Geoffrey Howe was one of Margaret Thatcher's closest allies and confidants and together the two made history. From 1983 to 1989 as Foreign Secretary Howe strengthened Britain as a leading voice within the European Economic Community, helped to combat the spread of communism, negotiated a Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong and was a key player in the Anglo-American relationship during the golden Reagan-Thatcher years.
Prior to the Foreign Office, Howe had initially served Thatcher as Shadow Chancellor between 1975-79, then spent four years as Chancellor of the Exchequer following the Conservative victory in 1979. After his resignation speech, Howe is most famous for his 1981 Budget Statement, one of the most controversial the British Treasury had ever submitted. The Conservatives defied conventional economic thinking by bringing in de-stimulatory policies during a time of prolonged recession.
It was famously criticised by 364 economists in a joint letter to The Times, detailing why the logic behind his deficit reduction plan was flawed. Within three months, however, the British economy was showing signs of improvement and by 1983 inflation had declined significantly from 11.9 to 3.8 per cent, a result that secured Howe’s reputation within government circles (although unemployment rose to a 50-year high).
It is here, within his years as chancellor, that some previously untold stories lie. Last week the National Archives released the Treasury papers from Howe’s private office, which collectively tell the story of Tory economics from 1979-83. Along with the usual (enjoyable) trivia—it turns out that Howe's staff repeatedly lobbied No 10 for a new kitchen—there is some substance.
Howe died last year, but I interviewed him in 2013 about his years with Thatcher. "What can I get you, a whisky?" he asked me at 10:15am on a cold morning. At 86, this was no "dead sheep" (in Denis Healey’s notorious jibe). He had a sparkle in his eye. Despite his frail appearance, he oozed charm and charisma—in every way the perfect gent. “I’ll just have a tea," I replied, aware that I was working. He looked disappointed. Wandering off in search of an Earl Gray, he soon reappeared with a glass of Chardonnay. "Why not?" he mused. I’d clearly found the life and soul of the House of Lords.
During our interview, Howe could not have been more generous towards Thatcher, praising at length her leadership, humanity and the qualities that had won over many Tory skeptics following her surprise election as Conservative Leader in 1975. As well as reeling off the facts and figures of his days in cabinet, Howe was also a great storyteller: memories of his days touring the world as Foreign Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev dining at Chequers and tales of President Ronald Reagan’s unscripted remarks, all the while stressing the role that Thatcher played in easing international tensions.
He was, however, the instigator of her downfall, following his dramatic resignation from her government in 1990. In a chilling speech that silenced the Commons, Howe finished: “The time has come for others to consider their own response to the tragic conflict of loyalties with which I have myself wrestled for perhaps too long.” Three weeks later, she was gone. Britain was in search of a new prime minister. Decades on, Howe still insisted that he resigned solely because of Thatcher’s stance on Europe, not because of her domineering style. Listening to his rhetoric and gentlemanly way with words, I believed him. Thousands wouldn’t have, though.
The Treasury papers collectively tell the story of Tory economics from 1979-83. The files contain the ideas and intentions of the political advisors and private secretaries at the Treasury, and include some revealing marginalia—pink markings reveal Howe’s thoughts; blue scribblings reveal Thatcher’s responses. Despite the relative success of Howe’s ‘81 Budget, there is no doubt that at the time it caused distress among some Conservatives. The papers also contain an analysis of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), who were surprisingly a cause for concern for Conservative policymakers.
Celebrating the official release of Howe’s papers, Adam Ridley, Douglas French and Terence Burns, who all served as special advisors to Howe, took part in a panel discussion at the National Archives where they reflected on their Treasury days. The Tory party in 1979 was “the best prepared British government there ever had been,” Ridley commented, adding that over 100 papers had been drafted on issues such as taxation and public expenditure in preparation for a Conservative return to power.
Together, the trio fell over themselves in praising Howe’s “prestigious intellectual energy,” labeling him as “a natural consolidator, mediator and cooperator.” Chancellor of the Exchequer was the perfect fit for Howe, it appeared, given that he had gained legislative experience in Edward Heath’s government (1970-74) and was broadly interested in all areas of government.
Ridley, perhaps the most well known advisor of the group, was eager to state that no one leaked from Howe’s treasury, a comment he appeared proud to make. There was, however, one quite catastrophic leak that did make its way out of Number 11. In 1982 the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) briefed the government on possible ways to reduce the size and scope of the welfare state. Their report, which included plans to scrap universal healthcare and implement charges for schooling, found its way to The Economist. Cue an instant public outcry. Thatcher, believed to have been “horrified” by the report, was quick to reassure the electorate that the NHS “is safe with us.” Howe’s papers, however, suggest that Thatcher continued to pursue plans to dismantle the welfare state, even after ministers believed the idea had been rejected in cabinet.
Howe’s Treasury papers clearly have a story to tell. Collectively they demonstrate the mechanisms behind a party that had spent four years preparing for government. They further reveal who was predominantly advising No 10 at the time of one of the UK’s most controversial Budgets. If nothing else, the files offer a further glimpse into the nature of the often tense, but productive Howe-Thatcher relationship. Reminiscing on his days as a junior advisor, Douglas French recalled Howe’s ability to think past the immediate problems of policy and “close his ears to the present.” Does Philip Hammond, the current Chancellor, have the same ability?
