In the first half of the 1970s, as Spain's dictator of more than three decades, Francisco Franco, was nearing the end of his life, discussion of what would replace his authoritarian regime became intense. There were those in Spain, and abroad, who argued that a history of authoritarianism, an intrusive and inefficient state, and a weak civil society had caused democracy in Spain to fail in the past, and risked doing so again. Jos? Mar?a Aznar, then a precocious twentysomething whose family background had steeped him in the politics of the right, was also unsettled by the prospect of change. For him, demands for greater autonomy and even independence in Catalonia and the Basque country posed the greatest threat to Spain after Franco. An ardent Spanish nationalist, he feared that if uncontrollable centrifugal forces were unleashed, Spain would be torn apart.
But despite those fears, the transition after Franco's death turned out to be smooth (a failed military coup in 1981, a reaction to an upsurge in terrorism by Basque separatists, was the one blip) and the negotiation of autonomy statutes with the regions allowed pent-up forces to be released. In 1982, another milestone was reached when the first left of centre administration since 1939 came to power. Led by the charismatic Felipe Gonz?lez, the reform-minded social democrats did not seek retribution for decades of persecution, but focused instead on bedding down democracy at home and rehabilitating Spain abroad
While the 1980s were wilderness years for the right, the unflamboyant and devoutly Roman Catholic young Aznar rose steadily through the ranks of a demoralised right. From governor of Castilla-Le?n - geographically and historically Spain's dominant core - he became leader of what had evolved into the Popular party by the end of the decade. But the right's electoral fortunes continued to be affected by widely held suspicions that once in power its authoritarian reflexes would re-emerge. Aznar's attempt to rehabilitate the right was made easier by a Gonz?lez administration that, by the early 1990s, had lost its way. Minister-sanctioned killings of those suspected of involvement in Eta and revelations of corruption raised old questions about whether democracy could work in Spain.
To benefit from the yearning for change, Aznar self-consciously styled himself as the antithesis of Gonz?lez, whom he loathed. Proudly uncharismatic and austere, Aznar believed such traits proved his "seriousness." He forged his party in the same image: steady and industrious, peopled by dull but dutiful technocrats. He promised clean and efficient government, but consensus and continuity too. Politics would become, he implied, reassuringly boring. This was, again, designed to differentiate his party from its opponents. Many of the governing Socialist party's ministers had begun to appear more interested in lining their pockets than effecting change, and regional barons paid little heed to Madrid (a problem that still bedevils the party and with which the new prime minister, Jos? Luis Rodr?guez Zapatero, is likely to struggle after his unexpected election victory in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings).
Despite Aznar's assurances and strong anti-incumbent feeling from the late 1980s, he lost his first elections as leader in 1989 and 1993. And even when he did overtake the Socialist party in 1996, he was denied an outright majority. But once in power, the then 43-year-old Aznar was eager to demonstrate that he had turned his Popular party into a moderate, centre-right party free of Francoist sympathies. This moderation was to be seen in a cabinet of figures mostly young and untainted by Francoism, and a commitment to preserve Spain's consensual social partnership arrangement (to reassure the labour movement). But perhaps the most important sign that the right had changed its spots was Aznar's stance on those regions which had traditionally resisted Castilian domination and who feared that the iron fist of Madrid would be revealed once the right returned to power. While still in opposition, Aznar authored a book, The Second Transition, outlining his plans for granting more new powers to the regions than anything the Gonz?lez government had countenanced. Apart from recognising that regional and national identities were in some cases poorly reconciled, there was also a pragmatic logic. The growth in the size and complexity of government in the second half of the 20th century demanded decentralisation, if only for reasons of efficiency. And today Spain is the least centralised of the large non-federal European countries.
Yet despite these changes and the genuine transformation of the Spanish right, Aznar has left office with relations with Catalonia and the Basque country as fraught as they have been since Franco's time. After winning an outright parliamentary majority in 2000 - allowing Aznar to govern without the support of the parties from Catalonia, the Canary Islands and the Basque country - he adopted a "thus far and no further" position on devolution in his second term. And it is turmoil in the Basque country that will be among Aznar's successor's least welcome inheritances, even more so if it turns out that separatist terrorists did have a hand in the 11th March attacks.
