Faced by an Islamist insurgency, an economic crisis and growing separatism in the provinces, Pakistan urgently needs a strong government that will stand united in the face of these multiple threats. What is the likelihood of such a government emerging from this election?
On the face of it, depressingly small. There are no saviours in the wings. Since the sacking of an intransigent chief justice and the subsequent crackdown on civil society, President Musharraf and his parliamentary allies, Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q), have haemorrhaged support. The assassination in December of Benazir Bhutto, leader of the country's largest political party, the Pakistan People's party (PPP), has further eroded their legitimacy. What little goodwill they had built up through economic growth in the last five years has been lost through recent microeconomic mismanagement resulting in acute power shortages and spiralling wheat prices. Bereft of the carapace of his military uniform, Musharraf is exposed, isolated and increasingly unpopular. He has no obvious role left to play in a democratic dispensation. Even his creatures, the leadership of the PML-Q, are distancing themselves.
The other contenders are the PPP and Pakistan Muslim League-N. Still reeling from Bhutto's murder, the PPP is now led by her widower, Asif Zardari. Widely perceived to be corrupt and autocratic, Zardari was known as "Mr Ten Per Cent" during his wife's two tenures as prime minister but was nevertheless bequeathed the chairmanship of the PPP in her will. He is struggling to keep the party united in the face of attempts by rival parties to lure away candidates. Nawaz Sharif, the PML-N's leader, twice ousted as prime minister amid charges of corruption and misrule, is also deeply compromised. Having been deposed in a military coup in 1999, he cut a deal with Musharraf to go into voluntary exile in Saudi Arabia for ten years in return for his freedom.
Depressed and angry at the imperfect choices they have been presented with, Pakistanis will reluctantly turn out to vote. But to have any legitimacy, the election process must be seen to be fair and free. It is unlikely that Musharraf has come this far—sacking judges, muzzling media, arresting lawyers and imposing a national emergency along the way—to meekly hand over power now. He will have tried to rig the elections. Opposition parties have already taken issue over the arbitrary appointment of an election commission and claimed that the country's intelligence agencies have been assisting the PML-Q in marginal seats. Restrictions imposed on the media during the emergency last November have also not been lifted—independent television channels are not allowed to report freely.
Despite these misgivings, mainstream opposition parties have shown maturity (and pragmatism) in not boycotting the elections. A certain amount of rigging is accepted as part of the culture of Pakistani politics—no election has been entirely free of it. But if the results fall overwhelmingly in favour of the ruling alliance, there will be nationwide agitation, as the public is in less mood to forgive this time around.
Much will depend on how the opposition parties conduct themselves after the election. In the past, their one imperative has been to achieve power and then jostle, at whatever cost to their own credibility and the democratic process, to keep it. Indeed, Bhutto and Sharif habitually sided with the establishment to topple each other's elected governments from power throughout the 1990s. But both Sharif and Zardari are aware that they, too, are running out of political lives. The Islamists wait in the wings. If they needed further proof of the gravity of that threat, Benazir's public assassination in broad daylight furnished it.
Thus far, Sharif and Zardari have acted responsibly, burying their differences to work together. It is unlikely, though not certain, that any one party will receive sufficient votes to form a government. The beneficiary of a huge sympathy vote, the PPP is likely to net the most seats. PML-N will probably do well in the Punjab, Sharif's home province. If predictions are proved correct, PML-N will secure 20 per cent of the parliamentary seats. PML-Q will not be obliterated altogether. Individual candidates with solid track records of service will retain their seats.
In all likelihood, then, the PPP and PML-N will have to go into coalition. Zardari and Sharif have already both publicly pledged to do so. But to actually run a coalition government is not easy. It needs an overwhelming rationale, like a war, to make it possible. Pakistan does have just such a rationale in the shape of the Islamist threat. Pakistanis now have to hope that their leaders will, finally, have the wisdom to see it.
Musharraf can even now redeem himself by accepting the results, whatever the cost to his presidency. Sharif and Zardari, even if they do not win an outright mandate, can prove to their electorate that although they have let them down in the past, they are still worthy of their trust. This election then is not so much about winning office as about earning forgiveness. This election will not produce a new hero, but it may provide an opportunity for an old villain to redeem himself. And the ultimate winner may not be the one declared to be so, but he who conducts himself in accord with the new demands of the electorate.
