case, half-measures are possible. Political decision-making, however, favours complete measures. And economies are more easily opened up than the political sphere (where territory has to be exclusively defined).
The European Community was born out of the rejection of war, but the peace it promoted was a continuation of the cold war by other means. From 1947 to 1989 the Soviet Union did Europe the great favour of providing it with a de facto border, the Iron Curtain, and a sworn enemy. All our lofty European values cannot detract from the fact that affirmation comes through negation: the "I" exists only in opposition; the "we" also. Give me a border and a threat and I will build a community, the rules of civilisation cannot be rewritten. Integration only takes place in the face of an outside danger. But where is Europe's other?
Is a strategic Europe possible? The "transatlantic partnership" is the tactful name given to an unequal relationship which leaves strategic questions and their costs in the hands of our big American brother. It seems doubtful that Europe will opt for such a problematic role in the near future. Why? Firstly, there is enlargement which will produce a muddle even more difficult to define than the current one. Then, there is the cultural fusion-European countries have adopted the same images, brands, machines and urban speak as the rest of the world. You don't define your interests in opposition to someone whose ways of thinking, feeling and talking have been incorporated into your own, unless you want to be seen as a traitor or a madman. The US dreams of a Europe which asserts its power but stays subservient-a Europe which pays its own way, has its own soldiers on the ground but under the command and with the aerial support of the US. The US wants Europe to be something and nothing at the same time. This ambivalence also reflects our caution. Independence is costly. We do not want to pay the price-financially, politically or morally. We make do with appearances.
No country or group of countries creates a constitution for the sake of it. The laws of the French Republic emerged from an existential crisis. Legal engineering responds to a need, it does not create that need. Over the last two centuries, numerous federations have been created here and there, but few have survived. In any case, no federation has grouped together long standing nation-states. Fortunately, history is a constant source of innovation and precedence is not binding. But seeing eminent minds call upon the Europeans to follow the 13 colonies in Philadelphia in 1787 with no mention of the fact that this constitution was a tool of national emancipation for the new states, the culmination of a war and a declaration of independence, calls into question the historical understanding of these experts. And why ignore the Monroe Doctrine which followed. For us who believe in democracy, "America for the Americans," goes without saying. But we shudder at the thought of the indignation caused by the idea of "Europe for the Europeans."
Leaving troublesome issues to the superpower and limiting ourselves to trade and pension funds is not in itself reprehensible. But it is unsurprising that under these conditions, Europe no longer excites those that are part of it. No amount of media intervention can rectify this. No one makes sacrifices, whether personal or political, if they are not guided by values which at least equal, if not surpass, the status quo.
Our European machine only interests its employees-the MEPs, bureaucrats, ministers, journalists, experts. Economic agents think at a global level; the average citizen, whose horizons are more limited, complains about eurocrats when he is affected by some regulation, but forgets about them the next day. In the world in which I move-which is far from being the most chauvinistic or depoliticised in France-the world of writers, philosophers and artists, I cannot recall one meeting, dinner, party, seminar or exhibition at which the EU was the subject of conversation. Over the past 40 years, we have had vicious arguments about everything, from Algeria to Kosovo, but never about the European project, except, fleetingly, for and against Maastricht. Indifference rules.
In 1955, at my school in Paris, the best pupils took German. It was seen as a natural subject to choose, and a fashionable one. Today, no bright or even average pupil would contemplate German. English has been taken up by all Europeans. Young people in France only have eyes and ears for what comes from across the Atlantic. We read, watch and talk to each other less and less. Our states are converging but as individuals, we ignore each other.
It could be said that the absence of popular fervour is not a bad sign; the best ideas have often emerged without the conscious knowledge of the majority. And many ridiculous ideas have mobilised entire generations-think of fascism, communism, nationalism-those great projects of which nothing now remains. The endurance of a historical idea cannot be measured by the extent to which its contemporaries are aware of it. After all, the Roman empire awoke one day to find itself Christian without the Romans having been warned of it (in fact, they were against it). It is useless to wait for the citizens of Europe to actively embrace European sovereignty. We should let it take shape quietly. And our grandchildren will wake up in 2040 swearing allegiance to the European Federation after a quiet referendum one Sunday (with a turnout of 12 per cent, extrapolating from current trends in France).
No European who knows his history can underestimate the value of a framework within which we can peacefully sort out those differences of opinion or interest which are perfectly natural in a plural Europe. From there, some people imagine that these rivalries can be abolished-a leap from history into utopia. Yet I am told that Germany did not consult her French friends before definitively giving up her nuclear industry, nor France her German friends before ending compulsory military service. Each one plays its own game and has its own vision of Europe. These differences should be recognised for what they are, natural phenomena, irritating maybe, but unchangeable facts and enduring identities that derive from a past, a language, a religion or simply from geographical positioning. To endow them with greater significance than they deserve or to stigmatise them as remnants of the past to be swept away, makes no sense.
In France, most opinion formers are fervent europhiles with the tendency to mistake their desires for reality. They denounce the rise of self-interest and petty bargaining, the small-mindedness of leaders whose actions fall short of those demanded by their mission. Europeanism is one in a long line of secular religions but one which has an advantage over previous religions in being able to advance under cover. It is not by chance that it draws together those who remain inconsolable from the loss of former faiths: the former devotees of the revolution and the orphans of Christianity (former leftists and christian democrats).
An integrated Europe is obviously desirable on paper. But it may provoke negative reactions in the national subconscious. With the best of intentions, a legal Europe could harm the "real" Europe, the one which limps along in the civil, industrial and service sectors, with remarkable success. The Europe of Europeans is doing fine. We should strengthen it as best we can. The europhiles' Europe, on the other hand, is making everyone suffer. Can we not conclude that the less we talk about Europe, the better it does?
