Persuasive, pragmatic, ambitious but not a deep thinker, Nicolas Sarkozy has long been one of the world's most fascinating politicians. For years, the candidate promised his country more than mere change; he promised la rupture, and during his first blistering 100 days in power he has delivered it, after a fashion.
Right from the start he shattered the aloof, monarchic French presidential style. Unflattering front-page photographs of him in shorts jogging up the steps of the Elysée Palace disconcerted some. More acceptable, but equally unheard of, was his descent into the crowd with his wife on 14th July, to join the fête populaire. Where his predecessors rarely spoke in public, and only then with studied gravitas, Sarkozy chatters away to the press on every subject—on holiday in America, he called a press conference to tell us he was on holiday.
But the greatest rupture came with his choice of government: parity between the sexes and a senior minister of north African origins. Later he added three secretaries of state from ethnic minorities. More surprisingly, he brought in members of the Socialist opposition—one as foreign minister and five as secretaries of state. The idea of opening up government was not his but came from his centrist rival for president, François Bayrou. During the election campaign, Sarkozy ridiculed the idea: "What can it possibly lead to? Impotence. Democracy is a majority and an opposition." But in office he changed his mind, for although giving jobs to the left provokes grumbling from his own party, it confuses the opposition. Also, by giving ministerial posts to politically isolated or inexperienced people, he concentrates more power for himself.
Breaking with tradition is one thing, but Sarkozy also promised to change France—rapidly. In four weeks, four new laws were on the statute book: reforming university budgets; decreasing tax; imposing minimum sentences on recidivists and creating a minimum public transport service during strikes. All were drafted and passed at great speed, with scant opposition. This produced a welcome exhilaration of forward movement, but it is not yet the kick up the pants some believe the country needs. The higher education reforms, for example, give university heads some autonomy over budgets, with the possibility of bonuses to attract better brains. They also slightly improve the conditions of students, but a proposal to select which students could take a master's degree was thrown out as anti-republican by the students' unions and the National Council for Higher Education. The more fundamental concept of introducing a selection process to get into university was not even broached. By remaining open to anyone passing the baccalauréat, universities will stay overcrowded, with too many students doing dead-end courses. But Sarkozy's priority was to be seen passing laws. Rather than pick a fight, he softened the reform.
The new obligation for employees in public transport to provide a minimum service during strikes sounds more muscular, but is in reality wrapped in vagueness. This highlights one of the central problems facing Sarkozy: how to resolve the contradiction between the unions' feeble representation—8 per cent of the workforce—and their power to topple governments. Challenging the unions head on, as Thatcher did in Britain and the Chirac/Juppé government tried in 1995, is not an option for Sarkozy. The right to strike must not be questioned, but the concept of everybody's right to work must also now be respected.
The danger is that delaying deeper reforms will result in what Milton Friedman called the "tyranny of the status quo"—unless a new government "makes major changes in the first few months after being elected, the tyranny of the status quo will assert itself and prevent further change." Getting bogged down in lengthy negotiations—exactly what the unions want—is Sarkozy's nightmare. But until the unrepresentative power of the unions is dealt with, fundamental labour reforms cannot be tackled. The one recent change to labour law—the contract for new jobs enacted two years ago and hailed by employers as a breakthrough—has been declared invalid by two courts and will probably be repealed. So rather than try to reform the code du travail, Sarkozy's hope is that lowering tax thresholds will attract enterprising businessmen back to France who will in turn create jobs and wealth. But the problem is not only the labour laws; high employers' charges are also dissuasive, and they cannot be lowered while France's social security deficit remains so high.
Parliament is another area many feel needs change. Sarkozy recognises this and has set up a commission to report on possible reforms, but in a speech to the commission said, "I want the president to be able to govern." The message is clear: don't touch my rights! Sarkozy will not be hedged in like the US president, having his projects vetoed by congress. However, he does want the president to address parliament once a year—to him this would be a major reform because it affects the constitutional separation of powers. But it is window-dressing. It is far more urgent to end the system of cumulative electoral mandates, which would oblige parliamentarians to spend more time attending to the business of the nation rather than the interests of their town and region. But accumulating mandates is fiercely defended: roughly 500 of France's 577 députés have at least one other elected office. And that is the problem: no one—trades unionists, students, employees, députés or presidents—wants their acquired rights changed.
Internationally, Sarkozy has made his presence felt, with his revised treaty on Europe, his attacks on the European Central Bank, movement on Darfur and the liberation of Bulgarian nurses from Libya. All were applauded back home as putting Gaullist grandeur back into France.
Sarkozy ends his first 100 days with more support than when he was elected. But it is volatile. Significantly, the reform that threatened the non-replacement of a quarter of the civil servants who retire this year was heavily opposed by 61 per cent in a recent poll. At the moment, his omni-president style goes down well, but his constant interfering in ministerial business, sidelining and humiliating his ministers, as if he alone were competent, will prove counter-productive.
