Gordon Brown's attempt to erect his "big tent" in the centre of British politics continues. From sipping tea with Margaret Thatcher to taking on Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs as advisers, Brown has worked hard to further his "post-party" politics. Yet the prime minister, and his unhappy opponents, may be forced to take more radical steps to forge cross-party co-operation after the next election. Opinion polls suggest a hung parliament is more likely than at any point in the last 25 years. Long-term electoral trends also point in this direction—the total share of the vote received by Labour and the Conservatives has fallen in every general election since 1992. At the same time, the Liberal Democrats have steadily increased their presence in Westminster, reaching 62 MPs in 2005.
But Westminster remains unprepared for a hung parliament. There is little agreement on the political or institutional implications, and only limited historical precedent. On the other hand, all three parties have acquired experience of coalition and minority government away from Westminster. The experiences of the Scottish parliament and Welsh assembly provide clues as to how politics would change if the next election proved indecisive.
A hung parliament could result in even greater political promiscuity. When circumstances demand, parties find it easy to set aside tribalism. Following the 2007 Welsh election, previously unthinkable coalition options emerged—the "rainbow coalition" of Plaid Cymru, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, or the "red-green alliance" of Labour and Plaid Cymru. The implication for Westminster is that a Lib-Lab coalition is not necessarily the only—or even the most likely—response to a hung parliament.
The electorate's perceptions of the result could be critical to the make-up of the new government. In Wales in 2007, many parties were disinclined to negotiate coalitions with Labour because it was felt that Labour had "lost" the election—despite remaining the largest party. The fact that the legitimate "winner" in Cardiff Bay, unlike in Holyrood, was disputed goes a long way to explaining the prolonged uncertainty that followed polling day. In the aftermath of the next general election, it is entirely possible that Labour will remain the largest party in parliament having secured fewer votes than the Conservatives. In such a scenario, many Liberal Democrats would be loath to prop up a "dying" Labour administration (at least without a very high price, such as full-scale electoral reform for Westminster).
Given this, and the political difficulties of creating a formal coalition agreement in the frantic post-election period, a minority government may prove more likely than a formal coalition. The experience of Wales and Scotland suggests this will not automatically lead to political instability. Both the Labour minority government under Rhodri Morgan in Wales and the SNP minority government in Scotland have been relatively stable and effective. A minority government at Westminster would find life harder than those of Cardiff Bay or Holyrood—the greater range of responsibilities could encourage more partisan discord. The more fragmented party systems of Scotland and Wales, where nationalist parties play a major role, also provide greater opportunity to forge agreement on an issue-by-issue basis. But national parliaments have managed minority government effectively. In Canada, there have been eight minority governments (and not one coalition) since the war, including the last two.
Nonetheless, coalition or minority government will require a shake-up of the institutional and cultural framework of Westminster politics. In Wales and Scotland, institutional mechanisms have emerged to minimise conflicts between coalition partners. In Scotland, the Liberal Democrats and Labour used expert committees to craft policy recommendations in controversial areas like student tuition fees—providing both parties with the political cover to make the necessary compromises on their manifesto pledges. These institutions were not brought about by legislation, but by political parties who understood that coalition and minority governments would need mechanisms to reduce the political strains. In Germany, which has had continuous coalition government since 1949, policy conflicts are mediated by a raft of inter-party committees.
Westminster parties could establish similar institutions. The barrier to doing so is cultural. A culture that views non-majoritarian government as a short-term aberration is unlikely to introduce the changes needed to make non-majoritarian government a success—a self-fulfilling prophecy. Without a commitment to electoral reform, making hung parliaments more likely, Westminster parties will have no incentive to adapt.
However, there is no inherent reason why Westminster should fear non-majority government. While they may introduce added complexity non-majority governments can be stable and productive, and may pave the way to a more consensual style of politics.
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