During his first term, Aznar was careful not to overreact to Eta's campaign of murder, often directed at his party (he survived an assassination attempt in 1995). And when Eta called a ceasefire in 1998, he sanctioned face to face talks and made concessions on issues such as relocation to jails in the Basque country of those convicted of terrorist offences. However, the ending of the ceasefire in 1999 led to a hardening in his attitude. He banned Eta's political wing, Batasuna, in the face of opposition by a majority of Basques.
This appears to have been effective - in 2003 Eta murdered three people, its lowest number since 1973. As the militant separatists have seen support wane and their strength sapped by security forces, Eta has been whittled down to a rump of its most extreme elements, as was witnessed on two occasions before 11th March when attempts to bomb civilian targets in Madrid were made. It was this reason, among others, that led Aznar's government to insist that home-grown terrorists were behind the attacks.
But if militant separatism is in decline, non-violent separatism strengthened during Aznar's tenure. The moderate Basque nationalists who have governed in the region for decades are intent on seeking de facto independence and have scheduled a referendum on the question for next year. Although they have chosen to challenge the authority of the Spanish state and its constitution, Aznar often appeared to be goading them towards the brink and upped the ante further in late 2003 by making advocacy of the proposed referendum punishable with up to five years in jail. If anything, he increased the likelihood of what he called the balkanisation of Spain. Basques will now probably step back, but if they do, it will not be thanks to Aznar.
As Aznar's self-confidence grew in his second term, he also revealed what many saw as an authoritarian streak. His decision to actively back the war in Iraq - he was the mover behind the "new Europe" letter of eight backing the US - and his unwillingness to take the trouble to make the case to a deeply sceptical public, marked a high point of his new imperiousness. He was able to act in this way thanks to Spain's deferential political culture and a weak tradition of accountability. Aznar enjoyed unquestioning obedience in his party despite the widespread misgivings on the Iraq war. Inadequate institutional checks and balances allowed him to adopt a neo-presidential style. Unlike Germany and Italy, which carefully diffused power after their experiences with totalitarianism, Spain's experience of less extreme authoritarianism resulted in fewer qualms about creating strong and stable government. The 1978 constitution created a legislature which is largely subservient to the executive, and a judiciary which lacks independence.
It was this that allowed Aznar to reposition Spain geopolitically. For Aznar, Spain's failure to punch its weight in the world was anathema, a product of the defeatist mindset which the right traces back to the Spanish-American war of 1898 when the US ejected Spain from its last remaining colonies in Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Aznar wanted to banish the inferiority complex. He believed that with the tenth biggest economy in the world, a population of more than 40m, a world language and links to the Americas (including the increasingly important Hispanic population in the US itself), Spain deserved to be a global player. To achieve this, Aznar did two things. First, he took a more assertive stance in international affairs, even if this risked the ire of other EU countries used to Spain being a follower, not a leader. The second strand was the forging of closer ties with the US in the belief that only by gaining influence with the superpower could Spain wield more clout. Within months of taking office he integrated his country's military into Nato (it had been semi-detached since joining in 1982). In his second term, Aznar accelerated the move towards the US, facilitated by the coming to power of George W Bush, with whom he was politically and personally close. While other Europeans opposed US plans to create a national missile defence shield, Aznar gave it his blessing and later agreed a bilateral defence agreement with the US, which was to provide, among other things, satellite intelligence on Basque terrorists. And it was the issue of terrorism that did more than anything else to cement the ties. Aznar, along with Tony Blair, had immediately recognised the new attitudes that the attacks of 9/11 had created in the US.
But it was an incident with neighbouring Morocco in the summer of 2002 that convinced him that if there was a choice to be made between the US and Europe, he would come down on the American side. To test Spain's reactions to a sovereignty-disputed territory, Morocco landed gendarmes on an islet between the two countries. Aznar responded forcefully to the provocation by sending in the military to expel the Moroccans and restore the ambiguous status quo. In the ensuing crisis, he felt let down by his EU partners and believed that France had shown as much concern for third-country Morocco as for fellow EU member state Spain. When Colin Powell ended the crisis to Spain's satisfaction, Aznar decided that the US was "serious" and the Europeans were not. In his decision to back the war in Iraq it was this view that was as important as any other.
