Germany’s new traffic light coalition has declared its ambitions. Can it deliver?

They promised to put a coalition together by 6th December and they delivered. The Social Democrats, the Green Party and the Free Democrat Party in Germany (collectively known as the Traffic Light coalition, after their respective party colours) have, after two months of negotiation, agreed a government programme and a division of ministerial posts. Assuming that their party memberships endorse the deal (and there is no sign so far of any serious opposition), the new government will be in place within a couple of weeks.

It will be the first time that Germany has had a three-party coalition (although the Christian Democrats and their Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union are technically separate entities, in practice they operate as a single political unit). This could make the management of government business more complicated. But the three parties conducted their negotiations skilfully to form the coalition and there is no reason why they should not continue to do so when in power. The decisions confronting them in the months ahead will require them to hit the ground running.

The document they have agreed is long—about the same number of pages as a short novel—and full of aspirational language. Much of it is a recapitulation of traditional German policies. But in some areas it reflects a shift in priorities. On climate change and environmental issues it incorporates ambitious targets: coal will be phased out completely by 2030 instead of 2038, and by the same date 80 per cent of Germany's energy should come from renewable sources. But the phasing out of nuclear energy also remains in place and there is no indication of how the loss of coal will be compensated for.

There will also be changes in social policy. Cannabis will be legalised for private use by adults and trans people will be able to self-certify. The minimum wage will increase from €9.60 euros an hour to €12. It will be easier for immigrants to acquire German nationality. The voting age will be reduced to 16.

The agreement sets potentially ambitious goals on the development of the EU. The new government will effectively seek to turn it into a federal state. But, as ever in German political discourse, there is no indication of what additional powers should accrue to the EU in order to achieve this or how precisely such an EU would differ from the present one. Similarly, the new government's foreign policy will be more European and more value-driven. But when it comes to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the emphasis is on the Minsk agreement from which the EU is excluded; and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is not mentioned.

Nor is there any evidence that the new government will be any keener than its predecessors on spending its taxpayers’ money on European projects. The bloc’s Covid recovery fund is characterised as temporary in nature; and though there is recognition of the need for some flexibility in the application of EU fiscal rules, there is no commitment to ambitious new schemes of the kind favoured by President Macron.

There will, however, be a greater focus on the rule of law within the EU. Countries which do not live up to the EU's standards should not expect to receive EU money—a clear message to Poland and Hungary. This general approach applies to the United Kingdom as well, which is directly threatened with countermeasures if it fails to implement the Northern Ireland Protocol. There are also many ideas on procedure: more majority voting, more power for the European Parliament and transnational lists for European elections.

As regards foreign policy more widely, there are few surprises. The commitment to the transatlantic relationship is maintained. There is though no reference to the Nato target of 2 per cent GDP expenditure on defence. Instead, the government will commit itself to spending 3 per cent on defence, diplomacy and development aid combined. It is unclear what this will mean for the individual sectors involved, but it does not suggest any significant increases.

A similar fudge has been found for what was expected to be one of the most contentious issues in the coalition negotiations, namely German's future role in Nato's policy of nuclear deterrence. On the one hand Germany will join, as an observer, the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, something which no other Nato country has done. This is a symbolic gesture with no practical significance, but is a sop to the anti-nuclear partisans among both the Greens and the SPD. On the other hand the—somewhat tortuous—language on the replacement of the Bundeswehr's fleet of Tornadoes leaves open the possibility that the aircraft’s successor will also be equipped to deliver dual key tactical nuclear weapons, whereby German aircraft deliver American nuclear bombs.

Under the German constitution, the chancellor is more than a first among equals and enjoys a right to set the guidelines for government policy (this is one reason why, in order to establish policy in advance, coalition agreements have to be so detailed). So Olaf Scholz, the first Social Democrat chancellor since Gerhard Schröder left office in 2005, will be the dominant figure in the new government. He enjoys wide personal popularity and is credited with the rejuvenation of his party, which somewhat unexpectedly emerged as the leader in the polls during the final weeks of the election campaign. He will also be the most experienced member of his Cabinet. A politician all his life, he has served twice as a federal minister, most recently as finance minister, and as Mayor of Hamburg. None of his Green or FDP colleagues have experience of federal government.

He is not a charismatic figure, unlike his SPD predecessors Brandt, Schmidt and Schröder, and during the election campaign he was sometimes dismissed as Merkel-lite. He is not even the head of his own party, which has two co-leaders and whose main figures are mostly to the left of him politically. But for the moment his power at home is solid. He will also probably—and to the chagrin of President Macron—inherit Merkel's position as the leading figure in Europe: the size and strength of the German economy make this inevitable.

But he will not have things entirely his own way. His party won only 25 per cent of the vote, the lowest ever by the party providing the chancellor and no more than the Greens and the FDP combined. Only a minority of cabinet ministers will be Social Democrats. If the two smaller parties are able to work together, as they did at the beginning of the coalition negotiations, they will form a substantial counterweight. The leader of the FDP and future finance minister Christian Lindner is a business-friendly fiscal conservative who will be keen to establish his own political profile. So too will Robert Habeck, the co-leader of the Greens, who is expected to take over a super economics and environment ministry. The party's other co-leader, Annalena Baerbock, is likely to become foreign minister. She ran a disappointing campaign as her party's candidate for the chancellorship and has little international experience. It remains to be seen whether her professed wish to take a tougher line on human rights with Russia and China will prevail against the concerns of the German business community.

And what of the new government's likely attitude to Britain? Alongside the threat of reprisals over the Northern Ireland Protocol, the coalition agreement notes that the UK is one of Germany's most important partners outside the EU. Hardly a ringing endorsement, but a recognition that they will have to have some sort of relationship with us. There is, however, no reservoir of goodwill towards Britain in Germany and the Johnson brand remains toxic. The new government will view the UK through an EU prism. If our relationship with the EU improves, Germany will be open to bilateral co-operation in foreign policy and defence. But we are unlikely to command much of their attention.