In March 1966, President Charles de Gaulle announced that France was withdrawing from Nato and that all Nato troops must leave by the following April. The bust-up had been a long time coming: France had acquired its own nuclear deterrent and de Gaulle had long chafed under Nato’s “Anglo-Saxon” leadership. Back in 1958 at a briefing on Nato forces in France, he had asked General Norstadt, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to tell him the location of US nuclear weapons in France and their targets.
“I’m afraid I cannot answer those questions unless we are alone,” said Norstad. “Very well,” said de Gaulle. The entourages of the two generals left. “Well?” “Well, General, I’m afraid I can’t answer your questions.” “General,” de Gaulle concluded, “this is the last time… that a French leader will hear such an answer!”
Come 1966, de Gaulle wrote to President Lyndon Johnson:
“The will of France to rule itself, without which she would soon cease to believe in her own role and be useful to others, is incompatible with a defence organisation where she is subordinate… France is determined to regain on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty, at present diminished by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the use which is made of her airspace; to cease her participation in the integrated commands; and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of Nato.”
John Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in the White House, recalled:
“The line that was developing was that the president ought to reply in such a way as to stimulate antipathy in western Europe, and perhaps in France, against de Gaulle. We all marched with this letter over to [Johnson’s] office. It was a very interesting experience. We all sat down. We handed him the draft and he looked at it. “I see you have all voted on this, have you?” And he dismissed us and he took it away and he completely changed the whole tone, everything. It was the sweetest reply. “Yes, General de Gaulle, we shall do our best to leave as promptly as we possibly can. We understand” etc, etc.
“The president was a better international politician than all his advisors put together. He instinctively knew that, if he attacked de Gaulle, this would have just made the French more difficult to deal with, there would be resentment. You could not kick de Gaulle out by getting the rest of Europe mad at him, and you would just get the French to dig in deeper. He was right, absolutely right.”
Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, recalled:
“President Johnson was determined to do everything that de Gaulle asked us to do, simply as a matter of dignity, and get our forces out of France before the deadline. But de Gaulle’s request went down hard in Washington. In fact, Johnson insisted that I ask de Gaulle, ‘Do you want us to move American cemeteries out of France as well?’ I carried out my instructions. De Gaulle, very embarrassed, had nothing to say.” (Over 120,000 US servicemen and women from both world wars were buried in France.)
De Gaulle’s decision complicated relations between the US and Europe in the middle of the Cold War. On 29th March, 1966 Britain’s prime minister Harold Wilson wrote to President Johnson:
“Nato is vital to the safety of Britain and it must therefore continue. First, because it commits the US to the defence of Europe. Secondly, because it provides a tolerable context in which not only Britain, but most of Europe, have been able to accept West German rearmament. And thirdly, because only an integrated and interdependent alliance can provide a credible deterrent against attack from the east and effective resistance if attack should come. The General’s 19th-century nationalism, his anti-American motivation and above all his bull in a china shop tactics are certainly dangerous to the alliance and possibly malevolently so.”
Alan James, a Foreign Policy Advisor to the US European Command (EUCOM), recalled:
“In retrospect, it seems clear that given de Gaulle’s vision of France, his obsession with fear of domination by the US… and his insistence that France should not allow her independence to be diluted, it was only a question of time before he sought to dissociate France from the military side of Nato. But when the blow fell we were all shocked… At EUCOM, de Gaulle’s decree was regarded as an arrogant act. Expelling US forces and Nato would, it was generally felt, make defence of Europe more difficult… And there was resentment; we had after all gone to the rescue of France twice in this century.
“Not a few French officers were chagrined by de Gaulle’s decision. The French civilian officials I knew deplored it. I think particularly of Pierre Dambeza, and his deputy, Louis de Beauchamp. Both were friendly to us beyond the demands of protocol… Dambeza gave a splendid farewell party in his Paris apartment for senior Embassy and US military officers. It was an imaginative affair. Dambeza created, in miniature, Nato… as if from the Atlantic to the Rhine, from one room in his apartment to another. In each room were laid out the specialities, the cheeses, wines, pates, pastries, of the particular region of France through which the [lines of communication] passed… It was a lavish affair… but most of all it was a gesture of amity that we all deeply appreciated.”