Although doubts about the wisdom of his foreign policy departure lingered, Aznar was broadly successful in achieving his objectives up to that point, and his handling of foreign affairs attracted little criticism. That all changed with the war on Iraq, with both popular and elite opinion strongly opposing action - including many people who had taken a very hard line against domestic terror. Unlike Britain and France, Spain long ago ceased to be a warrior nation and anti-militarism is strong, in part because of the role of the defence forces in nearly four decades of Francoist dictatorship. If, as some suggest, "old" Europe has become a continent unwilling to face down threats from the Hobbesian world without, then Spain is as old as any.
Aznar raised Spain's international profile and increased its influence with the US, but it came at a cost in terms of relations with the other big EU states - especially France and Germany. He was even prepared to undermine his relationship with his closest European ally, Tony Blair, by persuading George W Bush to raise the issue of British-ruled Gibraltar. And Britain notably did not back Spain over its rigid line (along with Poland) on changing voting weights in the EU's governing body, the council of ministers.
Moreover, Aznar's willingness to irk others in the EU was a shock to Spain's elites, which had embraced the European integration project as enthusiastically as any other. Not only was EU membership a means to rehabilitate Spain after Franco, the Spanish political class shares the belief that the EU has become the main vehicle for the pursuit of the country's international interests. The depth of the commitment was evidenced by the unquestioning bipartisan commitment to joining the euro.
The shift in orientation towards the US was even more of a jolt. A history of strategic competition with the US in the Americas, which culminated in the loss of its remaining colonies in the Spanish-American war of 1898, meant that Spain has never been one of Europe's Atlanticist nations. The left has also been strongly anti-American in the past, partly as a response to US support for the Franco regime. Would a third term for the Popular party have started to win more consent for the new geopolitical direction? It is a moot point. In any case the return of the Socialists to power will almost certainly see a restoration of the status quo in relation both to the EU and to the US. There is some logic behind this. Aznar's new assertiveness was not solidly based. Militarily, Spain is a minnow, spending a quarter of Britain's defence budget. Economically, it is heavily dependent on EU subsidies and with per capita wealth among the lowest in the EU. And diplomatically it is under-resourced and lacking a strategic thinking capability or culture.
The strong expectation of a Popular party election victory (until the attacks on 11th March) derived mostly from strong economic growth over the past eight years, during which Spain has expanded more rapidly than any of the other big European countries. By far the most important reason for the strong growth has been the euro. By abandoning the soft peseta for the hard euro at a competitive exchange rate, Spain gained a strong currency and permanently lower and stable interest rates. This stimulus contributed greatly to the long consumption and property boom that Spain has enjoyed for almost a decade. Aznar's administration deserves only some credit for ensuring Spain's qualification for the single currency project in the first place. He was fortunate to inherit an economy on the cusp of boom and doubly fortunate that Spain's large budget deficit, which threatened to exclude it from participation, began to fall as a result. This triggered a virtuous cycle: improving public finances increased confidence that Spain would make the cut, which caused Spain's traditionally high interest rates to fall.
Though it is hard to fault any politician for taking more credit than is his due when things go well, Aznar's failure to take advantage of fast economic growth to push through wider economic reform, especially of the pension system and the labour market, is among the greatest failings of his time in office. But for all that, the economy is strong, as is the country's democracy, as evidenced by the smooth handover of power in the traumatic days after the election. Aznar's greatest achievement is to have consolidated his party's move towards the centre. And even if he showed signs of high-handedness in his second term, his central role in modernising the right has allowed a normal and healthy bipolarism to develop in Spanish politics. This alone has assured him a place as one of the central figures in Spain's democratic transition.
But how Aznar's premiership is judged will depend also on the events in the final days of his tenure. If, as seems likely, al Qaeda or a related organisation is shown to have been behind the Madrid bombings, his legacy will be a more complicated one. The reversal in his party's fortunes in three traumatic days - thanks largely to higher than expected Socialist party turnout - reflected less a capitulation to terror than a desire to change a government that showed itself to be too arrogant and out of touch on defence and security issues, which normally play a relatively small role in Spanish elections. The Madrid bombs placed the Iraq war squarely in the front of people's minds when they voted and for the majority of Spaniards, Aznar got it wrong.
