Mightier than the sword

A negotiated solution to Syria’s devastating civil war seems as distant as ever. Two years after the uprising began, state brutality and bloody polarisation have forged an impossible chasm. So it was a surprise to many that Moaz al-Khatib, head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition, offered in February to engage in talks with the regime. Though not unconditional, the offer broke with the opposition’s longstanding position that there can be no negotiations other than to set the terms for the regime’s ouster.

Given Bashar al-Assad’s butchery—more than 60,000 Syrian are estimated to have died and close to a million have fled to neighbouring countries—the offer of talks was dismissed by some as naive. Even if Assad’s grip on power is weakening, his actions point to a willingness to bring the country to utter ruin rather than negotiate an end to the conflict. “Assad or the country burns,” as his supporters have long proclaimed.

Yet, Khatib’s move—even if doomed to failure given Assad’s intransigence—could actually signal an important watershed in the developing maturity of an opposition long plagued by internal divisions and deepening extremism. Indeed, the proposal may be one of its smartest political initiatives to date, potentially pointing to a more effective strategy for eventually dislodging Assad than that of armed struggle alone.

At face value Khatib’s offer acknowledges that the price of victory will be so high that unpalatable compromises are now needed. While armed rebels are confident of ultimate victory, Assad’s enduring strength and substantial remaining domestic support make a near-term triumph unlikely. Interestingly, despite some internal opposition, Khatib’s initiative garnered wide support among Syrians on the ground, suggesting increasing fatigue with the conflict’s trajectory, particularly as many grow wary of the nature of the armed opposition.

Given, however, that few expect meaningful negotiations from the Assad regime, the more important impact lies elsewhere, namely the initiative’s undermining of the regime’s narrative that it is safeguarding the country from an extremist opposition. Though absurd in the face of the regime’s own responsibility for the descent into conflict, it is a lie that binds Assad to his domestic and international backers. Khatib’s proposal could now mark a first step towards chipping away at this lingering support base.

Moving forward, an opposition willing to tone down its absolutist ambitions and engage in compromise-seeking negotiations will resonate powerfully with those fearful about its intentions and the destructive trajectory of the conflict. For too long, the opposition’s lack of support among a silent middle and the country’s minorities has undermined its national strength. A shift in political approach towards more moderate and therefore inclusive demands could well begin the long but critical road towards winning the confidence of these important communities.

Equally, by calling for dialogue the Khatib initiative corners Assad’s international backers—Russia, most importantly—who have long argued that the conflict can only be solved by Syrian-led talks. An unwillingness by Assad to reciprocate the opposition’s offer may dampen Moscow’s willingness to maintain its hitherto unwavering support for the regime. That Khatib held his first meetings with the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers just days after announcing the initiative shows that it swiftly injected momentum into their deliberations.

Somewhat ironically, by calling Assad and Moscow’s bluff and expressing a willingness to talk, the opposition may also eventually strengthen the case for greater western intervention. A failure by Assad and his international supporters to back genuine negotiations, rather than the imposed settlement that the opposition has long insisted on, leaves little more to be said for the long desired political track and may empower those voices in the west backing more assertive military support.

Needless to say, the fact that the proposal met with some internal resistance, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Syrian National Council (SNC) and a number of armed groups, highlights the opposition’s ongoing vulnerabilities. Yet, the very fact that the proposal still gained popular support suggests some realisation of its political astuteness. If the opposition can develop this strategy in the face of a bloody conflict which has long left political developments trailing in its wake, it could potentially emerge as a far more effective player.