All is quiet in Paris again. The strikes which paralysed France in the autumn of 1995 have left little visible impact on political life. Prime Minister Alain Jupp?s still in power-only slightly less unpopular than before.
Much ado about nothing? Not exactly. The strikes have solved none of the structural problems facing France. The country still provides a vivid illustration of Europe's democratic challenge. Can we combine growth and social security with low inflation and low unemployment? Can solutions be found which are acceptable to a still rigid corporatist society, while remaining compatible with the constraints of Maastricht and its aim of achieving monetary union before the year 2000?
If France is more affected by the present socio-economic crisis than most of its European neighbours, it is because the role of its state is more central than anywhere else. The French nurture contradictory feelings towards their state. They criticise its heaviness, its rigidity. But they also want the reassuring presence of its protection. Frenchmen behave vis-?vis their state as adolescents vis-?vis their parents, switching from submission to rebellion. Only a minority really want a minimalist "business friendly" state.
Beyond the crisis of the state there is a crisis of the political elite, most of whose members are graduates of the prestigious but stifling Ecole Nationale d'Administration (Ena)-the famous Enarques.
One of the main weaknesses of the French system-once considered a strength-is its recruitment process. This incestuous system is close to the Chinese mandarin tradition and completely inappropriate to the end of the 20th century. Drawing its talents from three or four grandes ?les, the system guarantees a perfect homogeneity. Students who enter these schools through very exacting exams are "les bons ??ves"; that is, those who work hard and who have a clear rather than an original or creative mind. Personal reflection and independence are not encouraged. How can France change with such a conservative and conformist elite?
The relationship between Enarques and the broader French intelligentsia is mostly distant. Between those who have the political, administrative and economic power, and those who have intellectual power, there is little interaction-even if occasionally some Enarques write books and see their prestige reinforced among their peers by their demonstration of intellectual and stylistic abilities.
The experiment of the first socialist presidency (1981-88) was proof of the rigidity of the French system. The political revolution of the left, coming to power after 23 years in opposition, was not accompanied by a social revolution. "Les grands corps" continued to run France. Dealing with Enarques, you sometimes have the feeling that they own the state-or even that they are the state, rather than being its servants. They form an enlightened and benevolent technocracy far removed from the ordinary people.
From an economic point of view it is far from clear that French technocrats offer the best answers to the challenges of modernity. In private, a German publisher active in France told me of his love for the Enar-ques: "They congratulate themselves when they sell me their publications at a reasonable price. Once I have bought them, I make a big profit from them."
And it seems that the Enarques' bluff is now being called. The French are getting fed up with their elite. They are beginning to criticise it in a manner reminiscent of their ancestors who questioned the role of the nobility at the end of the ancien r?me. If those who embody the state at the highest level are incapable of finding answers to unemployment and social injustice, why should they enjoy their exclusive status and immunity from accountability? In France, the virtual monopoly of the elite schools in the decision-making sphere means that graduates of these schools attain positions of responsibility at a very early age. They lack not only the required maturity and work experience, but also the modesty which only time and the test of government can provide.
Yet many French people remain proud of their distant elite chosen in a meritocratic way through sterile exams. It embodies an enlightened and monarchical vision of France which corresponds with what the French want their country to be. The French were moved by the death of Francais Mitterrand because through him-and in spite of his cynicism-their prosaic small democracy acquired a grandeur.
Beyond the crisis of the French elite there is a deeper social malaise-a lack of hope for the future. In May 1968, the French were bored, the weather was beautiful and the state was rich. In the autumn of 1995, the French were depressed, it was cold, and the state was poor. The young who have not yet entered the work force and the wage earners who worry about the future of their pensions were bound together by a common fear of the future. When Alain Jupp?ut forward his reforms, he did not understand the depth of these fears.
France is in the middle of a transition from a welfare state living beyond its means to a modernised and responsive state learning to live within its means. It still has a long way to go. France's Enarques represent a formidable obstacle on the path to reform.
