Since the 7th October Hamas attacks and the ensuing war in Gaza, the once relatively contained Iran-Israel hostility, ongoing for decades, has become an open and dangerous confrontation. It is driven by Iran’s ideological opposition to Israel’s existence, its broader regional ambitions and the activities of its support groups such as Hamas in Gaza, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, militia groups in Iraq and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad—collectively known as the axis of resistance. Israel, in turn, perceives Iran as a growing existential threat, particularly due to its nuclear programme and support for the axis groups that sit in the main on its borders. The conflict between the two countries remains one of the key historical, ideological and geopolitical fault lines in the Middle East, with no clear resolution in sight.
Two times now in one year, as an outgrowth of the war in Gaza, Iran has launched missiles directly at Israel. The first attack, on 13th April, was in response to the Israeli bombing of Tehran’s consular facilities in Damascus, Syria, where a number of senior Iranian military commanders were killed. After Israel responded with a 19th April strike on an Iranian airbase both sides retreated from further escalation. The second more surprising strike was launched recently, on 1st October, in retaliation for both the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and the recent assassination of Hezbollah commander Hassan Nasrallah on 27th September. For Tehran it was also an effort at reinforcing deterrence. At the time of writing, the Israeli government, in consultation with the Biden administration, is discussing the scope and scale of its response. Reports indicate that Israel might hit Iranian oil facilities, military bases or other strategically important sites. If Tehran considers this counterstrike disproportionate it could lead to further escalation, with Israel opening a third front in an already volatile Middle East.
Since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran and Israel have gone from having a cooperative and cordial relationship to one of deep hostility and confrontation. Before the revolution, under the rule of the Shah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi), the two countries, which both saw neighbouring Arab nationalist regimes as adversarial, maintained relatively close ties. Iran was one of the few majority-Muslim countries that did not oppose Israel’s existence, and there was bilateral economic, military and intelligence cooperation. Iran provided Israel with oil, and in return Israel offered agricultural and military expertise.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a dramatic change in Iran’s foreign policy, as a west-leaning secular government switched to a theocratic non-aligned one. The new leadership under the clerical firebrand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini adopted a strongly anti-Israel stance. Khomeini’s anti-imperialist government saw Israel as an illegitimate entity and a proxy of the United States. Because of this worldview and Iran’s desire to challenge Israel and expand its regional influence, it has instrumentalised the Palestinian cause for its own purposes.
From that period on, Iran began to support and fund Palestinian liberation groups opposed to Israel. Iran played a significant role in the creation of Hezbollah— which emerged after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah has engaged in numerous conflicts with Israel, including the month-long 2006 Lebanon War when, with Iranian financial aid, weapon, and military training, the group was able to withstand Israeli military pressure. Above all, Hezbollah and the axis groups have become a key component of Tehran’s defence strategy, as they are used to confront Israel indirectly through asymmetric warfare and to deter any Israeli attacks on Iran.
Prior to 7th October, the Iran-Israeli confrontation was often described as existing in the “grey zone” where both parties maintained low-level, limited operations against each other. This included attacks on ships in the open seas, cyber operations, and Israel’s assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist and sabotaging of nuclear facilities. Israel also played a role in encouraging President Trump to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018, with the US also imposing financial and economic sanctions on the Iranian economy. Despite these serious challenges, confrontation between the two sides remained indirect and relatively well managed.
Hamas’s attacks and the subsequent mobilisation of the axis of resistance against Israel, however, changed the dynamics between the two countries. On 7th October, Israel’s leaders awoke to discover their long-running axis containment strategy had failed. Israel’s military leadership came to understand that the only way for Israel to address its security crisis with the axis groups on its borders would be through eradicating the military threat posed not just by these groups but by Iran itself. This has led Israel to pursue a targeted campaign known as the “octopus doctrine”, which is designed to take out the “tentacles” in the form of the axis groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as to slowly go after the head of the octopus in Tehran. As part of this campaign, Israel has targeted Iran’s facilities abroad and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard commanders positioned across the region. Taken together, the Gaza war and the Lebanon front are the building blocks of a larger campaign being directed at Tehran.
Over the past year, despite escalation across the Middle East and its continued support for the axis of resistance, Iran has made clear that it wants to avoid a broader regional war. Because of this, Iran has not forcefully defended attacks against the axis and in many circumstances has practised strategic patience to avoid being drawn in. Yet this time, in response to domestic pressure and concerns over reputational damage, Iran’s leaders have felt compelled to respond to Israel’s octopus strategy with another missile strike.
There is no way to predict what will happen next. If Israel’s counterstrike is carefully managed, there could be a stand-down like the one seen in April. But should Israel target Iran’s nuclear facilities, extensively damage oil export facilities and infrastructure, or inflict civilian casualties, further escalation will certainly be possible.
