I no longer believe that in the life of this parliament, 2001 to 2005, Tony Blair will call a referendum on the euro, no matter the outcome of Gordon Brown's five economic tests.
In July 2000, I forecast that Blair would call the referendum-as he had promised in the election manifesto-in November 2001, and win it, just.
My forecast was based on the nearly half of the British population who say either (split equally) "I am generally in favour of British entry into the single european currency, but I could be persuaded to vote against it if I thought it was in Britain's economic interests to do so," or "I am generally opposed to British entry into the single european currency, but I could be persuaded to vote for it if I thought it was in Britain's economic interests to do so."
I thought that with the concerted support of the prime minister and the chancellor, the majority of big business and the City, significant trade union support and both the Labour party and the Liberal Democrats, joined by the "big beasts" of the Conservative party, Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine, a sufficient number of voters could be persuaded to learn to love the euro.
But the outcome of the last election means that there is no pressure on the prime minister to do anything about it. The Liberal Democrats are marginalised; the Conservatives cannot choose an electable leader. The only dangers on the horizon for the prime minister are joining the Americans in a war with Iraq without UN support and losing it, or calling a referendum on the euro and losing that. Losing a euro referendum would destroy the credibility of Tony Blair's government in the same way that Black Wednesday, destroyed John Major's Conservative government. Why risk it before the next election?
It is true that important decisions about the management of the currency and the EU economy will be taken in the next couple of years and Britain will be excluded from them. Yet other big euro countries want Britain to join, so they are unlikely to take decisions that will make entry harder. Indeed, the signs are that European politicians, if not central bankers, want to shift the management of the euro to something rather closer to Gordon Brown's system for managing sterling.
Pollsters measure people's behaviour, their knowledge and their views. Their views can be further sub-divided into three levels. The first is people's opinions, the "ripples on the surface of the public consciousness," easily blown about by political winds and the media. Below the surface are attitudes, things which people have thought about, discussed and care about. Attitudes are not so easily shifted. You must present persuasive argument to change them, and the arguments must come from someone the hearer respects. Deeper still are the tides of the public's view which we call values (things like belief in God, the death penalty, euthanasia). Values change very slowly, if at all.
Opinion polls are unlikely to produce the same results as referendums. Polls are here today, gone tomorrow. When an interviewer asks you some questions, you do not feel an obligation to think carefully about them. The media will not have covered the questions in advance. You are just courteous enough to answer.
Referendums are more considered. At the end of a three or four-week campaign people know what is at issue, and those who cast their vote have thought about it. It is not sprung on them.
Bearing in mind that qualification, what can opinion polls tell us about views on the euro? First, the broader identity issue. Three people in four, 75 per cent, of the British public say they feel strongly that they belong to their local community; 78 per cent say they feel strongly about England or Scotland or Wales (the Scots and the Welsh are up in the 80 per cent range); and 84 per cent say they feel strongly that they belong to Britain. However, only 35 per cent say they feel strongly that they are Europeans.
Every two months we ask a question on behalf of Schroder Salomon Smith Barney: if there were a referendum now on whether Britain should be part of the euro, how would you vote? We also ask a second question-how would you vote if the government really put its back into winning the referendum? (The latter makes about a three-point difference to the result; it narrows it, but nothing like as much as it did in the 1975 EEC referendum.)
A four-part question is put to people, which enables us to gauge strength of feeling and assess likelihood of voting. The question is: "Which of the following best describes your own view of British participation in the single currency?"-"strongly support British participation"; "I am generally in favour of British participation, but could be persuaded against it if I thought it would be bad for the British economy"; "I am generally opposed to British participation, but could be persuaded to vote in favour of it if I thought it would be good for the British economy"; and "I strongly oppose British participation."
The figures are these: some 19 per cent are solidly in favour, so the euro supporters need to add 32 per cent minimum and preferably 34 per cent to achieve a majority (with a little comfort) at a referendum. There are 24 per cent leaning to the "yes" vote so, to win the referendum, the euro supporters must get their 19 per cent to the polls, plus the 24 per cent leaning to "yes" and then convince nearly half those leaning against to shift their vote. A tough hill to climb. On the other side, the 29 per cent who strongly oppose Britain joining the single currency need only to ensure that the 22 per cent leaning towards them get out to vote and they have won. The lower the turnout, the more important the ten point advantage for the no vote.
Elite opinion will make some difference during a referendum campaign but it is more divided than in 1975 and voters are less inclined to defer to it. Big business opinion is, in any case, ambivalent. Mori interviewed 187 senior board directors of Britain's leading companies between 5th September and 12th November 2001. Following a decline over the previous three years, belief in the value of the euro to Britain has risen again but Britain's business leaders support Britain joining by only around three to two.
The introduction of euro notes and coins on 1st January went better than the most ardent Europhile could have hoped. But it made no difference to public opinion. And, despite the continuing Labour lead in the polls, mid-term blues are setting in; a euro referendum in 2003 would end up being a referendum on the government, as it was in France when they voted on Maastricht. That is why I now believe there will not be a referendum until after the next Labour victory, in May 2005.
And the result, when it does come (perhaps in spring 2006)? Most likely a narrow win for entry-that, at any rate, is what a majority of the British public believe will happen, even while opposing that outcome. In a survey carried out for GrahamBishop.com, 52 per cent of the British public said that whatever their personal view of membership, they thought it was likely that people in Britain would regularly use the euro in 2005 (34 per cent thought not), and three people in four, 74 per cent, said they thought it was likely by 2010.
Britons have yet to be convinced of the economic benefits. In another survey last July, a majority said they thought the euro would not create more jobs (53 per cent to 29 per cent), would not result in lower inflation (45 per cent to 26 per cent) and would not create faster economic growth (42 per cent to 30 per cent), whereas they thought it would cause Britain to "lose control over its economic policy" (64 per cent to 24 per cent) and to "lose too much of its identity" (64 per cent to 30 per cent). And yet, by 45 per cent to 37 per cent, they think it will have more advantages than disadvantages. The majority says that when they think about the euro they feel "interested" (64 per cent) but also "powerless" (73 per cent); few feel either "enthusiastic" (22 per cent) or "afraid" (24 per cent). Tellingly, only just under two in five (38 per cent) say it makes them feel "European." Yet eight in ten of the British expect that Britain will have joined in ten years' time.
While only a third expect to see a United States of Europe by 2010, over half, 57 per cent, expect a US of E by 2050. Only 17 per cent of the British said they supported "a United States of Europe with a federal government" in 1994 and 18 per cent in 1998, but omitting the words "federal government" almost doubles support, to 34 per cent, according to a Mori survey for the Sun in October 1997. It may not be here tomorrow, but it's on the way.
