Last week, according to the Moldovan government, Russia launched a psychological operation, testing the public reaction to a declaration that the separatist region of Transnistria—a narrow strip of land between the Nistru (Dniester) river and the Ukrainian border—might request to join Russia on 28th February.
Fears were stoked on 20th February when Ghenadie Ciorba, a former so-called “minister of communication, information and relations with mass-media” in the Tiraspol (the capital of Transnistria) government, posted a claim on his Facebook page. He said that at an all-deputies’ congress the Transnistria authorities would appeal to Moscow to join the Russian Federation. Vladimir Putin would then announce in his 29th February address that Transnistria, which is politically, economically and militarily supported by Moscow, would be annexed by Russia—mirroring his declarations regarding Luhansk and Donetsk ahead of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Moldovan and Ukrainian governments soon dismissed the claim, but Tiraspol took a whole week to infirm the rumours, eventually calling Ciorba a “provocateur”.
According to the Moldovan government, too, the declaration “was a provocation that proved successful.” “Local as well as international journalists amplified it and Moldovans started packing their bags,” a senior Moldovan official told me. “It was clear that people are scared of war and that this theme will be exploited in the upcoming [presidential] elections [in October]”, he added.
After Ciorba’s statement was published by international media, the Moldovan national currency, the leu, also fell by 1 per cent to the euro. The value of some listed Moldovan businesses decreased by as much as 6 per cent. This economic impact may be short-term, but Russia can use the same tactics again to deliberately create fear at key moments. After all, Moscow has been using Transnistria to destabilise Chișinău, the Moldovan capital, for three decades.
The frozen conflict in Transnistria is a product of the short but bloody 1992 war between Russia and the newly independent Moldova. It allows an autocratic, oligarchic regime as well as Russia’s grip over Moldova—now an EU candidate, about to start accession negotiations—to endure. According to Brussels, Moldova should be able to join the EU without Transnistria, following the Cyprus model. The Moldovan government’s vision, meanwhile, is to reintegrate Transnistria in stages, using diplomatic and economic means.
Despite a commitment Moscow made at the Istanbul OSCE summit in 1999 to withdraw its troops, 1,500 Russian soldiers are still stationed on the left bank of the river Nistru—most of them local men employed by Moscow. The region, with a population of approximately 338,000, has preserved its Lenin statues, tanks and Soviet-era school textbooks from when Romanian language was written in the Cyrillic script.
Transnistria has also embraced a form of capitalism which means that one firm, the Sheriff conglomerate, owns everything from the football club that brought Moldova into the Champions League to mobile network companies, malls and liquor factories. This monopoly doesn’t leave much space for economic opportunities for people in Transnistria. Many commute to Chisinau for work or emigrate in search of better salaries, using their Moldovan, Russian or even Romanian passports.
Meanwhile, Russia provides the region with free gas, while keeping a tab and regularly blackmailing Moldova over its “debt”. The government in Chișinău, in turn, benefits from cheap electricity made in Cuciurgan, a power station controlled by Russia and Transnistrian separatists. Experts say at least two factions rule Transnistria: the FSB group, led by “minister of foreign affairs” Vitaly Ignatiev, and the oligarchic faction, represented by “president” Krasnoselsky and Sheriff founder Viktor Gushan. While the first are closely connected to Moscow, the latter have properties in Ukraine and EU passports, and have so far tried to stay out of the war in the neighbouring country while still being subordinate to the Kremlin.
However, Krasnoselsky and Gushan were upset about a ruling from Chișinău that Transnistria businesses should pay tax on exports made to the EU since 1st January—something they have been exempt from for three decades, supposedly in order to avoid double taxation. Indeed, “economic pressure from Chișinău” was the root cause the separatist leader Krasnoselsky invoked for the “all deputies’ congress” on 28th February. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Transnistria relied on trade with Ukraine and Russia. In the past two years, the region has reoriented towards the EU, where it exports a significant proportion of its products.
The all-deputies congress would convene local councillors, called “deputies” in Transnistria. While most of these summits have had no significant impact (there have been seven), the first, in 1990, proclaimed the independence of Transnistria, while the 2006 assembly decided to organise a referendum which was not recognised by the Moldova government or internationally, but in which 98 per cent of people said they would like to join Russia in the future.
So what will happen next? The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) wrote last week that while Transnistria may initiate a new referendum seeking annexation by Russia, a formal request for annexation or a military invasion is unlikely. As journalist Irina Tăbăranu, who founded the independent Moldovan media outlet Zona de securitate, specialising in the coverage of Transnistria, explains: “Even if Transnistria asks for direct annexation, that wouldn't change much without a direct frontier, as it already is a sort of mini-Russia.” Instead, the ISW expects an inflection in hybrid warfare, possibly setting the conditions for an “imminent political crisis”.
According to a Moldovan official, the key moment may come a couple of months before the upcoming presidential elections in October, in which pro-European incumbent Maia Sandu will run to secure a second term. Russia, in turn, will try to get its own candidate in power in order to reintegrate Transnistria on its preferred terms and to preclude Moldova’s European integration. There are concerns that scaremongering about war will be a tactic Russia returns to at election time.
Tomorrow, Tiraspol will try to present Transnistria as a victim before the international community, sources inside the Moldovan government tell me, to say that they are facing a humanitarian crisis and put pressure on Chisinau to break its customs code and prevent further economic reintegration. The information was confirmed by Tiraspol. Nonetheless, Moldova says it is ready for all scenarios.
