After Iraq's election 2

Every major Iraqi community turned out to vote in high numbers, including the Sunnis who boycotted the last election in January. From 8m voters then, the number rose this time to 11m, out of 15m registered to vote. But where, prior to the Ba'ath regime, Iraqi parties covered the established political spectrum of left and right, this time identity politics took centre stage; large numbers voted on the basis of ethnicity or sect.

Nevertheless, in my conversations with Iraqis of various communities, it was region and class that seemed to determine voting choices most strongly. Fawaz, a third-year chemistry student at Baghdad University and a Sunni, leaned towards a secular list but felt pressured to vote Sunni by the shadowy violent groups in his mixed neighbourhood, al-Hurriya in Baghdad, where both Sunnis and Shias have been targeted.



More broadly, these elections, and the constitution approved in October's referendum, have entrenched the ethnic polarisation of the Iraqi political scene, undermining the larger national Iraqi identity. This is not entirely the Iraqis' fault. It is also the effect of the US-led coalition approach to Iraq as a mere construct of three Ottoman provinces, with each roughly containing one of the three groups: Kurd, Shia and Sunni. This attitude ignores 80 years of an active Iraqi national identity, where politics took many different covers that were not always defined by identity.

For the Sunnis, this election is their belated effort at repackaging themselves as the Sunni community, just like the Shias did in the January election and the Kurds chose to do in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war. There were several contending Sunni lists in the Sunni triangle and in Baghdad. Turnout was robust, with stories of families being forced out of their homes to ensure full participation. This is a marked distinction from January. There is a feeling that democratic participation is unstoppable, like a train passing through that all will join at different stations. The Sunnis understood that the elections were their best chance at playing a role in Iraq's politics.

As for the running of Iraq, it will be difficult to find a compromise that will form a national unity government any time soon. The UIA, the religious Shia list which preliminary results suggest has won a large majority, stands in stark contrast to the Sunni lists, such as the National Dialogue Front and the National Accord List, both of which have strong Arab nationalist leanings and oppose federalism and decentralisation. Sunni politicians have already issued statements suggesting vote-rigging, and if these initial skirmishes develop into a prolonged sectarian conflict and the coalition forces pull out, the Kurds, the third major grouping, may see secession as the best option.

A leading Sunni tribal sheikh summed up the issue by saying to me, "Even if we only achieve 30 per cent of our requirements, Iraq will move forward, but we cannot be under the rule of the mullah taking orders from Iran. They want to extend their Persian empire here. We are proud Iraqis and our roots run very deep."