What once seemed like an impossible dream is now reality: Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fallen. For Syrians, this is a moment of profound hope but also immense uncertainty. The pressing question remains: what comes next?
On the ground, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which fronted the main military offensive against the regime at the end of November, has wasted no time in consolidating its position, establishing an interim government and seizing control of the country’s transition from dictatorship to post-Assad future.
But HTS’s designation as a terrorist organisation, with the group’s roots in Isis and al-Qaeda, raises serious concerns about the nation’s trajectory. And while Syrians are navigating this critical juncture, the international community seems detached from developments. If regional and global powers fail to act decisively to support an inclusive transition led by Syrians themselves, the opportunity to stabilise the country—and, by extension, the region—may slip away. The cost of this would be chaos and violence—not the peace that Syrians desperately need and deserve after more than a decade of war.
HTS led the military campaign that ultimately toppled Assad, positioning the group at the centre of Syria’s political shift. Thought to comprise some 12,000–15,000 fighters, HTS has bolstered its image as a disciplined and pragmatic actor through extensive media outreach and savvy public messaging. Its leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has been catapulted into the global spotlight. Highly intelligent and pragmatic, he transformed HTS from a few dozen members in 2011 into the de facto ruler of Syria’s political transition today. This success has come through sidelining and eliminating other power centres within the group and among other rebel factions.
Since capturing the city of Aleppo in the initial offensive it led against the regime, HTS has pledged to protect civilians, safeguard minorities and preserve public institutions and assets. These promises, coupled with remarkable discipline in newly seized territory, lent credibility to its rhetoric. In the days when the regime was brought down there was no looting of public or private properties by HTS fighters. There were no reported violations against civilians (including minorities) or people affiliated with the regime, such as civil servants or police officers. HTS even protected public institutions. Further, the group’s fighters focused on battling the regime, following orders and moving on to new areas rather than staying to celebrate or exploit their gains.
However, HTS’s actions since Assad’s fall tell a different story. Benefiting from its superior organisation, resources and control over security in former regime territories, HTS moved swiftly to dominate the transition process. The group appointed the prime minister of its affiliated Salvation Government—a governing body that previously administered HTS-controlled territories in northwest Syria, with a population of some 4,000,000 in 2023—to head the interim national government. This manoeuvre has effectively placed HTS in a commanding position to dictate Syria’s political future.
The Salvation Government’s track record inspires little confidence in its ability to govern a larger territory. In the northwest, it was known for poor service delivery, a top-down approach to policy, and the exclusion of local communities from decision-making. Elections under its rule have been widely criticised as illegitimate and unrepresentative, while its administration has faced repeated protests over allegations of rights violations against political rivals, further tarnishing its reputation.
Even more troubling, however, is the unilateral manner in which HTS has dominated the transition to date. If things continue as they are, Syria’s political shift risks becoming a power grab that alienates other opposition groups and deepens existing divisions.
The transitional body’s mandate, limited by HTS to three months to signal that this is indeed a temporary arrangement, is set to expire in March. However, there is growing concern that HTS may exploit this period to consolidate power and impose its vision for Syria’s future. For example, the country’s constitution was drafted by the Assad regime in 2012 in order to cement its rule—and was summarily rejected by Syria’s opposition. There is consensus that suspending the constitution to allow for amendments is necessary in principle, but this has also been met with deep scepticism. The lack of transparency surrounding the process of reviewing the constitution and even the identities of the people who would be involved raises fears of unilateralism. Constitutional reform is too critical a matter to be dominated by a single actor or conducted in secrecy. It must be inclusive, deliberative and transparent.
If HTS seeks to replicate the Salvation Government’s model of governance across Damascus and other former regime-controlled areas, the results could be disastrous. Given the northwest's experience, such a move is unlikely to inspire public trust or deliver the accountability Syrians demand. Without participation from a broad base of the public, HTS risks perpetuating the very grievances that ignited the Syrian uprising in the first place.
Meanwhile, despite the lightning pace of developments on the ground, the international community remains conspicuously absent. From conversations during my recent visit to major capitals in Europe, there is clearly much hesitation when it comes to adopting a more active role in supporting Syria after Assad’s fall. The officials I spoke with gave the impression that they are in wait-and-see mode, observing how HTS and Jolani behave before deciding on next steps. They were focussed on HTS’s treatment of minorities, women’s rights, the group’s stance toward Israel and its willingness to allow refugees to return. But while states in the region and elsewhere are understandably cautious, their inaction is costly.
Saturday’s diplomatic summit in Jordan, which included countries in the region alongside the United States and the United Nations, offered a glimmer of hope that the momentum is shifting. A joint statement supporting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254—a roadmap for Syria’s political transition—signalled a renewed commitment to stabilising the country. However, HTS is creating a reality on the ground that is increasingly disconnected from the UN-led process.
Jolani has expressed a desire for the group to be delisted as a terror organisation and recognised as a political actor. This ambition gives regional and international powers critical leverage. By engaging cautiously with HTS, the international community can pressure the group to commit to an inclusive, democratic transition that extends beyond its rhetoric. However, such engagement must come with firm conditions: HTS cannot monopolise the process, sideline other Syrian actors or unilaterally impose its model of governance.
The stakes could not be higher. The decisions made in the coming weeks will shape Syria’s trajectory for generations. The international community must seize this historic opportunity to support a transition that is democratic and transparent. Such an effort would not only honour the sacrifices of millions of Syrians during years of war, but also lay the foundation for lasting peace and stability.
The ripple effects of Syria’s turmoil would extend far beyond its borders, threatening regional security. Continued instability could lead to groups—including the likes of Isis—using Syria as a base for launching attacks against other countries. Another wave of fighting in Syria could force those who have recently returned to the country to flee abroad once more. It could also drive out those who remained in Syria throughout the 13 years of conflict. This would create new waves of refugees.
It's not too late. A first step would be to send a clear message to HTS that the mandate of the interim government should not extend beyond March. Likewise, HTS should be pressured to clarify that this government will focus only on facilitating essential functions and services; it should not make any long-term changes, including constitutional reform. At the same time, international actors who care about the country should start engaging with all Syrian actors and facilitating meetings between them to agree on next steps, including the composition and mandate of the inclusive transitional body that should lead the country after March. Likewise, Syrian groups need help to start an inclusive process of constitutional amendment. Anything less would be a betrayal of their sacrifices—and a failure of global responsibility.
There is now a rare opportunity to transform Syria’s darkest chapter into the beginnings of a brighter future. The world must act decisively—not as passive spectators but as committed partners. This will help Syrians build a nation defined by justice, stability and hope.
