Preface:
The Europe debate has moved up a gear, driven by the changes required by EU enlargement and by Joschka Fischer's now celebrated Berlin speech in May. To counter an enlarged EU's inefficiency and lack of legitimacy, Fischer proposed a classic federal structure: a European parliament and government with real legislative and executive power, circumscribed by a constitution. Such proposals are not new-elements of it already exist. Fischer's originality lies in the idea that a core group should forge ahead, leaving the rest behind. Eventually, they would abandon the gradual pooling of sovereignty for a once-and-for-all constitutional settlement, allocating powers between centre and states.
But federalism is not a popular concept in France, least of all with Jean-Pierre Chevènement (who opposed the Maastricht treaty). For this leftist Republican, sovereignty resides at the national level, though this does not preclude delegating power to Brussels. Chevènement's view carries extra weight because it is close to that of Lionel Jospin.
The irony is that the Europe debate is still, to a large extent, driven by national interests. France has always defined its influence in Europe by leaving other countries behind, especially Britain (hence President Chirac's endorsement of the pioneer group idea). Meanwhile, Fischer is arguing for a neat allocation of powers in the EU, as in the Federal Republic.
As Martin Wolf wrote recently in the FT, there are three responses to integration: "The first (the German) combines maximum integration with some kind of federalism; the second (the French) combines maximum integration with control by governments; and the third (the British) combines minimum integration with control by governments? But the federal ideal is unworkable, bureaucratic inter-governmentalism is intolerable, and minimal integration is unavailable."
Can the EU transcend these models? What is frustrating about the following debate is that it ends just where it should begin, with the question: what belongs to the nation and what to the federation? Perhaps a dose of Anglo-Saxon empiricism is required to find the answer.
Ben Hall
Le Monde/die Zeit: Joschka Fischer, what was your reaction when you heard Jean-Pierre Chevènement, in response to your speech in Berlin, say that Germany was still dreaming of the Holy Roman Empire and had not fully recovered from the Nazi period?
Joschka Fischer: In France, Jean-Pierre Chevènement is regarded as a supporter of national sovereignty. By contrast, I am a convinced integrationist. Perhaps that's what bothers him. Alternatively, perhaps what he is saying is that Germany has a tragic history in which the creation of the nation-state was blocked. And that Germany wants to turn its back on the nation-state in order to escape its past-seeking salvation in an abstract conception of Europe.
Le monde/die zeit: Is this not the case?
JF: No. Jean-Pierre Chevènement underestimates what has happened in the past ten years. Now, after 150 years of tragic history, the Germans understand themselves. Politically and culturally, the Germans are as happy with themselves as the French are, even with their history. Our history is unfortunately different. But the "German question" is no longer open-neither internally nor externally. The final step has been the move from Bonn to Berlin. Its symbolic importance cannot be overestimated.
Le Monde/die zeit: Do you agree with Joschka Fischer?
Jean-pierre Chevènement: Let me say at the outset that there is nothing more important than a close understanding between France and Germany on Europe. So, where are we today? Germany is reunited, has a 50-year heritage of constitutional patriotism and a capital once more in Berlin. The conditions exist for Germany no longer to be afraid of itself. But the past weighs on Germany as it does on France. France remains very marked, not only by the French Revolution but also by the traumatic events of 1940. It seems quite natural to me that Germany is tempted to demonise the idea of the nation-state. Traditionally, the idea of the nation-state in Germany was confused with the concept of ethnicity, the concept of the Volk, which until last year was still the basis of the right to German citizenship. Of course, the change in the right to citizenship-the introduction of jus solis-is something which not only changes the definition of a foreigner, but also the definition of a German. It should lead to a new conception of the nation as a community of citizens. If, after so many dramas, wars and catastrophes, Germany has now arrived at a civic understanding of the nation, then the time is right for a frank, direct relationship where we are able to say things to each other which, even a few years ago, we would not have dared to say. There is no need to seek refuge in a vague federalism.
Le Monde/die zeit: Is the temptation to demonise the nation, which existed before reunification, past?
JF: If there was one reason for me becoming interested in politics, it is this confrontation with the idea of the German nation. I still remember my first visit to Paris in the mid-1960s: the uncomplicated relationship between the generations, a flourishing national culture, everyone singing the same songs. At home, by contrast, everything was contaminated. The best of our national traditions had been infected by the Nazis. Thus it was difficult for us to develop a modern understanding of the nation as a community of citizens. Germany did not have a bourgeois revolutionary tradition to which it could refer. If the parliament in Frankfurt had succeeded in 1848, things would have been different. We would never have known an ethnic Germany, but rather a self-confident, constitutional Germany with a democratic, revolutionary tradition. It was not so. We were only liberated from our history by the peaceful revolution of 1989. We are indebted to the decision of the Americans to stay in Europe after 1945, as well as to Schuman and Monnet for proposing a new principle of statecraft-the principle of integration. The irony is that just as we have inherited the classic form of the nation-state, it is no longer big or powerful enough to decide the fate of the peoples of Europe. We must now transcend the old European state system. On this point, I am a French revolutionary. I want to abolish the ancien r?me. To the barricades!
