Europeans have fretted about the return of Donald Trump to the White House for over a year now. After the European parliament election last summer, I reflected here on what the implications of a second Trump administration might be for the continent. I was pessimistic then. I am even more so now that Trump has won.
In theory, a second Trump term should galvanise Europeans into joint action. This was the effect he had in 2016, with the former German chancellor Angela Merkel standing as Europe’s unquestioned leader, a pillar of the “free world”.
There may indeed be some areas in which European anxiety will tip into unity. Trade is the best bet. This is where Trump-proofing has been most advanced, not least given that policy competence on trade clearly resides in Brussels. Tactics and strategy have been developed since the first Trump term. These range from wooing the president-elect with generous trade offers to options for retaliation were these to fail. It will not be easy to hold the line. The EU is now more dependent on the US when it comes to defence and energy, both of which can be weaponised against us.
Further, some countries—namely Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands—are more exposed than others to US trade, and are therefore more likely to cave. Europe is already in a quasi-trade-war with China, making it even harder to sustain a two-front economic conflict with the US as well. But at least there are the vestiges of a plan to handle this scenario, and a single player, the European Commission, to carry it out.
The second area where Trump’s win may mobilise European action is defence. There has been talk about a significant increase in European defence spending for months, possibly through a multibillion-euro defence fund financed through the issuance of common debt. A constellation of European countries is already willing to move in this direction, spanning from north and eastern members that feel particularly threatened by Russia to western and southern ones, including France, Italy and Spain, which are generally in favour of more EU spending on security. Trump’s win may tip the balance in these countries’ favour, pushing reluctant states like Germany and the Netherlands to agree. The accelerated collapse of the German “traffic light” coalition government could also provide clarity and move Europe in this direction. It is also possible that the so-far vague and underwhelming ideas for an EU-UK security pact will grow more ambitious and be catalysed into action.
But that is where the silver lining stops. Trump 2.0 represents a far greater challenge to Europe than his first incarnation. It is not “just” Donald Trump and the Republican party that won the US election, including the White House, the Senate and, most probably, Congress. It is the Maga movement that won. Its ideological and political cohesion and overwhelming control of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of American government, as well as its pervasive presence in big business and the (dis)information space, is nothing like what it was in 2016. If Trump is determined to wage economic war, abandon Ukraine, disengage from the continent’s security and play divide and rule in Europe, he is far more equipped to do so today than he was during his first term.
The area where this is most likely to play out is Ukraine. Beyond what may happen on the battlefield, in the event of an abrupt US military disengagement from Ukraine (which Europeans would be able to compensate for only partly), the real question is what the political repercussions might be. It is likely that northern and eastern European countries, whose own security is on the line, would want to stand up to any Trump push for Ukraine’s surrender. And perhaps France and the UK would, too. But what about Germany, and even more so Italy? I struggle to see Berlin or Rome resisting the sirens of surrender (masked through the language of “peace”). Viktor Orbán may no longer be such an outlier in Europe. In short, the real threat to Europe is political: a Europe divided by Trump is a delight for Vladimir Putin.
This leads me to the final and most important point, related to democracy. Elections are obviously a necessary pillar of liberal democracy. In this respect, the US election, as indeed elections in Europe, have demonstrated time and time again that this key tenet stands firm. But we know elections are insufficient to protect democracy, with the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, civil rights and individual freedoms, starting with the freedom of the media, being just as important. And these features of democracy are in danger in both the US and Europe. Trump’s return could usher in the Orbánisation of several European countries, not “just” on foreign policy, but domestically as well. My own country, Italy, is certainly at risk.
The US election is as catastrophic for Europeans as they make it out to be. If our democracies were strong and our leaders brave and far-sighted, Trump’s comeback could be a blessing in disguise for Europe. But I see little vision and hardly any courage on display in Europe these days. I hope I’ll be proven wrong.
