Looking back on 7/7

The terrorist attacks that hit London on 7th July last year looked at first like a turning point as decisive as 9/11 was for America. Although they lacked the scale and drama of the twin towers' destruction, they were the first suicide bombings on British soil, and looked likely to be the first attack of many.

They were also particularly disturbing for Britain's 1.8m Muslims—especially when it was discovered that the London bombers were British-born and relatively well-integrated young men from law-abiding families.

But so far 7/7 hasn't turned out to be such a historic turning point. Although there were big increases in attacks on Muslims immediately after the attacks, the underlying level of violence has not risen to the scale that was initially feared; there has been no upsurge of domestic terrorism; and although the BNP has gained ground, there has been nothing comparable to the public backlash against Islam seen in the Netherlands.



Many of the factors that lay behind 7/7—including young Muslims' anger over Israel and the occupation of Iraq—remain. But the ways in which key institutions have responded have contained a potentially inflammatory situation. From the first moment the media stressed the unrepresentativeness of the bombers and gave prominence to black and Muslim victims rather than casting the attacks as a battle in a war of civilisations. And many politicians echoed Ken Livingstone's comments which reasserted London's cosmopolitan openness.

The most intense pressures—to deliver results while avoiding mistakes—have fallen on the police. A huge operation to find and avert attacks appears to have foiled some potentially threatening plans, and there have been some exemplary initiatives like the Muslim Safety Forum and the National Community Tensions Team. But the imbalance between the number of arrests and the number of convictions has shown the inadequacies of police and particularly MI5 intelligence. According to the home office, 895 people were arrested under the Terrorism Act between September 2001 and September 2005, of whom only 23 were convicted. And failure was brought into even sharper relief by the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes and the recent raid in Forest Gate. There is no formula which tells the police exactly how to cope with uncertain intelligence—but much greater sensitivity is clearly going to be needed.

The government has also responded appropriately, for the most part. Within days of 7/7, very visible discussions had taken place between government and prominent Muslims, and a task force of British Muslims—Working Together to Prevent Extremism—had been gathered and told to report back within six weeks. Exercises of this kind are always problematic and this one was no exception. The civil servants serving the group were stretched, and so far only a few of about 40 recommendations have been adopted by the government. Some came away cynical and disillusioned. Nevertheless, at least there had been some dialogue—symbolically important—and, unlike in the US and many European countries, a reasonable number of Muslim MPs, councillors and peers were available to help shape it.

Perhaps the most surprising shifts have been taking place within Muslim communities. On the one hand, many Muslims are involved in shaping policy and developing their own initiatives. On the other hand, there are signs of continued alienation from mainstream politics. It's also clear that many young Muslims feel just as alienated from organised Islam as they do from the state. Here are the words of a fairly typical young Muslim in one of many discussions in which our organisation, the Young Foundation, has been engaged: "I learnt how to chant the Koran in a language I don't understand. I would go to mosque and it would be in Gujarati and Arabic—neither of which I understood. I went to mosque from the age of four to 12 for thousands of hours but learnt nothing. It's a miracle that I call myself Muslim."

Many young Muslims want to respond to the perceived attacks on Islam by expressing their Muslim identity more assertively. Yet many are critical of the local mosques, which are often seen as wholly out of touch with their aspirations for careers and prosperity and their everyday experiences and frustrations.

These complex shifts will take a long time to play themselves out; they are a story of integration as well as alienation and resentment. In the meantime, the government's problem is that however much it acts on jobs and schools, the main causes of resentment are not domestic but foreign.

So 7/7 does not now look like a turning point. Britain has not responded by declaring a "war on terror" or a "clash of civilisations" or treated Muslims, as some European countries have, with rhetoric about "enemies within." But the risks remain high—policymakers can all too easily conflate counterterrorism with community relations, and the sheer bluntness of so much policing means that many feel guilty until proven innocent. We are now in territory in which small mistakes can have huge consequences, and where there is no shortage of local politicians—from the BNP to Respect—and activists ready to seek advantage by amplifying tensions when they occur.