Survival the IISS quarterly
Winter 1996-97
Two questions arise from the Bosnian experience: how much responsibility does the international community have for reconstructing a society after a war; and is the option (confirmed at Dayton) of a single Bosnia sensible? Would we do Dayton again? For me, the broad direction was absolutely right, but the agreement is too complex and prescriptive. That said, there is a potential paradox. Many commentators-among them those who have taken the strongest line on human rights-have argued that it would have been more honest simply to have partitioned the country on ethnic lines. Other commentators have argued that this will ultimately happen since it is the "natural" order of things and efforts to counteract ethnic separation are a waste of time and resources.
There have even been accusations that separation has been the secret agenda of at least some of the Contact Group countries. This is nonsense. It may be that in the end the communities cannot be persuaded not to separate further. But it is right, politically as well as morally, to try to prevent this happening. If ethnic purity were to be sanctioned as the main criterion of stable statehood, there would be no viable-size unit in the Balkans which met it, and almost infinite bloodshed would be in prospect.
On the other hand, in order to keep Bosnia together as a single country, was it necessary for outsiders to become so deeply involved? Many of the mistakes in Bosnian policy lie in the early stages of the process. Once events had been set on a track leading to war, it was probable that they could only have been rescued by interposing a force capable of peace enforcement.
Elections are an indispensable ingredient of any settlement. But it is less clear that it was desirable to try to erect a complex political structure which is itself liable to be the cause of further disagreement. A single Bosnia composed of several ethnic communities is one thing. The development of a degree of political and economic integration between the embittered communities is probably too ambitious in the short term.
In general, peacekeeping in Bosnia is not a model for the future, not even the Ifor period which, while a success, was too intensive and too expensive a way of stopping war to become a blueprint. The time taken, diplomatically and militarily, to bring about a real ceasefire meant that the eventual peacekeeping force had to be much larger and more combat-capable than need otherwise have been the case. Providing and funding forces of this dimension and sophistication is not sustainable.
This does not mean that Nato should retire from peacekeeping. On the contrary, there is much to be said for the UN employing a competent regional military organisation comprising forces accustomed to operating together in peacekeeping operations rather than relying on ad hoc forces. But Nato cannot take on a monopoly of responsibility for peacekeeping globally nor can it be expected to mount huge forces each time there is a call for its services.
Accepting this means two things. First, crisis prevention and management must be taken much more seriously. It has hitherto been treated as a lesser art, worthy of the OSCE's attention, but not that of the alliance. The reality is that stability in Europe-as elsewhere-will only be secured if disasters such as Bosnia are avoided. Crisis prevention and peacekeeping proper (as distinct from peace enforcement) are politico-military tasks worthy of the attention of Nato planners and foreign and defence ministries on both sides of the Atlantic. Reluctance to intervene militarily in another country's affairs is a healthy instinct and, for this reason, work needs to be done on identifying the crucial indicators of a developing crisis and the appropriate range of responses to them. This means willingness to spend small sums of money in order to avoid greater costs later. Governments are not very good at this.
Second, if there is to be a military intervention, the experience of Unprofor teaches some specific situations to avoid: forces which are too lightly armed or too widely dispersed; lack of unity of command in theatre; lack of clarity and agreement over proportionality and impartiality; lack of a clear mandate and mission; and lack of an agreed political strategy for the force to support.
Governments must be clear from the outset whether they are contributing troops to keep or enforce a peace. These are two very different activities, and the second is much more dangerous than the first, requiring a combat-capable force to undertake it. Governments must not expect peacekeepers to become peace enforcers.
Much of the agony on the ground in Bosnia stemmed from the fact that key international players across the Atlantic did not agree over policy. For a long time they frustrated each other, but were unable either to convince others of their position, or concede to a different view. This stalemate paralysed the Contact Group and was at the root of the mistakes made regarding Unprofor's military mission. They in turn put soldiers' lives unnecessarily at risk.
Applying to Nato the thesis that there must be unity of purpose in a military operation has a number of implications. Since the US is most unlikely to refrain from wishing to drive policy, it will be necessary-but not sufficient-always to secure agreement across the Atlantic. Despite the technical possibilities that are being developed inside the alliance for European military action not involving the US, it will be right except for all but the simplest of operations (such as a natural disaster evacuation) for there to be equal exposure across the Atlantic to military burdens and risks, which implies US military participation. As Bosnia has shown, if there is disagreement, the alliance itself is on the line.
Finally, the UN needs to regain the security responsibilities which properly belong to it. As was to be expected, depriving the UN of all but a minor role in Bosnia has not hastened reform, which is stalled for much wider reasons. The proper place to bring together the military and civilian sides of an operation is at the UN security council. It should not be beyond the Contact Group countries to achieve this.