Prior to the Foreign Office, Howe had initially served Thatcher as Shadow Chancellor between 1975-79, then spent four years as Chancellor of the Exchequer following the Conservative victory in 1979. After his resignation speech, Howe is most famous for his 1981 Budget Statement, one of the most controversial the British Treasury had ever submitted. The Conservatives defied conventional economic thinking by bringing in de-stimulatory policies during a time of prolonged recession.
It was famously criticised by 364 economists in a joint letter to The Times, detailing why the logic behind his deficit reduction plan was flawed. Within three months, however, the British economy was showing signs of improvement and by 1983 inflation had declined significantly from 11.9 to 3.8 per cent, a result that secured Howe’s reputation within government circles (although unemployment rose to a 50-year high).
It is here, within his years as chancellor, that some previously untold stories lie. Last week the National Archives released the Treasury papers from Howe’s private office, which collectively tell the story of Tory economics from 1979-83. Along with the usual (enjoyable) trivia—it turns out that Howe's staff repeatedly lobbied No 10 for a new kitchen—there is some substance.
Howe died last year, but I interviewed him in 2013 about his years with Thatcher. "What can I get you, a whisky?" he asked me at 10:15am on a cold morning. At 86, this was no "dead sheep" (in Denis Healey’s notorious jibe). He had a sparkle in his eye. Despite his frail appearance, he oozed charm and charisma—in every way the perfect gent. “I’ll just have a tea," I replied, aware that I was working. He looked disappointed. Wandering off in search of an Earl Gray, he soon reappeared with a glass of Chardonnay. "Why not?" he mused. I’d clearly found the life and soul of the House of Lords.
During our interview, Howe could not have been more generous towards Thatcher, praising at length her leadership, humanity and the qualities that had won over many Tory skeptics following her surprise election as Conservative Leader in 1975. As well as reeling off the facts and figures of his days in cabinet, Howe was also a great storyteller: memories of his days touring the world as Foreign Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev dining at Chequers and tales of President Ronald Reagan’s unscripted remarks, all the while stressing the role that Thatcher played in easing international tensions.
He was, however, the instigator of her downfall, following his dramatic resignation from her government in 1990. In a chilling speech that silenced the Commons, Howe finished: “The time has come for others to consider their own response to the tragic conflict of loyalties with which I have myself wrestled for perhaps too long.” Three weeks later, she was gone. Britain was in search of a new prime minister. Decades on, Howe still insisted that he resigned solely because of Thatcher’s stance on Europe, not because of her domineering style. Listening to his rhetoric and gentlemanly way with words, I believed him. Thousands wouldn’t have, though.
The Treasury papers collectively tell the story of Tory economics from 1979-83. The files contain the ideas and intentions of the political advisors and private secretaries at the Treasury, and include some revealing marginalia—pink markings reveal Howe’s thoughts; blue scribblings reveal Thatcher’s responses. Despite the relative success of Howe’s ‘81 Budget, there is no doubt that at the time it caused distress among some Conservatives. The papers also contain an analysis of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), who were surprisingly a cause for concern for Conservative policymakers.
Celebrating the official release of Howe’s papers, Adam Ridley, Douglas French and Terence Burns, who all served as special advisors to Howe, took part in a panel discussion at the National Archives where they reflected on their Treasury days. The Tory party in 1979 was “the best prepared British government there ever had been,” Ridley commented, adding that over 100 papers had been drafted on issues such as taxation and public expenditure in preparation for a Conservative return to power.
Together, the trio fell over themselves in praising Howe’s “prestigious intellectual energy,” labeling him as “a natural consolidator, mediator and cooperator.” Chancellor of the Exchequer was the perfect fit for Howe, it appeared, given that he had gained legislative experience in Edward Heath’s government (1970-74) and was broadly interested in all areas of government.
Ridley, perhaps the most well known advisor of the group, was eager to state that no one leaked from Howe’s treasury, a comment he appeared proud to make. There was, however, one quite catastrophic leak that did make its way out of Number 11. In 1982 the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) briefed the government on possible ways to reduce the size and scope of the welfare state. Their report, which included plans to scrap universal healthcare and implement charges for schooling, found its way to The Economist. Cue an instant public outcry. Thatcher, believed to have been “horrified” by the report, was quick to reassure the electorate that the NHS “is safe with us.” Howe’s papers, however, suggest that Thatcher continued to pursue plans to dismantle the welfare state, even after ministers believed the idea had been rejected in cabinet.
Howe’s Treasury papers clearly have a story to tell. Collectively they demonstrate the mechanisms behind a party that had spent four years preparing for government. They further reveal who was predominantly advising No 10 at the time of one of the UK’s most controversial Budgets. If nothing else, the files offer a further glimpse into the nature of the often tense, but productive Howe-Thatcher relationship. Reminiscing on his days as a junior advisor, Douglas French recalled Howe’s ability to think past the immediate problems of policy and “close his ears to the present.” Does Philip Hammond, the current Chancellor, have the same ability?