J-P C: But against whom is this revolution.
J.F: Against the ancien r?me in Brussels.
J-P C: I don't think that's the problem. Surely the issue is globalisation. There are positive aspects to globalisation, but also a lot of negative ones. It is an untamed process which takes place beyond the control of citizens. It is against this that we need a revolution. We will return to that later. Back to Europe: for this pivotal relationship between France and Germany to work, we need to be able to face up to Germany's history. I have tried hard to understand what happened in Germany. And I think it is the result of the late birth of the German nation, as you explained, and the failure of the liberal, democratic revolution of 1848-9. The bourgeoisie came to power under Bismarck in the shadow of the aristocratic and military classes. It is thus possible to see why it has a different conception of the nation from France's. But perhaps I misread your recent speech-perhaps I am confusing Joschka Fischer with J?Habermas.
JF: It's a confusion which flatters me.
J-P C: Habermas is a distinguished figure, but his idea of the nation as an entirely civic entity is somewhat intangible and detached from historical reality.
JF: Habermas's principal theme is the reconciliation of the German nation with the bourgeois revolution. He developed it through the concept of constitutional patriotism. You can see that we have now disposed of an ethnic concept of the nation. Consider the debate on nationality in Germany, or the debate on immigration. With the next generation, this theme will be closed for good. I am convinced of that. And I reject the claim that we Germans use Europe to escape our identity. After the war, the desire to escape our history was strong. Things are different now.
J-P C: Habermas's concept of constitutional patriotism is too superficial. According to Renan's definition, the nation is defined by a heritage of shared memories as well as a desire for community. We cannot distinguish so clearly between the abstract idea of a community of citizens and the idea of an historical community. In actual nation-states, the two are mixed up.
Le monde/die zeit: Is this limited to the nation-state?
J-P C: No. It need not be limited to the nation, but there is not yet a European people. To be honest, the idea of European citizenship is a joke, and will remain so until we create a common space for debate at the European level. We cannot put institutions before political debate. Politics must precede institutions, otherwise we will be playing Meccano.
JF: I see it more dialectically. I think it is dangerous to make a distinction between a community of reason and an historic community, because you fall back on a pre-constitutional, ethnic interpretation of the nation. Our nations are much older than our nation-states. The French revolution created the modern nation-state based on universal values. Eventually it triumphed in Germany, too. The evidence for that is the response to the question: did the end of the second world war represent a liberation for us Germans-yes or no? Today, even the democratic right responds in the affirmative. With his brilliant speech of 8th May 1985, Richard von Weizs?er, then president of the Federal Republic, became the first Christian Democrat to claim that 8th May 1945 was a liberation, thus breaking the taboo. It was an enormous step. In the light of this, the monument to the victims of the Shoah, which is to be erected in Berlin, does not represent a rejection but an affirmation of our nation.
J-P C: The defeat of 1945 was clearly a liberation. However, the Nazi period only lasted for 12 years. The liberation of 1945 does not have to lead to eternal dependence on the liberator. We Europeans must learn to regard the US as a partner and not as a protector. If we create a badly thought-out European federation, the real unifier will be the US.
JF: I do not think that 1945 has made us dependent on our liberators. I have always been in favour of alignment with the west, but I have often criticised the policies of the US government. I am aware of what we owe the Americans, but I want a strong Europe because I think that the US needs a strong partner-it is in the Americans' own interests. This partner cannot be France, Germany, Poland or Britain alone-but together, we can fulfil this role. The basic question "a federation-yes or no?" is now academic. Many basic elements of a federation have been in place for some time. The euro is part of that federation. And what is Schengen? As for EU citizenship, I have quite different rights in Paris now from those I had in 1968, and vice versa for Jean-Pierre Chev?ment in Berlin.
J-P C: If Europe is to define itself, we need a social or geopolitical project-for example, to anchor Russia to Europe's destiny. If Russia does not become a stable country, Europe will be prone to instability.
JF: True. Russia is crucial. We have had many discussions about this in the council of ministers. But where is this Europe with the capacity to act?
J-P C: I think we have to talk about politics first and then the institutional elements will follow. Now, everything begins with the admission that Europe as conceived by Schuman and Monnet is ineffective and will become even more so with enlargement. So we need to embrace the reforms being debated by the Intergovernmental Conference which ends in December [reweighting votes in the council of ministers to give big countries more clout; an extension of qualified majority voting; limiting the number of commissioners; and, most controversially, amending the provisions on closer cooperation]. But I also fully support the position of French foreign minister Hubert V?ine in his response to you [he argued that the French model of a union of nation-states was incompatible with Fischer's plan for a federal government for the EU]. In areas such as foreign policy and defence, we should move towards further cooperation. But I do not believe that Europe can assert itself as an association of interdependent nations if we not have a political debate on basic issues such as the model of society we want, the form of civilisation we represent in relation to America, our geopolitical project. Without this, it is all just institutional technicalities.
