In his essay "A liberal Israel lobby" (Prospect, April 2008), Gershom Gorenberg makes a number of false charges about our book The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy.
First, he claims that we "overstated" the lobby's influence. "Perhaps the most striking flaw," he writes, "is that Mearsheimer and Walt accept Aipac's own claims regarding its power and who it represents." Our book contains an abundance of evidence demonstrating the lobby's power, and we did not simply take the word of officials from Aipac (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee). We presented testimony from a wide variety of congressmen, congressional staffers, journalists and former executive branch officials, and we referred to surveys that find Aipac to be among the most powerful lobbies in Washington. We also provided detailed case studies showing how pro-Israel groups have worked to influence US policy towards the middle east. Gorenberg does not offer a single example to show that our accounts were wrong. Nor does he point to a case where we clearly "overstated" the lobby's influence.
Second, Gorenberg maintains that we argue that the Israel lobby "controls the levers of US middle east policy." This is not true. Although we did argue that the lobby has a profound influence on US middle east policy, we explicitly said that it is "not a cabal or conspiracy that 'controls' US foreign policy." We also argued that its influence is neither good for Israel nor the US. Gorenberg must agree with our assessment of the lobby's impact, or he would not want to create a more liberal version.
Third, Gorenberg charges that we defined the lobby "poorly." In fact, we provided a clear definition of the lobby as a "loose coalition of individuals and organisations that actively works to move US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction." Like other interest groups—such as the environmental movement or the anti-tax coalition—the Israel lobby has a number of different elements and employs different strategies to achieve its aims. We emphasised that there is a diversity of views within the lobby, but that its various elements all share the common goal of preserving the "special relationship" between the US and Israel. This means that even groups like Americans for Peace Now oppose making US aid to Israel conditional on ending settlement-building and withdrawing from the West Bank. And we made it clear that hardline elements such as Aipac wield much more influence than more moderate groups like the Israel Policy Forum.
Fourth, Gorenberg says that we were wrong to include the neoconservatives within the lobby, because the neoconservatives are a "wider political stream for whom Israel is just one concern." This makes little sense, because being part of the lobby does not imply that Israel is one's only concern; it merely has to be an important one. We include the neoconservatives in the lobby because virtually all of them are strongly committed to Israel. As neoconservative commentator Max Boot once noted, "Supporting Israel is a key tenet of neoconservatism." Moreover, many neoconservatives are connected to the think tanks, publications and committees that comprise the core of the Israel lobby.
Fifth, Gorenberg echoes the widespread charge that we failed to conduct a sufficient number of interviews with Washington policymakers. This is both wrong and irrelevant. We interviewed plenty of former officials, academics, journalists and congressional staffers, and we used some of their testimony. But not much, mainly because we found that what we learned in interviews was consistent with what we found in the public record, and readers who wanted to look at our sources could access the latter but not the former. Most importantly, those who level this charge have yet to identify a single instance where interviews would have cast credible doubt on our conclusions.
Finally, it is worth noting that although Gorenberg says our book is not "sober and balanced," his policy prescriptions are similar to ours. He supports a two-state solution, as do we. He supports the emergence of a more moderate Israel lobby, as do we. In fact, we argue in the concluding chapter of our book that the best hope for changing US middle east policy would be the emergence of a "new Israel lobby," either by strengthening pro-peace groups like the Israel Policy Forum or by wresting control of groups like Aipac and the Conference of Presidents away from the hardliners. Given the extent of our agreement, it is unfortunate that Gorenberg impugned our book. Prospect readers who want to know what we said should take a look for themselves and make up their own minds.
