The sovereignty contradiction

It has been an eventful, and unprecedented, four months in politics.

Let’s start with the facts. A decision has been taken, by the British people, to leave the European Union. A decision that will stand as one of the most significant moments in our modern history. And while it is true that 16 million people didn’t choose this outcome, we are now set on a path that—barring a profound change in circumstances—will see us leave the EU.

We have a Prime Minister running the country who was not chosen by the people. With no mandate of her own, her unconventional choice of cabinet Ministers has raised eyebrows around the world. After four months of drift and indecision, a sense of the government’s priorities is only now starting to emerge.

But beyond these bald facts things remain rather murky.

There has been much effort expended by the government and the Brexit press to undermine the idea of a distinction between “soft” and “hard” Brexit. Brexiteers would have you believe there is only one way to leave the European Union: a “clean” and abrupt severing of all ties.

This is patently not the case. You can be outside the EU and still be a full part of the single market. Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein are all proof of this: as members of the European Free Trade Association they participate in neither the Customs Union nor the formal decision-making processes in Brussels, but they observe the panoply of Single Market rules. As a result they have unqualified market access, freedom to strike their own trade deals, and (at least in theory) greater control over immigration.

It is also possible to be part of the EU Custom’s Union without being a member of the EU, as is the case with Turkey. Liam Fox continues to dangle the enticing prospect of a host of new global trade deals if we leave the Customs Union. Yet he fails to mention the deluge of red tape that awaits exporters to the continent if we do so.

There are therefore choices to be made about the way we leave the EU. There isn’t just one version of Brexit. The Brexiteers need to be honest about that.

The political vulnerability of the "hard" Brexiteers has been exacerbated by the absurdly Utopian claims they have made. Shortly before becoming Brexit Secretary, David Davis claimed that “within two years…we can negotiate a free trade area massively larger than the EU.”  While Boris Johnson boasted "we are going to get a deal which is of huge value and possibly of greater value” than the Single Market.

These claims of an impending golden age are, frankly, incompatible with a strategy which dramatically diminishes the UK’s access to its largest export market by jettisoning both the Single Market and the Customs Union.

But while we ask for honesty from the “hard” Brexiteers, those who favour a “soft” Brexit need to be candid that a Norwegian-style model falls well short of the advantages we have enjoyed as a full member of the EU too. The Norway option involves a steep diminution of sovereignty as the rules of the market by which we would have to abide are no longer rules which we help draft in the first place.

So the fundamental argument between "soft" vs "hard" Brexit is in many ways an echo of the deeper debate about our membership of the EU itself: a level playing field for British companies in a borderless European market comes at the price of pooled decision making and an acceptance that people, as well as goods, services and capital, can move freely; a reassertion of unqualified national “control” over our borders and our laws comes with a significant economic price.

However, whilst many Brexit voters undoubtedly wanted to reassert control over immigration, there isn't much evidence that they wanted to reassert control over the technical rule setting of the Single Market or the tariff and non-tariff barriers negotiated in modern trade deals.

Recent polls by Open Britain and ComRes show, respectively, that 59 per cent of the British public wanted to “stay a member of the single market,” and 49 per cent thought “the Government should prioritise getting favourable trade deals with EU countries” (sic).

Philip Hammond was right to say that people didn't vote to make themselves poorer. As Fox, Davis, and Johnson drive the UK towards the most economically self-harming version of Brexit they should beware the British public's dislike of governments who make choices which drive up prices, generate red tape and discourage investment.

The waters between “soft” vs “hard” Brexit are about to be muddied further. Several weeks ago, Davis said that the government wants “to maintain or even strengthen our co-operation on security and defence” with Europe. Yet such continued participation can only happen if the UK continues to pay into Europol and other institutional EU budgets and acknowledges the force of the common rules adopted by the EU to deal with organised crime.

So the Government seems to be heading towards an explicitly "soft" Brexit when it comes to crime on our streets, but an unambiguously "hard" brexit when it comes to people's jobs, livelihoods and household finances. It is difficult to reconcile such a selective application of the Brexiteer’s doctrine of sovereignty.

Given the continued contradictions in its own plans, it is no wonder the government is remaining tongue tied about its intentions.