JF: But how can we talk about an enduring association between Russia and Europe when we are not even in a position to integrate the countries of central Europe? The current institutional arrangement does not allow it. So we must restructure our institutions.
J-P C: We must do the two things at once if we want to be more than an American suburb.
JF: In fact we are facing a European revolution, a constitutional revolution. I agree with you that it also requires a common political understanding. We can only preserve the European social model under a common European umbrella. As individual states, we are too weak. The classic European nation-state is too small in an age of globalisation.
J-P C: But how can your European federation enable us to protect our social model-for example, the right to work-against the challenge of globalisation?
JF: A European federation does enable us to protect Europe's interests. Let me give you a few current examples. When Boeing and Lockheed merged, and the European commission expressed concern, the executives in Seattle took notice. If it had been the anti-monopoly bureau in France or the German cartel office, they would not have been interested. Another example: none of us like GM foods. Whether or not they are safe is another question. The fact that Europe is united on this issue has an impact in the US. Or take the death penalty. Following Europe's decision to abolish the death penalty, debate on the issue is slowly emerging in the US.
J-P C: Two of the examples you mentioned bear no relation to the economic and social situation. And the European commission has no tools at its disposal with which to introduce greater balance between capital and labour. The European competition commissioner only considers competition rules-not employment or environmental impact.
Le monde/die zeit: Does this mean that you would like to increase the powers of the commission in Brussels?
J-P C: Well, it would certainly be better for the commission to take factors into consideration other than the rules of competition. We have done this at the national level, but not at the European level. In the past, Europe was associated with Christianity or with the white race. It is now in danger of simply representing the neo-liberal economic order.
JF: This is a separate debate. I consider myself to be on the left, but I think a modern left must rethink the relationship between the individual and the collective and our attitude towards the market. We all face similar problems. But if we want a common social policy, Europe needs functioning institutions. We need a European parliament whose members defend what they have decided in Strasbourg in their home countries. This is a key point. Not new institutions for their own sake, but a vibrant European democracy. With a loosely connected confederation of states, we will achieve nothing in an era of globalisation.
J-P C: I am less optimistic than you about the consequences of globalisation. Globalisation creates many inequalities. Within the traditional framework of the nation-state, a certain balance was achieved between capital and labour. Today, we are again in an unbalanced system and this calls for economic government for the Euro 11. It is in the context of the Euro 11 that we should consider the future of employment in Europe. But I repeat: a functioning European democracy needs a common space for public debate. If this common space does not exist, we have nothing more than an illusory parliament; a fa?e to conceal the power of the oligarchs. Europe relies too much on private networks-its citizens do not exercise effective control. It is within nation-states that debate is most lively and honest, and where the real democratic decision-making still resides.
JF: The EU commission has become weaker, while the European parliament is stronger but has no real connection to national public opinion. At present it is only the European council of ministers, representing national governments, which has indirect democratic legitimacy. This is not a criticism but the decision-making process is not transparent. We must create a European space without destroying the national arena. What should the balance be between the national and the European? This is the question.
J-P C: We must first bring about more convergence between our states; but I do believe that sovereignty still resides with the people at national level. This does not prevent the development of common policies nor the delegation of power to Brussels.
JF: I am currently interested in the early phase of American constitutional history after 1776. At that time, there were no political parties. Similarly, today, there are no real European parties, only different attitudes towards Europe. The relationship between the nation-states and Europe constitutes the fundamental question. What belongs at the European level? What remains with the nation-state? I don't understand why you are against federalism. A centralised Europe should be your worst nightmare. If we agree that Europe is being created, what form should it take if not a decentralised federation? The choice is simple: a federal Europe or a centralised Europe? or no Europe at all, which would be the worst outcome.
J-P C: We could have an association of nation-states.
JF: That is not Europe at all!
J-P C: Let us start from where we are. The EU exists. I do not believe we can have a "federal" hard core. But we can have areas of reinforced cooperation.
JF: Like the Euro 11? That is already a federation.
J-P C: It isn't entirely a federation.
JF: In reality, the European Central Bank (ECB) is a federal bureaucracy. Eleven of us have handed over our monetary sovereignty to a bank.
J-P C: Personally, I was not a supporter of this outcome, and I am in favour of balancing the ECB with economic government. Ultimately, Europe is neither a federation nor a confederation. It is something which has never been defined by anyone.
JF: We have looked for a neutral German word to replace federation. Translated into French or English, it is always federation. So we are resigned to it.
J-P C: I don't understand how you intend to distribute competences between the federation to which you aspire, and the nation-states. Today the EU is responsible for everything-the length of a wheel axle, the date of the first day of the hunting season, the level of carbon dioxide in smoke emissions-and we are not about to renationalise all this. So what will actually fall within the competence of the nation?
JF: I can well envisage that certain competences would be given back to the member states.
J-P C: For example?
JF: You just mentioned several.
Le monde/die zeit: If you say that hunting should fall within the competence of the national state, you will be popular in France! But, gentlemen, we must stop there. Thank you.
