When Donald Trump was elected as United States president in 2016, Europe was at the peak of its first wave of nationalist populism. His shock victory had a clear and immediate effect: unifying the European Union. Eight years later, Europe is grappling with its second nationalist-populist wave. This is taking place amid a US presidential campaign that could return Trump to the White House. Yet the populist threat in Europe has morphed and the danger posed by Trump to European cohesion today is much higher. Were the Trump-JD Vance ticket to prevail at the polls in November, rather than unifying Europe, it could intensify the centrifugal forces tearing the continent apart.
The mishandled sovereign debt and migration crises in the 2010s fed an unprecedented rise of nationalist-populist parties in Europe, on both the far left but more typically the far right of the political spectrum. From the Finns Party to Greece’s Golden Dawn, from Alternative for Germany (AfD) to the Italian Five Star Movement and the League, from the French National Rally to the Spanish Vox, new and restyled nationalist-populists, though very different from one another, shared a common trait: they were all deeply Eurosceptic. They leveraged the EU’s objective failings over the economy and migration, while magnifying them through savvy social media campaigns peppered with disinformation. Lurking in the background, authoritarian powers such as Russia backed several of these parties, politically and financially.
The goal of the new populists was radical. Many Eurosceptic parties at the time supported exiting the Eurozone, if not the EU altogether. The UK led the way, with the referendum on EU membership held in June 2016. Following the Brexit vote, European capitals and EU institutions worried that the UK would not be the last member to leave the bloc. There were fears of a domino effect across Europe, with talk of Grexit, Nexit, Italexit and Frexit.
When Trump came to power, Europeans panicked even more. Here was the first postwar US president whose attitude towards Europe was at least disinterested, at most actively hostile. He was deeply sceptical of Nato and the US’s commitment to European security. And he was scathing of the EU, treating it as a trade and economic rival. With populism growing in Europe and with an adversarial America on the other side of the Atlantic, there was a palpable danger that the EU could fracture.
It did not happen. Far from dividing Europe further, Trump brought the continent together. By juxtaposing himself with the EU, the former US president shook Europeans from their navel-gazing, reminding them of the values that bound them together: democracy, multilateralism, international law and an adherence to the rules-based order. With Washington checked out of that order, the then German chancellor Angela Merkel—the undisputed leader of the EU at the time—became the voice of the free world.
Moreover, Trump’s America left Europe feeling in danger and alone. The European continent and the neighbourhoods to its south were on fire. Russia had already annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. The Arab Spring had tipped into a long winter of war and repression, with terrorism wreaking havoc not just in the Middle East but across European cities. Faced with escalating threats and Washington’s cold shoulder, Europeans understood that they had to stick together. It is no surprise that precisely in those years, term such as “European strategic autonomy” began populating official speeches and documents. The first steps towards European defence cooperation and EU-Nato coordination were made during this time.
This is not to say that Trump’s first term was good news for Europe. The US’s frontal attack on international organisations, its tariffs on European products, its hollowing out of arms control measures with Russia, and its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, violating international law as a result, were all serious blows to Europe. By undermining the Iran deal, Trump ignited a cycle of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, destroyed a rare case of effective multilateralism and shattered one of the EU’s greatest foreign policy successes to date. In the process, he exposed Europe’s weakness after it revealed itself incapable of saving the deal. Yet, tough as it was, Trump’s presidency galvanised Europeans to stick together.
The question haunting Europe today is whether it will be united once again should Trump return to the White House. There are many more reasons now as to why it should be than there were in 2016. The continent is at war, with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine upending European security. The area to its south is ablaze too, with the war in Gaza constantly teetering on the brink of a wider regional conflagration. In Africa, Europe and the US have been pushed out after a string of military coups; concurrently, Russia is strengthening its grip across western and central Africa. To the east, Europe no longer harbours illusions that China will become a responsible stakeholder of the rules-based order. Unlike in 2016, the EU is not as gullible regarding Xi Jinping’s claims to be a champion of multilateralism. Back then, many thought that a multipolar world could be compatible with multilateralism; now we know the latter is on life support. The need for a united Europe is much greater than it was eight years ago.
But is such unity likely? The US election is coinciding with yet another revival of European nationalist populism. As the migration crisis subsided and the EU handled the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting economic fallout relatively well, Euroscepticism temporarily eased. The widespread view that Brexit had been an unmitigated disaster for the UK further dampened the appeal of Eurosceptic parties. This led them to hunt for new slogans and policy platforms—as well as to revise their tactics— and eventually they found both.
Eurosceptic parties leveraged the impact of inflation—exacerbated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the energy dilemma it created. They focused too on the (alleged) costs of the European green deal, the EU’s plan to reach climate neutrality by 2050, as well as the resumption of migration flows across the Mediterranean, which were induced by war, repression, food insecurity and climate change in Africa. Standing against the EU’s climate agenda and support for Ukraine, as well as rehabilitating traditional anti-migration platforms, has enabled European nationalist populists to revamp their political image and their offer.
