Ashraf Ghani: we should name and shame corrupt members of the government
Discuss this article at First Drafts, Prospect's blog
What hope for Afghanistan? Most Afghans feel that their country is sliding in the wrong direction. The outside world is increasingly vocal about the threat of insurgency, the menace of narcotics, and the crisis of governance. Our predicament is captured in our drop—from 117th in 2005 to 176th in 2008—on Transparency International's corruption index, and our rise from 11th to 7th on the failed states index.
But these indices do not reflect the determination both inside and outside the country to do better. The international community's new push—and the calibre of people leading it, from General David Petraeus and Richard Holbrooke to President Obama—is creating a second chance; one with a prospect of success.
We must begin, however, by recognising poor choices made in the immediate past. When the Taliban was overthrown in 2001 Afghans welcomed the international forces, and the US enjoyed overwhelming support. But too few forces came to help keep law and order. When more finally did, in 2006, they were too late to stop the al Qaeda and Taliban insurgency, which also operated with impunity from Pakistan, a problem that only started to be addressed late in 2008.
Resources for Afghan reconstruction have been far too low. The aid that has arrived comes through contractors or UN agencies, creating new bureaucracies, not strong Afghan institutions. Put bluntly, the international community did its institution building on the cheap.
Many western media experts now claim that Afghanistan can't be saved and that history "proves" it is incapable of decent government. But the first eight decades of the 20th century were a period of relative peace and economic development. Millions of tourists passed through, en route to India. Unarmed police constables could get local chiefs to appear before courts of law.
Afghans regard the subsequent years of war as an aberration. They agree with the international community that the country needs a functioning state to deliver law and order, and deny Afghan territory to both al Qaeda and the Taliban.
The way forward now falls to General Petraeus and his colleagues who have until April's Nato summit in Germany to announce a plan for Afghanistan. Petraeus's approach is likely to move beyond the old counter-terrorism strategy and recognise that force can work only when it changes the political equation. Other instruments—diplomacy, development, trade and the creation of functioning institutions—are the key to winning support and defeating the insurgency.
The first step is establishing order. Nato should pick eight of the country's 34 provinces for special attention. Although including all regions of the country, two or three should be in the east and south, the epicentre of the insurgency. The establishment of good governance in these provinces—and, of course, the capital of Kabul—will then be a visible demonstration of what can be achieved.
Next, measures are needed to combat narcotics, because drug money currently feeds both the insurgency and government corruption. Nato—and especially the British in the south—should focus on disrupting the supply of heroin, which hurts traffickers hardest. Top cartel members, and their partners in the government, should be named and prosecuted. Most importantly, a goal should be set to increase the income of rural Afghans from $1 to $4 a day: the economic tipping point where opium loses its competitive edge. A policy of "buy Afghan first" among Nato forces, and secure markets for Afghan agricultural markets in Europe, would help this happen.
Bolstering the Afghan National Army (ANA) is also vital to sustain any improvements this new approach can bring. The army is a relative success story, particularly when contrasted with the $6bn so far wasted on the endemically corrupt police. For the sum spent on deploying one Nato soldier, we can train and deploy 70 Afghan soldiers. A commitment to long-term funding and training for the ANA will help push other Afghan institutions to take more responsibility for law and order.
All of this, of course, needs money. The $20bn spent each month on military operations, if instead used over four years on the development of the younger generation of Afghans, particularly the women, could transform the lives of five generations to come.
As a first step Nato members, as well as the Gulf countries and Japan, should look at ways to provide investment risk guarantees, while helping Afghanistan to acquire the institutions of a functioning market. OPIC, the US private sector support agency, has shown the way forward— providing over $1bn in loan guarantees. (As of July 2008, only $18,000 had been recalled.) With more help, the ability of Afghan-owned banks to take in public deposits suggests the potential for building bond markets in cities, which could finance further reconstruction.
Meanwhile, the success of the Afghan telecoms sector is encouraging. The number of mobile phones in the country has risen from only 100 in July 2002 to over 7.5m in February 2009. The telecom sector is now Afghanistan's single largest taxpayer. Beyond telecoms, our mineral wealth offers a real alternative to today's drug-based economy, while taking advantage of our water resources to generate power could turn Afghanistan into an exporter of energy too.
Building institutions, however, is worthless in the long term without investment in human capital too. Having neglected to upgrade a single university to even regional standards, the international community is now forced to deploy hundreds of foreign civilians and thousands of military officers for tasks that Afghans should be easily able to perform.
But progress requires action on the Afghan side too—especially on corruption. A counter-insurgency strategy will fail if people think the state, and its officials, are simply lining their own pockets.
To begin the process of cleaning up government, a new commission of civil society organisations should look into the sale and lease of state-owned land to influential individuals over the last few years. A second commission, this time of international experts, should examine the imports and sale of sub-standard fuel, an issue of major public concern. In both cases, any guilty parties should be speedily tried.
Taken together, all of these measures—by Nato, the international community and Kabul—can begin to put the country back on track. They will also create a more hopeful atmosphere for the forthcoming elections—now planned for August. This moment really is the second chance for Afghanistan.
