Governance limbo is putting Northern Ireland under immense strain

On Thursday the Institute for Government was interviewed by Sky News about our new report on Northern Ireland. We suggested that the UK did not pay much attention to what was going on there. Pushback from the interviewer: we talk about the border a lot.

Which is true. The words “Irish backstop” are seared on the hearts of a generation of Brexit watchers, commentators and negotiators. Ever since the then prime minister Theresa May signed off a Joint Report full of Irish fudge in December 2017, we seem to have talked about nothing else. Meanwhile we have come to have a familiarity with a new generation of Northern Irish politicians: Arlene Foster, Nigel Dodds and Sammy Wilson.

But.. but.. while the Northern Ireland/Ireland land border is a massive preoccupying issue for Brexit—and Brexit has been the sole preoccupation of the UK political establishment since June 2016—it is of course far from the only story about Northern Ireland. NI has been without ministers since January 2017: 980 days and counting, when deputy first minister Martin McGuinness resigned over the handling of the renewable heat incentive scheme (now the subject of an inquiry), but also reflecting a longer run deterioration in relations between the two big parties, the DUP and Sinn Fein.

The UK could barely cope with a limbo of five days in May 2010 when the parties were sorting out the consequences of a hung parliament. The fact that a whole nation of the UK has been left in a governance limbo for so long should be headline news, if not a major scandal.

It is a huge tribute to the civil service in Northern Ireland that they have filled the vacuum left by politicians. They have taken on responsibilities, made decisions, raised their public profile and kept the show on the road. But there are limits to what they can do. Anything that strays too far from areas where they have clear policy cover from the executive before it collapsed is likely to end up in the courts. Policy maintenance is possible. Reform is not. But in many areas of public service, reform is what Northern Ireland needs and those very same civil servants warn of the risk of “stagnation and decay.” In other areas, much needed legislation is languishing waiting for Westminster to act—or the legislature to return. Meanwhile the lack of an Assembly leaves a yawning accountability gap.

So what role has the UK government played? Suffice to say, it has not covered itself in glory. When the executive fell before in 2000, Westminster imposed direct rule. This time it did not—assuming, as people in Northern Ireland did, that this would be another temporary hiatus. The Northern Ireland Office worked on talks—in conjunction with the Irish government—and at times it appeared they might succeed. But the main tactic they adopted to induce the parties back was a minimalist approach to governing, to demonstrate the growing in-tray of decisions that were not being made. The problem is that tactic backfired—with more fingers pointed at the secretary of state than Northern Ireland’s politicians. At the same time, the confidence and supply agreement with the DUP gave Foster’s party a much bigger role in UK policy than they could ever have expected if they had been forced to influence the government in conjunction with the other parties in a power-sharing executive.

It is not clear that an executive could have withstood the pressures of Brexit—even though Foster as first minister and Martin McGuinness as deputy first minister did send a joint letter after the referendum stressing the need for an agreed way forward—and the responsibility of governing would have forced both sides to address practicalities, not just stick in entrenched positions. But if the executive had been around, Northern Ireland would have had a more balanced political voice in the Brexit discussions, representing all communities. An executive would also have meant the North-South ministerial bodies were in action too—offering the possibility of quieter cooperation with Ireland.

Now, with the prospect of a possible no-deal Brexit just weeks away if the government sticks to its plan, the Northern Ireland civil service is being forced to be increasingly forthright in its warnings. The absence of ministers means that it can release factual information free from political spin.

But no deal would mean the current limbo cannot last. The UK government has avoided direct rule so far. It cannot leave Northern Ireland civil servants to pick up the pieces after no deal with no political cover. So Westminster will have to take responsibility. And whereas before it has imposed direct rule when relations and joint working with the Irish government were good, this time it would have to do it when they are at their lowest ebb for decades. Once imposed, it might be hard to escape.

This is ironic when the UK government is looking to the NI institutions as a way out of the backstop impasse. If the problem is the “undemocratic backstop,” the way out is either to deal with the backstop or the lack of democracy. But asking the executive or Assembly to decide whether NI should stay close to the EU or close to GB would place those institutions under massive strain.

As our report shows, 20 years on from the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, the institutions it established are still fragile and need supporting. The UK government cannot take their continuation for granted and needs to take its responsibility to nurture them seriously.