In March 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that French forces would rejoin Nato’s command structure:
“This is in the interest of France and Europe and represents a strengthening of our sovereignty. We cannot risk the lives of our soldiers without taking part in the planning.” And a joint statement with Angela Merkel he declared that “as a response to crises and conflicts, the alliances that are based on shared values—the European Union and Nato—are becoming increasingly important.”
“I’m afraid I cannot answer those questions unless we are alone,” said Norstad. “Very well,” said de Gaulle. The entourages of the two generals left. “Well?” “Well, General, I’m afraid I can’t answer your questions.” “General,” de Gaulle concluded, “this is the last time… that a French leader will hear such an answer!”
Come 1966, de Gaulle wrote to President Lyndon Johnson:
“The will of France to rule itself, without which she would soon cease to believe in her own role and be useful to others, is incompatible with a defence organisation where she is subordinate… France is determined to regain on her whole territory the full exercise of her sovereignty, at present diminished by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the use which is made of her airspace; to cease her participation in the integrated commands; and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of Nato.”
John Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in the White House, recalled:
“The line that was developing was that the president ought to reply in such a way as to stimulate antipathy in western Europe, and perhaps in France, against de Gaulle. We all marched with this letter over to [Johnson’s] office. It was a very interesting experience. We all sat down. We handed him the draft and he looked at it. “I see you have all voted on this, have you?” And he dismissed us and he took it away and he completely changed the whole tone, everything. It was the sweetest reply. “Yes, General de Gaulle, we shall do our best to leave as promptly as we possibly can. We understand” etc, etc.
“The president was a better international politician than all his advisors put together. He instinctively knew that, if he attacked de Gaulle, this would have just made the French more difficult to deal with, there would be resentment. You could not kick de Gaulle out by getting the rest of Europe mad at him, and you would just get the French to dig in deeper. He was right, absolutely right.”
Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, recalled:
“President Johnson was determined to do everything that de Gaulle asked us to do, simply as a matter of dignity, and get our forces out of France before the deadline. But de Gaulle’s request went down hard in Washington. In fact, Johnson insisted that I ask de Gaulle, ‘Do you want us to move American cemeteries out of France as well?’ I carried out my instructions. De Gaulle, very embarrassed, had nothing to say.” (Over 120,000 US servicemen and women from both world wars were buried in France.)
De Gaulle’s decision complicated relations between the US and Europe in the middle of the Cold War. On 29th March, 1966 Britain’s prime minister Harold Wilson wrote to President Johnson:
“Nato is vital to the safety of Britain and it must therefore continue. First, because it commits the US to the defence of Europe. Secondly, because it provides a tolerable context in which not only Britain, but most of Europe, have been able to accept West German rearmament. And thirdly, because only an integrated and interdependent alliance can provide a credible deterrent against attack from the east and effective resistance if attack should come. The General’s 19th-century nationalism, his anti-American motivation and above all his bull in a china shop tactics are certainly dangerous to the alliance and possibly malevolently so.”
Alan James, a Foreign Policy Advisor to the US European Command (EUCOM), recalled:
“In retrospect, it seems clear that given de Gaulle’s vision of France, his obsession with fear of domination by the US… and his insistence that France should not allow her independence to be diluted, it was only a question of time before he sought to dissociate France from the military side of Nato. But when the blow fell we were all shocked… At EUCOM, de Gaulle’s decree was regarded as an arrogant act. Expelling US forces and Nato would, it was generally felt, make defence of Europe more difficult… And there was resentment; we had after all gone to the rescue of France twice in this century.
“Not a few French officers were chagrined by de Gaulle’s decision. The French civilian officials I knew deplored it. I think particularly of Pierre Dambeza, and his deputy, Louis de Beauchamp. Both were friendly to us beyond the demands of protocol… Dambeza gave a splendid farewell party in his Paris apartment for senior Embassy and US military officers. It was an imaginative affair. Dambeza created, in miniature, Nato… as if from the Atlantic to the Rhine, from one room in his apartment to another. In each room were laid out the specialities, the cheeses, wines, pates, pastries, of the particular region of France through which the [lines of communication] passed… It was a lavish affair… but most of all it was a gesture of amity that we all deeply appreciated.”
In March 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that French forces would rejoin Nato’s command structure:
“This is in the interest of France and Europe and represents a strengthening of our sovereignty. We cannot risk the lives of our soldiers without taking part in the planning.” And a joint statement with Angela Merkel he declared that “as a response to crises and conflicts, the alliances that are based on shared values—the European Union and Nato—are becoming increasingly important.”
