Since democracy came to South Africa in 1994, 16th December has been celebrated as a day of reconciliation. But this year it may instead hark back to its apartheid incarnation, when it marked the bloody defeat of Zulu king Dingane by early Afrikaner pioneers. For it is on this date that a group of former ANC leaders will launch a new political party, the most significant split in the organisation for almost 50 years.
Those who have quit the ruling party and emerged as leaders of the new entity—which may be called the Democratic Congress—include former defence minister, "Terror" Lekota, the former premier of the rich Gauteng province, Mbhazima Shilowa, and a host of other less senior leaders who back former president Thabo Mbeki.
It was Mbeki's precipitous removal from office by the Jacob Zuma-led ANC in late September that galvanised his supporters into action. The controversial Zuma, who defeated Mbeki for the ANC presidency in December 2007, forced Mbeki to step down as the country's president seven months before his term was due to expire, after a judge ruled not only that long-standing corruption charges against Zuma should be dropped, but also that they were politically motivated, driven by Mbeki.
Ten ministers resigned in sympathy with Mbeki, and other Mbeki supporters were purged from government and party positions. Although not all of those who resigned have yet pledged support to the new party, it is expected many will do so by the time of its launch.
It is difficult to gauge the support the new party will command. A little under 40 per cent of ANC members voted for Mbeki when he was defeated by Zuma. But not all of these will necessarily break their ties to the organisation. Its historic role has won the ANC enormous loyalty among many members. For them, it is not only a political organisation, but a large family to which they have belonged most of their lives.
The new party will attract some support from South Africa's other opposition parties. An alliance is possible and, down the line, mergers may be mooted with the official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (a mainly white, centrist group), the smaller Independent Democrats (led by Patricia De Lille, who campaigns on issues of morality and is popular in the so-called coloured or mixed race community centred in western Cape province) and the United Democratic Movement of former ANC deputy minister, Bantu Holomisa (a small, centrist party).
Even with alliances they are unlikely to make deep inroads into ANC support in the next election, likely in April 2009. They could, however, deprive the ANC of its two-thirds majority, which allows it to make changes to the country's constitution. The professed unwillingness of either Mbeki or, more significantly, Mandela, to campaign for the ANC will put a dent in its support.
In the medium term, a new, merged opposition movement would dramatically realign South Africa's politics. For the first time, the country could have a meaningful, non-racial opposition that could be a real contender for power.
However, to threaten the ANC, the new entity will have to overcome serious challenges. While Mbeki has not publicly endorsed the rebels, they are all very close to him. His autocratic style, his use of state institutions to fight personal political battles and failures on HIV/Aids, Zimbabwe and corruption, lost him the respect of a majority of ANC followers—and many South Africans outside of the party. The new party's criticisms of Zuma as undemocratic and intolerant will seem less credible given their support of, and active participation in, Mbeki's iron rule.
But one thing the new party won't lack is money. A number of its supporters are wealthy beneficiaries of the black economic empowerment that was driven by Mbeki, and benefited a small clique around him. The rebels' national convention in November was held at a sumptuous venue in Johannesburg's wealthy northern suburbs, drawing barbs from the ANC of elitism. Zuma, by contrast, came to power promising greater opportunities for all and with support from left-leaning trade unions.
The leadership of the new party will have to broaden beyond those who lost power for supporting Mbeki. But any association with the main opposition, Democratic Alliance, is also problematic. The two groups have common ground on constitutional issues, such as ending South Africa's restrictive PR electoral system, and the need for orthodox macroeconomics. However, the ANC's successful demonisation of groups like the Alliance could mean that former ANC voters are reluctant to favour a new party that includes them.
Turning this new coalition of the disaffected into a genuine centrist party, to counteract the left-wing ANC, will be difficult. Yet the global economic downturn, combined with corruption allegations and little concrete delivery by a Zuma administration, could change things. Certainly the ANC are rattled. Zuma's more capricious allies have pledged to "take up arms and kill" for their leader, while Zuma himself has hastily undertaken a nationwide tour.
The split has, to that extent, made the governing party more responsive to voters, presaging an environment of greater choice and competition. On the other hand, as the Zuma and Mbeki factions battled over the past few years, internal ANC politics got increasingly violent, culminating in the stabbing of the party's Western Cape general-secretary in June 2008.
We must hope that the new party precipitates a more tolerant, accountable South African democracy. If not, 16th December could again be remembered in South Africa for bloodshed, rather than national unity.
