The Power inquiry—the recent Joseph Rowntree Trust-funded inquiry into the failings of British democracy—suggests that parliament is toothless and ineffectual. This may resonate with a sceptical electorate, but it is an assumption that is out of date and misleading. And it highlights a flaw at the heart of this potentially important report—the assumption that highlighting public concern about politics and politicians is the same as identifying the real weaknesses in our institutions. By concentrating too much on what the public thinks is wrong, the report draws some wayward conclusions.
This is especially evident in its treatment of parliament, and most apparent in recommendation three: "Limits should be placed on the power of the whips." It is a proposal that is said to command public support. And having spent four years inside government in almost daily argument with the chief whip's office over various aspects of Commons' reform, I have some sympathy with the idea behind this sentiment. But it misses the point.
Second, the report misunderstands the way parliament works. The influence of the whips is less to do with their power than their reach. The fact that so much parliamentary activity is structured along party lines means that MPs rely on the organisational capacity and direction of the whips' office. Finding ways of increasing the scope for non-partisan and cross-party activity in the Commons would be a more creative approach.
One starting point is to reduce the number of whipped votes. The chamber is now much less defined by left-right politics. Yet in the last parliament, the government whipped bills on treatment of the mentally ill, gender recognition, and reproductive cloning. This despite there being little in the content of these measures to identify them as party political.
This is not an argument for abolishing party politics, but for the whips themselves to adopt a more rational approach to avoid unnecessary rebellions. The government's decision to allow a free vote on whether to ban smoking is a good precedent.
Yet it is the select committees that hold most hope of significant change. Enabling MPs to work as cross-party teams away from the party political pantomime of the chamber, the committees offer a more thorough form of scrutiny than anywhere else in parliament. And here there have been important changes in recent years.
The prime minister's appearance before MPs twice a year is the most public change. But committees are also better equipped than ever before. A new scrutiny unit was established in 2002 to support their enquiries, the committees now have their own press office and around 50 new staff have been dedicated to select committees.
The selection of members and chairs remains with the whips of all parties. But the ability to deploy places as a form of patronage has been circumscribed in recent years. Following the government's inept attempt to remove Gwyneth Dunwoody and Donald Anderson from their respective committees in 2001, Labour MPs now have the final say on which names are put forward. The continued presence of tenacious chairs such as Dunwoody and Tony Wright is one indication of this trend. But more significantly, none of the former ministers actively lobbying for committee positions after the 2005 election were nominated by the whips.
It is the dominance of the Commons chamber, and the adversarialism that goes with it, that is our parliament's fundamental weakness. In most other parliamentary democracies, the bulk of the work is done in committees, allowing MPs to get under the skin of government. The plenary session is where the main committee findings and big political issues are discussed. But we still have a parliament based around a permanently sitting plenary session, with select committees performing often unconnected roles.
The key to strengthening Westminster is to create a more committee-based institution. That would need to start with three changes. First, every backbench MP should be on a scrutiny committee. Of the 400-plus backbenchers at Westminster, only 250 or so currently have a role on the scrutiny committees. Second, select committees should be responsible for scrutinising and taking public evidence on legislation, replacing the standing committees whose members are chosen for their ability to sit quietly and vote with their party at the right time. Third, the committees need a dedicated period when the chamber is not sitting, perhaps one day a week, or one whole week each month.
These changes would represent a significant cultural shift in the way parliament operates. Yet it is unlikely they would alter the public image of parliament and MPs. Even in 1944, when the parties were united in the war effort, a Gallup poll found that more than a third of the British public believed MPs were only in it for themselves, a quarter that MPs only cared about the party and just 36 per cent felt they had Britain's interests at heart.
The ultimate objective of democratic change must be to ensure continued public faith in the system by making it more effective and responsive. Public opinion is therefore a critical indicator in the health of democracy, but it can be a poor guide to the reforms that are needed, and even as to what is wrong in the first place.
