Gisela Stuart MP (Lab). Foreign Affairs Committee, 2001-2010. Member, Defence Select Committee
On my first visit to Afghanistan in 2004 there were no bullet proof jackets, or special protection. Later visits saw tighter security and by 2009 we completed “proof of life” forms in case of kidnap. And yet we said “things are getting better.” Al Qaeda and the Taliban were on the run, there was less poppy production, free elections, more girls at school, an Afghan Army and police force. Were we right? In his 1999 Chicago Speech, Tony Blair explained why we intervene in countries like Afghanistan. The current MoD regards balancing the books as its main aim and the Foreign Office can’t articulate a vision of the UK’s role. A good outcome in Afghanistan now seems to mean leaving without further loss of British life. I want the MoD to review military lessons learnt, including the decision to deploy in Helmand, and No 10 to make further Afghan aid contingent on human rights.
Douglas Carswell MP (Cons)
It was clear why we went in. On 9/11, terrorists attacked our friend and ally. Four weeks later we invaded Afghanistan, in support of the US, to destroy al Qaeda and those responsible for the atrocity in New York. The threat posed by training camps in Afghanistan, meant we couldn’t afford not to.
The question we spent the following 12 years never answering is what were our aims having done that? Were we there to develop the country? Fight the Taliban? Destroy the heroin crop? Build the Kajaki dam? Listening to ministers—first Labour, then coalition—I have heard all kinds of explanations, none of them convincing. Few of the reasons given for remaining in Afghanistan could have been regarded as justification for invading in the first place. So why did they become a rationale for remaining there?
We failed to quell Helmand—why didn’t our armed forces have adequate helicopters and other kit? I got very short shrift from ministers and the MoD each time I asked. Why? Are we incapable of producing ministers at the MoD who can do anything other than read out the brief that Sir Humphrey hands them? On a visit to Camp Bastion in 2007, I was struck by how permanent things seemed to be. A tented camp had grown into a steel and concrete settlement. An expeditionary war appeared to have become a permanent occupation. No one back in London seemed to be asking why. The war bureaucracy in Whitehall, once set upon a trajectory, just seemed to keep going.
Perhaps the fundamental question is how, in a democracy, can it be possible that such decisions can be taken almost by default, without any proper deliberation and debate. Why don’t those we elect—MPs—rather than unelected officials, do the deciding?
Clare Short, former Labour MP for Birmingham Ladywood
The big question, which has been hardly discussed, is why we deployed to Helmand for the second phase of the war. The first phase was the invasion, which had strong international support and was very successful. This was launched because al Qaeda had open training camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban quickly melted away and there was very little fighting or bloodshed. Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN’s special representative, led the Bonn process and after wide consultation a new constitution was drawn up and elections held in 2005.
Then John Reid, as Secretary of State for Defence, deployed British forces to Helmand. This is where all the killing and the dying happened. The Taliban and their wider supporters regathered. My conclusion is that this showed total incompetence in UK policymaking on military deployment and war. Reid wouldn’t have committed troops unless it was his military briefing that there was little risk. It was this deployment that was a total failure leading to terrible loss of life, defeat and a very uncertain future for Afghanistan. I suspect the explanation is the UK’s abject determination to please the US at all costs.
Jeffrey Donaldson MP (DUP). Member, Defence Select Committee
I fully supported the original decision of the UK government, together with our allies, to carry out military action in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was using the cover of Afghanistan to plot terrorist attacks. They were utilising territory ceded to them by the Taliban in northern Afghanistan as training camps and as a base. In the aftermath of 9/11, it was essential that these operating bases were destroyed. Short of removing the Taliban regime from Afghanistan, there was no long-term sustainable way in which the west could have achieved this objective.
That said, while I support the decision to substantially withdraw troops from Afghanistan by 2014, I am concerned about the long-term political stability of the country and the region. The Taliban is growing in strength in Afghanistan and I am fearful that, when coalition forces withdraw, there will be an onslaught against the government and army.
We must support the peace process and dialogue with the Taliban. Having been involved in the Northern Ireland peace process for many years, I know the challenge that such dialogue represents and recognise that prospects of a settlement are slim.
Nevertheless, every effort must be made to strengthen the democratic institutions in Afghanistan. This requires political investment by the west. In the end, we can invest heavily in strengthening the Afghan National Army and police but if there is not political stability and strong leadership to give direction to the security response, then I fear that we could end up back at square one, with Afghanistan being used as a base from which to launch terrorist attacks on the west and to create continuous instability in this vital region.
Madeleine Moon MP (Lab)
Our biggest failure was our inability to help build a viable civil society. We gave attention to building the Afghan police force far too late, allowed corruption to go unchecked for too long, lost the trust of much of the population. We failed to provide the basics ordinary people looked for: a justice system with police, magistrates, and judges, free from corruption and political influence; reliable utilities and jobs.
We are now both leaving and staying in Afghanistan. The majority of our forces and civil aid is withdrawing but we will remain part of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan and a financial contributor to maintain the ANSF. I fear we lack the courage to withdraw our ongoing financial aid if we see no improvement in corruption or the development of civil society. Whatever government replaces Karzai’s will, I fear, be supported through a dread of Taliban control, no matter how bad it is.
Sherard Cowper-Coles, former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan
Asked whether he thinks the war merited an inquiry: “Yes, although I don’t think there will be one—people are tired of it. Unlike Iraq, it was not illegal—but it was naive and over-optimistic.”