At the same time, Eurosceptics have renewed their tactics. Aware that exiting the EU is no longer an appealing proposition for citizens, they have opted to remain in the Union. This was naively read as success by the pro-European mainstream. They saw it as an unmistakable signal of the moderation of the extremes, which were being socialised, especially when in office, into the European project. Many pointed to Italy’s Giorgia Meloni as evidence of this phenomenon, given that her Brothers of Italy party, once in power, appeared to toe a more conciliatory pro-EU and pro-western line, especially on key questions such as Ukraine.
But far from buying into the EU project, Eurosceptic parties have gradually “Orbánised” themselves. Hungary’s authoritarian leader Viktor Orbán, while bashing and blocking the EU at every possible turn, has never hinted at leaving the bloc. He knows that doing so would be hugely unpopular among Hungarian voters. His approach is to extract as many benefits from the EU as he can, while slowing down or preventing, whenever possible, a European consensus. This strategy has attracted much admiration among the “sovereigntist international” within and beyond Europe’s borders. One noteworthy admirer of the Hungarian leader is Trump’s running mate Vance.
Other Eurosceptic parties have taken Orbán’s cue. They too no longer want to leave the EU, but want to change it from within, getting what they can out of Brussels while undermining its drive for integration. Their aim is to block the deepening of the Union, if not actually pushing for a regression of EU institutions, laws and regulations. This project is far more dangerous than countries wanting to exit the EU. Sad as it was, Brexit did not represent a mortal danger to European integration. The hollowing out of the EU by Eurosceptic forces, however, seeks a return to a “Europe of nations”—the name of a defunct Eurosceptic political grouping that won seats in the European parliament in the 1990s. It would mean the end of the EU as we know it today, a project that, for almost 70 years, has secured peace through integration.
Budapest does not have the political weight to implement this vision on its own. If it is joined by other member states, especially larger ones, the promise (or threat) of turning the EU into a Europe of nations becomes more feasible. The strength of these parties has been growing. Not only did the European election result in a rise in the number of Eurosceptic seats compared to 2019 (albeit not as much as many had predicted), but also an unprecedented effort by these parties to organise themselves at a continental level. Orbán’s Fidesz, which had been nudged out of the centre-right European People’s Party in 2021, spearheaded the establishment of a new far-right group: Patriots for Europe. With the entry of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally into the Patriots, this new group is now the third largest in the European parliament.
The fourth largest is the European Conservatives and Reformists, which is also towards the far right, albeit closer to the centre, and is bolstered by the strong showing of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. Even further right than the Patriots, yet significantly smaller, is the Europe of Sovereign Nations, which hinges on the AfD. With far-right parties having both marginally increased their seats and rganised in groups, their influence on the EU policy agenda is likely to increase. There are fewer unaffiliated lawmakers in the European parliament than ever. Add to this the growing contingent of Eurosceptic governments represented in both the Council of Ministers and the European Council: Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and the Netherlands, which are all led by right- or left-wing Eurosceptic governments. Austria is probably soon to follow, after its elections in September.
The US election—which could plausibly return Trump to the White House—takes place amid this fraught and fractured Europe. This time, there is a much larger contingent of European governments that see eye to eye with Trump. Playing divide and rule with Europe will be easier now than in 2016 because the EU is much weaker. In fact, the prospect of a Trump comeback is already galvanising and radicalising the Eurosceptics further, with Orbán’s Hungary beginning its six-month rotating EU presidency with unmandated appeasement visits to Vladimir Putin, Xi and Trump himself. The slogan of Hungary’s EU presidency, true to its Trumpian cause, is “Make Europe Great Again”.
Of course, Trump’s return is not a given. Democratic candidate Kamala Harris may win the race in November. This would be a blow to nationalist Eurosceptics and a relief for all those who believe in a united and liberal democratic Europe. Still, the spectre of a Trump comeback looms large and is generating much anxiety on the continent.
The good news is that all this fear is already sparking a pro-European reaction. The renewed rise of the Eurosceptic right, coupled with the danger of a second Trump presidency, played into the calculations that saw the EU make a number of ambitious appointments to top jobs in record time and propose a policy agenda in earnest. The European Council rapidly agreed on the three top EU posts: Ursula von der Leyen as Commission president, Antonio Costa as president of the European Council and Kaja Kallas as the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. All three are solid figures and committed Europeanists.
By mid-July, von der Leyen had won a comfortable majority in the European parliament in support of her second term. This was premised on a strong policy agenda featuring the consolidation of the single market, a clean tech industrial policy implementing the EU’s climate targets, European defence integration and an expansion into the western Balkans and more of eastern Europe. Trump’s shadow also hovered over the European Political Community summit at Blenheim Palace in Oxfordshire in July. A new page is being turned in EU-UK relations under Keir Starmer’s Labour government. A broad security pact is on the horizon.
A united Europe has forged itself in crises, as Jean Monnet, one of the European Union’s founding fathers, predicted half a century ago. Europe is facing unprecedented threats from within and without; Trump’s return would only create further challenges. The European Union may have the resilience to withstand this and to transform itself through the process. Or its fragilities may be such that Trump’s return kicks European integration backwards, casting the continent into the trenches of nationalism.