Discuss this article at First Drafts, Prospect's blog
Discuss this article at First Drafts, Prospect's blog
What hope for Afghanistan? Most Afghans feel that their country is sliding in the wrong direction. The outside world is increasingly vocal about the threat of insurgency, the menace of narcotics, and the crisis of governance. Our predicament is captured in our drop—from 117th in 2005 to 176th in 2008—on Transparency International's corruption index, and our rise from 11th to 7th on the failed states index.
But these indices do not reflect the determination both inside and outside the country to do better. The international community's new push—and the calibre of people leading it, from General David Petraeus and Richard Holbrooke to President Obama—is creating a second chance; one with a prospect of success.
We must begin, however, by recognising poor choices made in the immediate past. When the Taliban was overthrown in 2001 Afghans welcomed the international forces, and the US enjoyed overwhelming support. But too few forces came to help keep law and order. When more finally did, in 2006, they were too late to stop the al Qaeda and Taliban insurgency, which also operated with impunity from Pakistan, a problem that only started to be addressed late in 2008.
Resources for Afghan reconstruction have been far too low. The aid that has arrived comes through contractors or UN agencies, creating new bureaucracies, not strong Afghan institutions. Put bluntly, the international community did its institution building on the cheap.
Many western media experts now claim that Afghanistan can't be saved and that history "proves" it is incapable of decent government. But the first eight decades of the 20th century were a period of relative peace and economic development. Millions of tourists passed through, en route to India. Unarmed police constables could get local chiefs to appear before courts of law.
Afghans regard the subsequent years of war as an aberration. They agree with the international community that the country needs a functioning state to deliver law and order, and deny Afghan territory to both al Qaeda and the Taliban.
The way forward now falls to General Petraeus and his colleagues who have until April's Nato summit in Germany to announce a plan for Afghanistan. Petraeus's approach is likely to move beyond the old counter-terrorism strategy and recognise that force can work only when it changes the political equation. Other instruments—diplomacy, development, trade and the creation of functioning institutions—are the key to winning support and defeating the insurgency.
The first step is establishing order. Nato should pick eight of the country's 34 provinces for special attention. Although including all regions of the country, two or three should be in the east and south, the epicentre of the insurgency. The establishment of good governance in these provinces—and, of course, the capital of Kabul—will then be a visible demonstration of what can be achieved.
Next, measures are needed to combat narcotics, because drug money currently feeds both the insurgency and government corruption. Nato—and especially the British in the south—should focus on disrupting the supply of heroin, which hurts traffickers hardest. Top cartel members, and their partners in the government, should be named and prosecuted. Most importantly, a goal should be set to increase the income of rural Afghans from $1 to $4 a day: the economic tipping point where opium loses its competitive edge. A policy of "buy Afghan first" among Nato forces, and secure markets for Afghan agricultural markets in Europe, would help this happen.
Bolstering the Afghan National Army (ANA) is also vital to sustain any improvements this new approach can bring. The army is a relative success story, particularly when contrasted with the $6bn so far wasted on the endemically corrupt police. For the sum spent on deploying one Nato soldier, we can train and deploy 70 Afghan soldiers. A commitment to long-term funding and training for the ANA will help push other Afghan institutions to take more responsibility for law and order.
All of this, of course, needs money. The $20bn spent each month on military operations, if instead used over four years on the development of the younger generation of Afghans, particularly the women, could transform the lives of five generations to come.
As a first step Nato members, as well as the Gulf countries and Japan, should look at ways to provide investment risk guarantees, while helping Afghanistan to acquire the institutions of a functioning market. OPIC, the US private sector support agency, has shown the way forward— providing over $1bn in loan guarantees. (As of July 2008, only $18,000 had been recalled.) With more help, the ability of Afghan-owned banks to take in public deposits suggests the potential for building bond markets in cities, which could finance further reconstruction.
Meanwhile, the success of the Afghan telecoms sector is encouraging. The number of mobile phones in the country has risen from only 100 in July 2002 to over 7.5m in February 2009. The telecom sector is now Afghanistan's single largest taxpayer. Beyond telecoms, our mineral wealth offers a real alternative to today's drug-based economy, while taking advantage of our water resources to generate power could turn Afghanistan into an exporter of energy too.
Building institutions, however, is worthless in the long term without investment in human capital too. Having neglected to upgrade a single university to even regional standards, the international community is now forced to deploy hundreds of foreign civilians and thousands of military officers for tasks that Afghans should be easily able to perform.
But progress requires action on the Afghan side too—especially on corruption. A counter-insurgency strategy will fail if people think the state, and its officials, are simply lining their own pockets.
To begin the process of cleaning up government, a new commission of civil society organisations should look into the sale and lease of state-owned land to influential individuals over the last few years. A second commission, this time of international experts, should examine the imports and sale of sub-standard fuel, an issue of major public concern. In both cases, any guilty parties should be speedily tried.
Taken together, all of these measures—by Nato, the international community and Kabul—can begin to put the country back on track. They will also create a more hopeful atmosphere for the forthcoming elections—now planned for August. This moment really is the second chance for Afghanistan.
Discuss this article at First Drafts, Prospect's blog
