Five months after agents of the FSB, the Russian Security Service, tried to murder him with a Novichok nerve agent, Alexei Navalny returned to Moscow and was immediately arrested. His treatment is not the only instance of the flagrant abuse of human rights which characterises President Putin’s regime. But it is the one which has understandably attracted great public attention.
Throughout his 21 years of rule President Putin has either shrugged off challenges to his authority or repressed them by force. He has ensured that while no political opposition to him has developed, a certain façade of democratic legitimacy has been maintained. Some of his opponents, like Sergei Magnitsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, have been jailed (Magnitsky died in prison, while Khodorkovsky was released in 2013). Others, like Boris Nemtsov, have been assassinated. But Navalny poses a new type of threat.
His strength lies in his ability to communicate and to mobilise. Unlike other opposition figures in Russia he has focussed on one single issue: the pervasive corruption of Putin’s regime and of Putin personally. He has targeted the young and has exploited social media to reach them. He has six million YouTube subscribers and two million followers on Twitter.
His message is delivered slickly, at times humorously, in language that hits home. His description of Putin’s party, United Russia, as “the party of crooks and thieves” struck a widespread chord and can be seen on banners at every political demonstration. More significantly perhaps, he and his supporters have uncovered detailed evidence of corruption in the private lives of senior figures in the regime, including Putin himself.
His most recent exposé was his publication of pictures of a vast mansion in Crimea which he said was owned by Putin and had been constructed illegally with state funds. The photographs have been seen by over 100m people in Russia. Of course, a Kremlin spokesman quickly denied the claim; but was unable to indicate who, if not Putin, was the owner.
Navalny’s decision to return to Moscow after his treatment in a Berlin hospital was both courageous and astute. Outside Russia he would lack media exposure and credibility, and would eventually become just another exile. The Russian authorities no doubt hoped he would stay abroad. But now he is back, they face a dilemma over what to do with him.
For the moment they are keeping him in prison. He has been sentenced to two years and eight months in jail for failing to report to a police station when on remand—not an easy thing to do when you are in an induced coma after being poisoned.
Curiously, though, he has been able to continue issuing statements, which suggests that the regime may be nervous about inflicting too harsh a penalty. Were they to do so, they would face the prospect of public unrest on an even bigger scale. The recent demonstrations took place in at least 109 cities including Moscow. 4,000 people were arrested. The scale of them may have made even Putin nervous.
But he and his regime are not going to be brought down easily. Putin has tight control of the security apparatus and of the armed forces and there is no sign of any opposition from them to his rule. He has shown himself to be ruthless in suppressing the press and in persecuting his critics. Past waves of demonstrations have in the end petered out. He may calculate that with Navalny in prison this one will too.
Many world leaders have condemned the treatment of Navalny. But so far no international action has been taken on his behalf: not least because it is not clear what the nature or purpose of such action could be. Russia is not easily susceptible to outside influence and sanctions as imposed on it in the past, for example after it annexed Crimea, have not yielded any obvious success. This does not mean that western countries should sit back and do nothing. But they need to be realistic about what they can expect to achieve.
The first priority should be to protect Navalny’s life. Western leaders should state publicly that if he is murdered or dies in prison there would be an unprecedented freeze in relations with Russia. It would be a mistake, however, to offer him more direct political support, even if this were practically possible. He has not asked for it and the regime in Russia would like nothing better than to portray him as a western puppet. Rather, the emphasis should be on promoting access to the sort of information which has contributed to his popularity.
This means focussing in particular on Putin himself and his immediate entourage: their bank accounts, property dealings, shareholdings and personal lives. Ridicule is an underdeveloped instrument of international diplomacy; so too is the mass use of social media. Western governments should try to harness both tools in order to ensure that the Russian people are as well informed as possible of the characters of their rulers.
Governments should also continue with targeted sanctions on individuals. So far, a number who were involved in Navalny’s poisoning have been identified, but there are probably more names which could be uncovered. Putting the emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals is likely to be more effective, and easier to co-ordinate internationally, than measures of more general application.
There may be calls for Russia to be expelled, or again suspended, from the Council of Europe. It is indeed anomalous for an organisation meant to be based on common values to include a member which so clearly does not share them. The counter-argument hitherto has been that continuing membership allows individuals in Russia to use the European Court of Human Rights to appeal against the operation of the Russian legal system. Navalny’s lawyers have indicated that they will do so in relation to his current detainment. How Russia responds to any eventual ruling from the Court might be the test of whether it should remain a Council of Europe member.
Ultimately, though, Russia’s fate is in the hands of its people. The economic downturn and the ravages of Covid have left them angry about the way they are governed. What is still unclear is whether their legendary capacity for patient suffering will continue to prevail.