Compiled by Jay Elwes, Deputy Editor, Prospect
On my first visit to Afghanistan in 2004 there were no bullet proof jackets, or special protection. Later visits saw tighter security and by 2009 we completed “proof of life” forms in case of kidnap. And yet we said “things are getting better.” Al Qaeda and the Taliban were on the run, there was less poppy production, free elections, more girls at school, an Afghan Army and police force. Were we right? In his 1999 Chicago Speech, Tony Blair explained why we intervene in countries like Afghanistan. The current MoD regards balancing the books as its main aim and the Foreign Office can’t articulate a vision of the UK’s role. A good outcome in Afghanistan now seems to mean leaving without further loss of British life. I want the MoD to review military lessons learnt, including the decision to deploy in Helmand, and No 10 to make further Afghan aid contingent on human rights.
Douglas Carswell MP (Cons)
It was clear why we went in. On 9/11, terrorists attacked our friend and ally. Four weeks later we invaded Afghanistan, in support of the US, to destroy al Qaeda and those responsible for the atrocity in New York. The threat posed by training camps in Afghanistan, meant we couldn’t afford not to.
The question we spent the following 12 years never answering is what were our aims having done that? Were we there to develop the country? Fight the Taliban? Destroy the heroin crop? Build the Kajaki dam? Listening to ministers—first Labour, then coalition—I have heard all kinds of explanations, none of them convincing. Few of the reasons given for remaining in Afghanistan could have been regarded as justification for invading in the first place. So why did they become a rationale for remaining there?
We failed to quell Helmand—why didn’t our armed forces have adequate helicopters and other kit? I got very short shrift from ministers and the MoD each time I asked. Why? Are we incapable of producing ministers at the MoD who can do anything other than read out the brief that Sir Humphrey hands them? On a visit to Camp Bastion in 2007, I was struck by how permanent things seemed to be. A tented camp had grown into a steel and concrete settlement. An expeditionary war appeared to have become a permanent occupation. No one back in London seemed to be asking why. The war bureaucracy in Whitehall, once set upon a trajectory, just seemed to keep going.
Perhaps the fundamental question is how, in a democracy, can it be possible that such decisions can be taken almost by default, without any proper deliberation and debate. Why don’t those we elect—MPs—rather than unelected officials, do the deciding?
Clare Short, former Labour MP for Birmingham Ladywood
The big question, which has been hardly discussed, is why we deployed to Helmand for the second phase of the war. The first phase was the invasion, which had strong international support and was very successful. This was launched because al Qaeda had open training camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban quickly melted away and there was very little fighting or bloodshed. Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN’s special representative, led the Bonn process and after wide consultation a new constitution was drawn up and elections held in 2005.
Then John Reid, as Secretary of State for Defence, deployed British forces to Helmand. This is where all the killing and the dying happened. The Taliban and their wider supporters regathered. My conclusion is that this showed total incompetence in UK policymaking on military deployment and war. Reid wouldn’t have committed troops unless it was his military briefing that there was little risk. It was this deployment that was a total failure leading to terrible loss of life, defeat and a very uncertain future for Afghanistan. I suspect the explanation is the UK’s abject determination to please the US at all costs.
Jeffrey Donaldson MP (DUP). Member, Defence Select Committee
I fully supported the original decision of the UK government, together with our allies, to carry out military action in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was using the cover of Afghanistan to plot terrorist attacks. They were utilising territory ceded to them by the Taliban in northern Afghanistan as training camps and as a base. In the aftermath of 9/11, it was essential that these operating bases were destroyed. Short of removing the Taliban regime from Afghanistan, there was no long-term sustainable way in which the west could have achieved this objective.
That said, while I support the decision to substantially withdraw troops from Afghanistan by 2014, I am concerned about the long-term political stability of the country and the region. The Taliban is growing in strength in Afghanistan and I am fearful that, when coalition forces withdraw, there will be an onslaught against the government and army.
We must support the peace process and dialogue with the Taliban. Having been involved in the Northern Ireland peace process for many years, I know the challenge that such dialogue represents and recognise that prospects of a settlement are slim.
Nevertheless, every effort must be made to strengthen the democratic institutions in Afghanistan. This requires political investment by the west. In the end, we can invest heavily in strengthening the Afghan National Army and police but if there is not political stability and strong leadership to give direction to the security response, then I fear that we could end up back at square one, with Afghanistan being used as a base from which to launch terrorist attacks on the west and to create continuous instability in this vital region.
Madeleine Moon MP (Lab)
Our biggest failure was our inability to help build a viable civil society. We gave attention to building the Afghan police force far too late, allowed corruption to go unchecked for too long, lost the trust of much of the population. We failed to provide the basics ordinary people looked for: a justice system with police, magistrates, and judges, free from corruption and political influence; reliable utilities and jobs.
We are now both leaving and staying in Afghanistan. The majority of our forces and civil aid is withdrawing but we will remain part of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan and a financial contributor to maintain the ANSF. I fear we lack the courage to withdraw our ongoing financial aid if we see no improvement in corruption or the development of civil society. Whatever government replaces Karzai’s will, I fear, be supported through a dread of Taliban control, no matter how bad it is.
Sherard Cowper-Coles, former Ambassador to Afghanistan and Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan
Asked whether he thinks the war merited an inquiry: “Yes, although I don’t think there will be one—people are tired of it. Unlike Iraq, it was not illegal—but it was naive and over-optimistic.”
Compiled by Jay Elwes, Deputy Editor, Prospect
